On Monday, September 12, 2016 at 2:14:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Sep 2016, at 20:48, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, September 11, 2016 at 12:02:03 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 10 Sep 2016, at 19:43, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, September 10, 2016 at 1:45:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 09 Sep 2016, at 19:14, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 10:38:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 09 Sep 2016, at 16:08, [email protected] wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 7:56:27 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, >>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the >>>>>>>>>> elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes >>>>>>>>>> necessary for >>>>>>>>>> the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have >>>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>> out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not >>>>>>>>>> good >>>>>>>>>> enough from my pov. AG >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the >>>>>>>>> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far >>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am >>>>>>>>> not sure >>>>>>>>> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some >>>>>>>>> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's >>>>>>>>> measurement >>>>>>>>> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of >>>>>>>>> FLT >>>>>>>>> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when >>>>>>>>> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even >>>>>>>>> know QM >>>>>>>>> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations". >>>>>>>>> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the >>>>>>>>> future can change the past, and physical causility becomes >>>>>>>>> meaningless. >>>>>>>>> With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, >>>>>>>>> but I >>>>>>>>> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past >>>>>>>>> physical >>>>>>>>> action (it does not make sense). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ah, you wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how >>>>>>>>> events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in >>>>>>>>> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in >>>>>>>>> one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to >>>>>>>>> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense >>>>>>>>> of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, >>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>> looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the >>>>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>>> machine). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of >>>>>>>> SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the >>>>>>>> measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this >>>>>>>> transformation >>>>>>>> occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems >>>>>>>> empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system >>>>>>>> result in >>>>>>>> the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's >>>>>>>> existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of >>>>>>>> its >>>>>>>> advocates. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too >>>>>>> seriously. AG* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + >>>>>>>> alive), >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it >>>>>>> does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. * >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Then the SWE is wrong. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the >>>>>>> box, but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the >>>>>>> consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest >>>>>>> known >>>>>>> antic theory of mind (mechanism) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and >>>>>> presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting >>>>>> your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? >>>>>> No unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this). >>>>>> >>>>>> Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead+alive), >>>>>> and when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself with the cat >>>>>> state, and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead (linearity of tensor >>>>>> product). Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a lives a *phenomenological >>>>>> collapse" like if the cat was reduced to "alive", and O-b lives a >>>>>> phenomenological like if the cat was reduced to "dead", but in the 3p >>>>>> picture, no reduction ever occurred. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Sorry, but what you write makes no sense. When you look at the cat, >>>>> presumably after box is opened, the cat is either alive or dead. You may >>>>> be >>>>> entangled with it, but at that point in time there is no superposition of >>>>> alive and dead. AG >>>>> >>>> >>>> I don't see how you can apply the SWE to this problem. It's a function >>>> of space and time and its solutions have nothing to do with alive or dead. >>>> And if you can't do so, your analysis makes no sense. AG >>>> >>>> >>>> We usually judged if an animal is dead or alive by a (rough and macro) >>>> analysis of the position of the atoms of its body. >>>> >>>> If the cat lies down: it is dead. If the cat walks: it is alive. No >>>> need to go beyond the space and time descriptions. >>>> The quality dead and alive are sort of biophysical macro (in the >>>> computer science sense). >>>> >>>> The superposition