On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 2:04 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 21 Apr 2017, at 12:42, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >>> I will gently help a little bit John here, if you don't mind. Not only I >>> did >>> claim that, but will claim it again! >> >> >> No problem :) >> >>> I have no worry that you will see what I mean. In fact I can recast a sum >>> up >>> of dialog with John Clark in the following way: >>> >>> I say that the first person is not duplicated *from the first person >>> perspective*. Like Brent and/or Quentin, probably others, saw is that I >>> am >>> just saying that, very obviously, the first person does not feel the >>> duplication. The 1-I is not duplicated in the 1-view, it is the 1-1 view, >>> which is actually the main invariant, so that along its history, the 1 >>> view >>> is the same as the 1-1 views, and 1-1-1 views, etc. >>> >>> But John Clark will reply that such 1-view is duplicated. He is right, >>> but >>> that is the 3 view on the 1 views. Yes, the 3 external observer is >>> computationalist enough to attribute an 1private experience to both >>> copies. >>> Then John Clark go up to the 3 view again, and I could say, you are >>> right, >>> but that is the 3-1-1 views, take the 1-1-1 views, which are the 1-views, >>> and John will go up to the 3-1-1-1 views which of course are duplicated, >>> forcing me to say that we talk about the 1-views, seen by the 1-views, >>> seen >>> by the 1-views, etc. >>> >>> John predicted once that in the movie thought experience (iterated >>> self-duplications); where you are duplicated 24 times per second (24) >>> during >>> 1h30 (60 * 90), into as many copies can be sent in front of one of the >>> 2^(16180 * 10000) possible images on a screen with 16180 * 10000 pixels, >>> which can be black or white each. >>> That he will see with certainty Ingmar Bergman movie in french "les >>> fraises >>> sauvages", with chinese subscripts. And then, if after the experience we >>> ask >>> to one among most John Clarks,(who saw white noise) that one will say >>> that >>> he knows that his prediction was true, as he knows (how? BTW) that a John >>> Clark has seen les fraises sauvages. You will tell him that this is the >>> 3-1 >>> views and that the question was for the 1-1-1-... view, and explain that >>> the >>> question was asked to the 1p about the 1p, and John will go up to the >>> 3-1-1, >>> etc. >>> >>> To say that consciousness is not duplicated from the view of the >>> conscious >>> experience is just saying that we don't feel the split, and cannot be >>> assured that a duplication has occured without 3p clues (like a phone >>> call >>> of the doppelganger, or like with the statistical interference of wave of >>> possible "states/histories"). >>> >>> If you accept the "Theaetetus definition of knowledge" applied on >>> provability (which by Gödel's incompleteness behave like a belief, even >>> in >>> the correct case), that is to define the knowability of p by the >>> [(believability in p) with p], i.e. [1]p = []p & p, you get the 1-views >>> and >>> the 1-1-views, by iterating [1], like [1][1][1]p. You get the 3-1 views >>> with >>> [][1]p. G is really a multimodal logic, where all the other >>> "views/hypostases" are macro-definition, and mixing them makes >>> (arithmetical) sense. >> >> >> I'd say we are talking about different things. >> >> John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that >> there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul") >> that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this: >> under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. > > > Even without physicalism. Everything is copied in the 3p views. It is more > like under the assumption that the 1p views do not exist, or that their are > not interesting.
