On 20 Apr 2017, at 16:16, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Legalese my ass. If you claim to have a scientific theory you
should be able
to clearly explain it without circularity and do it with AT LEAST
as little
ambiguity as a lawyer can argue his case at the Supreme Court. The
entire
point of Bruno's paper is to explore the relationship between the
first-person experience and the third-person, and yet on page 1 he
already
throws around a word like "you" as if the matter has already been
settled,
even when "you" is about to walk into a "you" duplicating machine.
Bruno is
starting with the very thing he's trying to prove, from page 1 line
1 Bruno
is assuming the "you" duplicating machine can't really duplicate
EVERYTHING
about "you" only some of the things.
My understanding of Bruno's article is that he is proving the
following: IF computationalism is true, THEN physicalism is false.
Furthermore, if computationalism is true then matter supervenes on
mind, and not the other way around.
Computationalism: the hypothesis that mind is a computation;
OK, but up to an ambiguity. I prefer the weaker and more precise
statement that it is the assumption that we can survive with a digital
brain/body emulating our brain/body at some substitution level. I have
found a new to express this which is that consciousness (an 1p notion)
is invariant for *some* recursive permutation (like substitution a
neuron by a million of litlle digital processor with the "right
program").
It is really the belief that the 1p is invariant for some 3p
transformation. I explain, because this will help for a point below.
Physicalism: the hypothesis that everything (including mind)
supervenes on physical matter.
We don't know if computationalism is true, so we can't conclude that
physicalism is false, but I am convinced that Bruno proves that both
cannot be true at the same time. This result seems to annoy certain
people to no end, but has you once said, nature doesn't care about
what you find weird or not.
Ambiguity around personal identity, for the purpose of this proof, is
removed with the device of the diaries. What about this device fails
to satisfy you -- for the purpose of this proof? It might be hard to
answer this question unless you read the entire thing.
Bruno never suggests that, at the moment of duplication, there is
anything that is not copied. If you claim otherwise, can you cite
where he says that?
I will gently help a little bit John here, if you don't mind. Not only
I did claim that, but will claim it again!
I have no worry that you will see what I mean. In fact I can recast a
sum up of dialog with John Clark in the following way:
I say that the first person is not duplicated *from the first person
perspective*. Like Brent and/or Quentin, probably others, saw is that
I am just saying that, very obviously, the first person does not feel
the duplication. The 1-I is not duplicated in the 1-view, it is the
1-1 view, which is actually the main invariant, so that along its
history, the 1 view is the same as the 1-1 views, and 1-1-1 views, etc.
But John Clark will reply that such 1-view is duplicated. He is right,
but that is the 3 view on the 1 views. Yes, the 3 external observer is
computationalist enough to attribute an 1private experience to both
copies. Then John Clark go up to the 3 view again, and I could say,
you are right, but that is the 3-1-1 views, take the 1-1-1 views,
which are the 1-views, and John will go up to the 3-1-1-1 views which
of course are duplicated, forcing me to say that we talk about the 1-
views, seen by the 1-views, seen by the 1-views, etc.
John predicted once that in the movie thought experience (iterated
self-duplications); where you are duplicated 24 times per second (24)
during 1h30 (60 * 90), into as many copies can be sent in front of one
of the 2^(16180 * 10000) possible images on a screen with 16180 *
10000 pixels, which can be black or white each.
That he will see with certainty Ingmar Bergman movie in french "les
fraises sauvages", with chinese subscripts. And then, if after the
experience we ask to one among most John Clarks,(who saw white noise)
that one will say that he knows that his prediction was true, as he
knows (how? BTW) that a John Clark has seen les fraises sauvages. You
will tell him that this is the 3-1 views and that the question was for
the 1-1-1-... view, and explain that the question was asked to the 1p
about the 1p, and John will go up to the 3-1-1, etc.
To say that consciousness is not duplicated from the view of the
conscious experience is just saying that we don't feel the split, and
cannot be assured that a duplication has occured without 3p clues
(like a phone call of the doppelganger, or like with the statistical
interference of wave of possible "states/histories").
If you accept the "Theaetetus definition of knowledge" applied on
provability (which by Gödel's incompleteness behave like a belief,
even in the correct case), that is to define the knowability of p by
the [(believability in p) with p], i.e. [1]p = []p & p, you get the 1-
views and the 1-1-views, by iterating [1], like [1][1][1]p. You get
the 3-1 views with [][1]p. G is really a multimodal logic, where all
the other "views/hypostases" are macro-definition, and mixing them
makes (arithmetical) sense.
Thanks for the help Telmo. I agree with all what you say. I hope this
precision might help you to see that the difference between G and G*
does provide an explanation of the different nature of quanta and
qualia, and that this put some light on the "hard" consciousness
problem.
Bruno
The differences start when the copies are exposed
to different environments, just the same as it happens to you and me
as we go from observer moment to observer moment.
(I am repeating the "unicorn" posts, and know already that this will
go nowhere)
Bruno assumes that there is some mysterious thing called "1-p you"
that
can't be duplicated, the "1-p you" is of course just a euphemism
for "soul".
1-p is the first person perspective of reality. If you don't know what
this is, then you're either a zombie or you're truly crazy.
Forget Bruno. Have you read Plato's "Allegory of the Cave"? I know
that Plato was an ignoramus from the distant past and so on and so
forth, but this is a well-defined though experiment. Does it go wrong
somewhere? Please provide arguments, not ad hominem stuff.
I do admit if one starts with the assumption that the soul exists
then it's
easy to conclude the soul exists, but I can find no reason to doubt
a you
duplicating machine can duplicate everything about you including
your soul,
sorry I meant to say including your 1-p you.
No, one just starts with the assumption that one perceives. The ONLY
thing that I know directly to be true. The least dogmatic statement
you could possibly imagine. As per above, the article is not about
proving that there is a "soul".
I think we made some progress though. My suspicion that you are having
a knee-jerk reaction to something that sounds to you like a religious
idea is more or less confirmed. I don't like religion either, but I
guess there's no point on dwelling on this.
For a proof to be worth anything you need to get more out of it
than you put
in, even I can prove that the Ryman hypothesis is true if you let
me start
with the assumption that the Ryman hypothesis is true, but that is
unlikely
to earn me the Fields Medal.
Man, I wish you won a Nobel Prize or a Fields Medal. Then maybe you
could relax and truly listen to other ideas.
Another 10 minutes wasted.
Telmo.
John K Clark
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