of the decaying atom contaminates all particles >>>> around and that contagion of superposition propagates to the whole box, >>>> and >>>> beyond if the box leaked or is opened. >>>> The propagation speed is subliminal (interaction-time). >>>> >>>> With Everett theory, which is just Copenhagen theory minus a postulate >>>> (collapse), we get back determinacy, locality, realism (although not at >>>> the >>>> usual mundane level, which I admit can seem shocking). >>>> >>>> My point, or result, is that IF we postulate Mechanism, an assumption >>>> in the cognitive science, or in philosophy of mind, or in psychology, or >>>> in >>>> theology, THEN we get Everett minus, yet again, a postulate: the SWE >>>> itself. It *has to*became explained as providing the unique measure for >>>> the >>>> first person plural emerging view on all computations in elementary >>>> arithmetic, or combinator algebra (etc.). And this works, in the sense >>>> that >>>> the modal, intensional, variant of self-reference available to any >>>> "sufficiently rich" (Löbian, or Gödelian) machine provides a quantum logic >>>> and a quantization on the states accessible by a Universal Dovetailer (the >>>> sigma_1 arithmetical reality, in logician's terms) relatively to itself. >>>> >>>> That provides an utterly clear arithmetic interpretation of a theory >>>> due to a neopythagorean of the first century of the C. era: Moderatus of >>>> Gades, but also of the main Enneads of Plotinus. >>>> >>>> And this 'machine's theology' contains physics, and so is testable. The >>>> conception of matter becomes weird and quite counter-intuitive, and >>>> without >>>> quantum mechanics, I would have judged it highly unplausible. But both the >>>> theology of the universal machine, and the verifiable measurable facts >>>> points toward a Platonist like theology. >>>> >>>> The Enlightenment Period will be transformed when theology, the modest >>>> and humble, and highly skeptical, science, will return at the faculty of >>>> science where it was born. Until then we are still in the middle-age like >>>> we can see by looking around us. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>> >>> *It 's easier just to claim the cat shares the wf of the radioactive >>> source. But you still have the 800+ pound gorilla in the room you can't >>> account for; namely, by your CHOICE to do the cat experiment, you're >>> claiming the creation of another world with another cat and another >>> observer.* >>> >>> >>> Where did I claim something like that? The terms of the branches does >>> not depend on my choice, >>> >> >> *It seems that they do. If you do a cat experiment, you get two branches. >> If you don't, you don't. * >> >> >> Well, there are explanation why our type of brain favors the position >> base, but when you choose to do an experiment, you don't create branches, >> you differentiate on the alternative you are interested in. >> >> >> >> *They don't exist apriori, unless you want to deny free will. They come >> into existence when an experiment is done, or possibly when there's some >> sort of decision tree, such as playing a slot machine at LV. AG* >> >> >> We don't know. We need a coherent quantum theory of gravitation to figure >> out. No problem with free-will, as it is not related to quantum of >> computationalist indeterminacy at all---but that is quite a different topic >> (already discussed here). >> > > *I think we do know. See comment below. AG * > >> and the results of the measurement do not depend on the base chosen. >>> >> >> *It seems that they do. Measurements of energy, momentum or spin for >> example, result in different bases. AG* >> >> >> They correspond to different base, but the numerical result are not >> dependent of the base chosen to describe the wave evolution. This is well >> explained in Everett long paper. >> > > *I don't see how you reach this conclusion. If I measure spin, I surely > get a different numerical result than if I measure energy, AG * > > > > Of course. The point is that if we measure whatever we want, the result > does not depend of the base used. Many are wrong on this when discussing > Everett's theory. > > > > > It is just the supposition terms of the wave (in any base). There are no >>> worlds, only relative states. My choice change only the way the multiverse >>> is locally and relatively to me partitionned. >>> >> >> *These relative states seem to require observers and a measuring >> infrastructure. * >> >> >> No problem. Everett theory is just that it obeys to QM too. >> > > *Please; no appeals to authority. * > > > mentionning a theory is not an argument of authority, it is called > honesty. Nobody claims that this or that theory is true or false. We avoid > "philosophy", or make special thread, which I avoid to prevent confusion. > > > > > > *Do you need observers or not on the other worlds, or branches, or > whatever, and their measuring infrastructures? AG * > > > Everett assume the Universal Wave, but ignores (like most) the consequence > of digital mechanism. > > I assume only elementary arithmetic and computationalism, in the UDA, and > only elementary arithmetic in the actual beginning of the derivation of > physics and of the wave from the interview of the universal machine. > > > > > > > > *You create them by virtue of what you DO, say in an experiment. Or do you >> back off from the apparent requirement of the MWI that all possible >> outcomes are measured somewhere, somehow? * >> >> >> You don't create them at all, no more than you create the moon by looking >> at it. You just localize yourslef relatively to the more probable >> (numerous, weighted) relative branche(s).th >> > > *What if the probability is 50-50 as in a spin experiment? How is the > choice made?. But more important, since I've never done one, will the > alternative histories pre-exist if I decide one day to do such an > experiment? AG* > > > > Have you read the sane04 paper? >