Exactly. When John uses ridicule/jokes, it's always to prevent serious discussion around the first-person view. Eleminativists go to the extreme of denying that 1p views exist (which is the dumbest possible statement I can imagine). > Physicalism can be invoked of course, it is the main tool > to put the 1p/3p problem under the rug, even if all progresses in physics > can be seen as an amendment to this. Galilee, then Einstein, then Everett > ... bring back the "taking into account the perspective of the subject. > Of course in cognitive science or philosophy of mind, we start from > accepting the existence of a subject. > > >> The problem is >> that physicalism leads to a contradiction, and then we can start >> thinking about what you describe above. Do you agree? > > > I agree, up to invoking physicalism. I can imagine arithmeticalists doing > the same error. Of course JC uses physicalism in its background assumption, > and you allude to that fact. What are arithmeticalists? > >> >>> Thanks for the help Telmo. >> >> >> The only help I can provide is to talk like a lawyer -- in the sense >> of, trying to answer in the most succinct way to remove the "attack >> surface" for intentional misunderstandings. I'm not sure this is the >> right thing to do. > > > It can help. I tend to agree with Quentin that John Clark seems insincere. > But I am not sure that not-answering him is a good strategy, especially for > newcomers. I can stop answering when we are in a loop, but not when there is > a new post, since long, coming up with statement like "I have refute this" > when it is not the case. > > > >> I know you're not interested in that, and I can >> understand why. > > > Why? I am interested. Unless you sent me a enormous bill like lawyers do :) :) > I am interested. That's why I thanked you. Clarification are always useful, > even if we can guess it will plausibly not help very much JC, but we must > think about all people reading the posts. Some of my answer to JC are really > for everybody ... except JC. I take the opportunity to make some point > clearer, or to show that some confusion have to arise if we forget the > assumptions and the definitions. Ah, I meant that I have the impression that you always write assuming good-faith on the part of the reader. Playing the lawyer requires modelling the person you are debating with as an adversary, who will explore possible ambiguities on purposes, etc. Perhaps it's better to not think too much like a lawyer in science. I don't know. In any case, you're welcome :) Telmo. > > Bruno > > > > > >> >>> I agree with all what you say. I hope this >>> precision might help you to see that the difference between G and G* does >>> provide an explanation of the different nature of quanta and qualia, and >>> that this put some light on the "hard" consciousness problem. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> The differences start when the copies are exposed >>>> to different environments, just the same as it happens to you and me >>>> as we go from observer moment to observer moment. >>>> >>>> (I am repeating the "unicorn" posts, and know already that this will go >>>> nowhere) >>>> >>>>> Bruno assumes that there is some mysterious thing called "1-p you" that >>>>> can't be duplicated, the "1-p you" is of course just a euphemism for >>>>> "soul". >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> 1-p is the first person perspective of reality. If you don't know what >>>> this is, then you're either a zombie or you're truly crazy. >>>> >>>> Forget Bruno. Have you read Plato's "Allegory of the Cave"? I know >>>> that Plato was an ignoramus from the distant past and so on and so >>>> forth, but this is a well-defined though experiment. Does it go wrong >>>> somewhere? Please provide arguments, not ad hominem stuff. >>>> >>>>> I do admit if one starts with the assumption that the soul exists then >>>>> it's >>>>> easy to conclude the soul exists, but I can find no reason to doubt a >>>>> you >>>>> duplicating machine can duplicate everything about you including your >>>>> soul, >>>>> sorry I meant to say including your 1-p you. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> No, one just starts with the assumption that one perceives. The ONLY >>>> thing that I know directly to be true. The least dogmatic statement >>>> you could possibly imagine. As per above, the article is not about >>>> proving that there is a "soul". >>>> >>>> I think we made some progress though. My suspicion that you are having >>>> a knee-jerk reaction to something that sounds to you like a religious >>>> idea is more or less confirmed. I don't like religion either, but I >>>> guess there's no point on dwelling on this. >>>> >>>>> For a proof to be worth anything you need to get more out of it than >>>>> you >>>>> put >>>>> in, even I can prove that the Ryman hypothesis is true if you let me >>>>> start >>>>> with the assumption that the Ryman hypothesis is true, but that is >>>>> unlikely >>>>> to earn me the Fields Medal. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Man, I wish you won a Nobel Prize or a Fields Medal. Then maybe you >>>> could relax and truly listen to other ideas. >>>> >>>> Another 10 minutes wasted. >>>> >>>> Telmo. >>>> >>>>> John K Clark >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an >>>>> email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an >>>> email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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