*No. I wouldn't know where to find it, but more important the theory doesn't appeal to me. I could be wrong, but it apparently relies on human memories and seems solipsistic. I think, without appealing to any theory or paper, you could answer the question directly about the preexistence of alternative states or histories. If I do a cat experiment, do I create the alternative states or histories, or are they preexisting? AG * > > > > > > >> >> *Just having a branch evolving is not tantamount to a measurement and >> observation. AG* >> >>> >>> * Calling it a branch or whatever doesn't solve your fatal problem. >>> There's a simpler solution to your problem; instead of conceiving of the >>> collapse as meaning irreducible randomness, * >>> >>> >>> The point is that the randomness becomes only a case of Mechanist first >>> person indeterminacy, which exist even without quantum mechanics. >>> >>> *why not assume it's a continuous process whereby the wf evolves into a >>> delta function centered at the value measured? IOW, just assume there's an >>> as yet unknown, continuous, non linear evolution of the state prior to >>> measurement, which is time reversible. After all, your objection to >>> collapse is its standard interpretation as irreducible randomness. AG* >>> >>> >>> That is a Bohm-De Broglie type of move. It assumes QM false, and leads >>> to many difficulties often discussed here (see Weinberg argument that non >>> linearity leads to the refutation of thermodynamics, GR, >>> >> >> *Do you have a link for this, particularly about his comments on >> thermodynamics? TIA, AG* >> >> >> Google on "Weinberg non linear quantum mechanics". >> >> >> >> >> >>> etc.), including irreducibly-hidden variables/initial-conditions, with >>> non local effects. Anyway, I work with computationalism, and show we have >>> to derive the wave and its equation, so we will see if there is a non >>> linearity in that case, but the results so far go in the direction that the >>> physics is reversible and linear, etc. >>> >>> Let us no do "philosophy" and just be clear on what theory we assume. >>> Once we assume digital mechanism, there is no more choice left (that *is* >>> the point). >>> >> >> *Succinctly, what is digital mechanism? I don't see how arithmetic and >> possibly a computer can reproduce any physical theory. It's real stretch >> IMO. AG* >> >> >> It has too, see my paper already referred, or ask for more. >> >> You are right, a computer cannot emulate the physical reality, nor >> consciousness. >> >> Digital mechanism, alias computationalism, is a very weak hypothesis in >> cognitive science: it is the hypothesis that we could survive with a >> digital artificial brain or body? It is a modern version of >> Descartes-Milinda Mechanism. It generalize and weaken many versions like >> Putnam's functionalism, which assumes the description level is high. >> > > *Are you referring to Peter Putnam who used to teach at Colombia > University in the late 1950's? Do you have a link? AG * > > > PUTNAM H., 1960, Minds and Machines, Dimensions of Mind : A Symposium, > Sidney > Hook (Ed.), New-York University Press, New-York. also in Anderson A. R. > (Ed.),1964. > > ANDERSON A.R. (ed.), 1964, Minds and Machine, Prentice Hall inc. New > Jersey. > (Trad. Française : Pensée et machine, Editions du Champ Vallon, 1983). > > > Bruno > > > > > >> Some sum up it by "no magic", a bit like Dideort defined rationalism by >> Descarte's mechanism. >> >> Then it is a theorem that elementary arithmetic reality (model) realize >> the universal dovetailing, and that both consciusness and matter are >> emergent pattern on a self-referential structure which exist in arithmetic >> (or Turing equivalent) and the math confirms this by showing that the >> (antic) definition of matter when translated in arithmetic gives a quantum >> logic. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's Cat. >>>>>>> AG* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is the measurement problem, and you talk like if the collapse >>>>>>> solves it, but then tell me precisely the range of QM. >>>>>>> I read de Broglie who suggested that entanglement would no more >>>>>>> operate at the distance of an atom diameter. People give criteria for >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> collapse, but the experience refutes them. I share Feynman's idea that >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> collapse is a collective hallucination, and the math shows that if comp >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> true then that hallucination is somehow necessary. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> With computationalism we have to generalize Everett's embedding of >>>>>>> the physicist in the physical reality to the embedding of the >>>>>>> mathematician >>>>>>> in arithmetic (which is actually what Gödel begun). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mechanism explains both the origin of consciousness and the origin >>>>>>> of the appearance of matter, and this in a way enough precise so that >>>>>>> we >>>>>>> can test it, and thanks to QM, mechanism is not (yet) refuted, and is, >>>>>>> I >>>>>>> think, the only theory explaining consciousness, including why it >>>>>>> cannot be >>>>>>> completely explained in any first person convincing way (the so called >>>>>>> hard >>>>>>> problem, which is only the antic mind-body problem after mechanism >>>>>>> solved >>>>>>> the "easy part" (AI)). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I do not defend any theory. You should not been able to guess what I >>>>>>> might believe true or not. Computationalism has an advantage in >>>>>>> philosophy, >>>>>>> which is that it can rely on theoretical computer science which is a >>>>>>> branch >>>>>>> of both mathematical logic and number theory. It is a good lantern to >>>>>>> search the key around, not more. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My main point is that we can study the highly non trivial relation >>>>>>> between machines' belief and diverse notion of truth they can discover >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> guess. They got a theology closer to Plotinus (300 after C., >>>>>>> neoplatonism) >>>>>>> and Moderatus of Gades (neopythagoreanism, 2 centuries before Plotinus) >>>>>>> than the materialist Aristotelians. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I say this being aware that some scientists still take the >>>>>>> Aristotelian metaphysics for granted, but of course science is just >>>>>>> beginning to be able to formulate the problem (which of Plato or >>>>>>> Aristotle >>>>>>> is closer to reality). The discovery of the universal machine/number is >>>>>>> still a very recent event and few get really the Church-Turing idea and >>>>>>> their relation with Gödel's completeness and incompleteness fundamental >>>>>>> results. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I can suggest you some good books if you are interested. But if you >>>>>>> dislike Everett, it might take some work before liking the consequences >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> the digital mechanist hypothesis. The bible is Martin Davis >>>>>>> "Undecidability", and its own introduction to computability and logic >>>>>>> (both >>>>>>> published by Dover) is excellent if you are enough mathematically >>>>>>> minded. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> we know that, before interaction, the physical state is well >>>>>>>> described by the expression O(a + d), with the tensor product noted >>>>>>>> multiplicatively, and that it is equivalent with Oa + Od. So even at >>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>> stage the "O" can be considered being in a superposition state. That >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> what I called the linearity of the tensor product. Now, by the >>>>>>>> linearity of >>>>>>>> the wave evolution we get O-a a + O-b b, that is each branch behaves >>>>>>>> classically (P-i = O with i in its memory. And both 0-a and O-b can >>>>>>>> repeat >>>>>>>> their measurement, and the linearity of the wave evolution implies >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> they will always find the same measurement result. So the MWI explains >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> persistence as much well as classical physics, or QM+collapse (if that >>>>>>>> means something precise). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My point is that at this stage, QM (without collapse) is compatible >>>>>>>> with Mechanism (used implicitly above) only insofar as the persistence >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> explained from a statistics on *all* computations (which exist once >>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>> agree that 2+2=4 independently of you and me). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My technical point is that this work in the sense that we can >>>>>>>> derive quantum logic (and normally physics) from the logical structure >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> the computations inherit from the logic of (machine) self-reference. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> That is elegant because at this stage the "theory of everything" >>>>>>>> needs no less and no more than very elementary axioms (and mechanism >>>>>>>> in the >>>>>>>> meta-background). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The only axiom that I use are the following: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 0 ≠ (x + 1) >>>>>>>> ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y >>>>>>>> x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1) >>>>>>>> x + 0 = x >>>>>>>> x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 >>>>>>>> x * 0 = 0 >>>>>>>> x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Actually I could even just use the two combinators axioms: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kxy = x >>>>>>>> Sxyz = xz(yz) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Such axioms are Turing complete, and you can prove the existence of >>>>>>>> the UD from them (and *in* them if you add some induction axioms, but >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>> prefer to put them in the epistemology of the observers). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The Turing-Church thesis rehabilit the neopythagorean theology, and >>>>>>>> we get physics exactly when we use the antic definition of knowledge >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> matter provided by them (notably by Moderatus of Gades). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On the contrary, if primary matter or if physicalism would be true, >>>>>>>> we remain with the task of explaining what is their role for >>>>>>>> consciousness >>>>>>>> (or just first person experience). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Aristotle idea of naturalism or (weak) materialism (the existence >>>>>>>> of a physical primary reality) has only been a tool for letting the >>>>>>>> mind-body problem sleep a bit, and that has been a very fertile >>>>>>>> simplifying >>>>>>>> hypothesis, but now, with mechanism, and plausibly with only quantum >>>>>>>> mechanics, we get the (predicted by the Platonist) problem of >>>>>>>> justifying >>>>>>>> the relation between first person discourse and third person >>>>>>>> discourse. We >>>>>>>> can't use the simple mind-brain identity theory, because we have an >>>>>>>> infinity of quasi identical brains in arithmetic, and we can't use a >>>>>>>> selection principle based on a substance without damaging the >>>>>>>> mechanist >>>>>>>> hypothesis. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Keep in mind that my origianl goal is to solve the mind-body >>>>>>>> problem, and with mechanism, we have no choice other than justifying >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> appearance of physicalness from a statistic based on the mix of "*all* >>>>>>>> computations + machine self-reference when distributed in those >>>>>>>> computations. It works (till now). Non-mechanism does not work, and it >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> well known that the mind-body problem has been put under the rug since >>>>>>>> Aristotle (except by the Platonists, who were just banned from our >>>>>>>> civilisation 1500 years ago). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In Soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. I don't pretend it is the >>>>>>>> last match. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above >>>>>>>>>>>> my pay grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I >>>>>>>>>>>> can make >>>>>>>>>>>> of them. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> OK. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and >>>>>>>>>>>> played a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone >>>>>>>>>>>> asked me >>>>>>>>>>>> what happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd >>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>> that would be a crazy question. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which >>>>>>>>>>>> counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* >>>>>>>>>>> exist, like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, >>>>>>>>>>> doesn't >>>>>>>>>>> mean they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I >>>>>>>>>>> see no >>>>>>>>>>> necessity for that. AG * >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> You need it to get the interference between the terms of the >>>>>>>>>>> wave. I agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple >>>>>>>>>>> interfering >>>>>>>>>>> histories. The collapse is an addition to avoid that >>>>>>>>>>> multiplication/differentiation consequence. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> But that's the question some physicists ask when they are >>>>>>>>>>>> confronted with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen >>>>>>>>>>>> Interpretation. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different >>>>>>>>>>>> because with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere >>>>>>>>>>>> and thus >>>>>>>>>>>> have some physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially >>>>>>>>>>>> without >>>>>>>>>>>> assuming the collapse of the wave. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene, >>>>>>>>>>> Deutsch, Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of >>>>>>>>>>> collapse, >>>>>>>>>>> believe the MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG* >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ? >>>>>>>>>>> I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution is >>>>>>>>>>> purely linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Accepting non linearity >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the >>>>>>>>>>>> QM wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge: >>>>>>>>>>>> interactions becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This >>>>>>>>>>>> makes >>>>>>>>>>>> wrong special relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a >>>>>>>>>>> linear DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue >>>>>>>>>>> here. >>>>>>>>>>> AG * >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the >>>>>>>>>>> collapse leads to non-linearity. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and >>>>>>>>>>>> that, strictly speaking the SWR is false. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> SWR = ? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG* >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects elements >>>>>>>>>>> which are space-separated. Einstein explained this already at the >>>>>>>>>>> Solvay >>>>>>>>>>> congress. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or >>>>>>>>>>>> between macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in >>>>>>>>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>>>>>> science. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> H*ow can we test our models without the duality of observer >>>>>>>>>>> and observed? You demand the impossible. * >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery. It >>>>>>>>>>> explains well why Everett restores monism in the philosophy of mind >>>>>>>>>>> (but he >>>>>>>>>>> missed this happens directly with Mechanism). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us >>>>>>>>>>> probabilities. It's not a causal theory. AG* >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> W >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. 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