> I will gently help a little bit John here, if you don't mind. Not only I did > claim that, but will claim it again!
No problem :) > I have no worry that you will see what I mean. In fact I can recast a sum up > of dialog with John Clark in the following way: > > I say that the first person is not duplicated *from the first person > perspective*. Like Brent and/or Quentin, probably others, saw is that I am > just saying that, very obviously, the first person does not feel the > duplication. The 1-I is not duplicated in the 1-view, it is the 1-1 view, > which is actually the main invariant, so that along its history, the 1 view > is the same as the 1-1 views, and 1-1-1 views, etc. > > But John Clark will reply that such 1-view is duplicated. He is right, but > that is the 3 view on the 1 views. Yes, the 3 external observer is > computationalist enough to attribute an 1private experience to both copies. > Then John Clark go up to the 3 view again, and I could say, you are right, > but that is the 3-1-1 views, take the 1-1-1 views, which are the 1-views, > and John will go up to the 3-1-1-1 views which of course are duplicated, > forcing me to say that we talk about the 1-views, seen by the 1-views, seen > by the 1-views, etc. > > John predicted once that in the movie thought experience (iterated > self-duplications); where you are duplicated 24 times per second (24) during > 1h30 (60 * 90), into as many copies can be sent in front of one of the > 2^(16180 * 10000) possible images on a screen with 16180 * 10000 pixels, > which can be black or white each. > That he will see with certainty Ingmar Bergman movie in french "les fraises > sauvages", with chinese subscripts. And then, if after the experience we ask > to one among most John Clarks,(who saw white noise) that one will say that > he knows that his prediction was true, as he knows (how? BTW) that a John > Clark has seen les fraises sauvages. You will tell him that this is the 3-1 > views and that the question was for the 1-1-1-... view, and explain that the > question was asked to the 1p about the 1p, and John will go up to the 3-1-1, > etc. > > To say that consciousness is not duplicated from the view of the conscious > experience is just saying that we don't feel the split, and cannot be > assured that a duplication has occured without 3p clues (like a phone call > of the doppelganger, or like with the statistical interference of wave of > possible "states/histories"). > > If you accept the "Theaetetus definition of knowledge" applied on > provability (which by Gödel's incompleteness behave like a belief, even in > the correct case), that is to define the knowability of p by the > [(believability in p) with p], i.e. [1]p = []p & p, you get the 1-views and > the 1-1-views, by iterating [1], like [1][1][1]p. You get the 3-1 views with > [][1]p. G is really a multimodal logic, where all the other > "views/hypostases" are macro-definition, and mixing them makes > (arithmetical) sense. I'd say we are talking about different things. John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul") that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this: under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is that physicalism leads to a contradiction, and then we can start thinking about what you describe above. Do you agree? > Thanks for the help Telmo. The only help I can provide is to talk like a lawyer -- in the sense of, trying to answer in the most succinct way to remove the "attack surface" for intentional misunderstandings. I'm not sure this is the right thing to do. I know you're not interested in that, and I can understand why. > I agree with all what you say. I hope this > precision might help you to see that the difference between G and G* does > provide an explanation of the different nature of quanta and qualia, and > that this put some light on the "hard" consciousness problem. > > Bruno > > > > >> The differences start when the copies are exposed >> to different environments, just the same as it happens to you and me >> as we go from observer moment to observer moment. >> >> (I am repeating the "unicorn" posts, and know already that this will go >> nowhere) >> >>> Bruno assumes that there is some mysterious thing called "1-p you" that >>> can't be duplicated, the "1-p you" is of course just a euphemism for >>> "soul". >> >> >> 1-p is the first person perspective of reality. If you don't know what >> this is, then you're either a zombie or you're truly crazy. >> >> Forget Bruno. Have you read Plato's "Allegory of the Cave"? I know >> that Plato was an ignoramus from the distant past and so on and so >> forth, but this is a well-defined though experiment. Does it go wrong >> somewhere? Please provide arguments, not ad hominem stuff. >> >>> I do admit if one starts with the assumption that the soul exists then >>> it's >>> easy to conclude the soul exists, but I can find no reason to doubt a you >>> duplicating machine can duplicate everything about you including your >>> soul, >>> sorry I meant to say including your 1-p you. >> >> >> No, one just starts with the assumption that one perceives. The ONLY >> thing that I know directly to be true. The least dogmatic statement >> you could possibly imagine. As per above, the article is not about >> proving that there is a "soul". >> >> I think we made some progress though. My suspicion that you are having >> a knee-jerk reaction to something that sounds to you like a religious >> idea is more or less confirmed. I don't like religion either, but I >> guess there's no point on dwelling on this. >> >>> For a proof to be worth anything you need to get more out of it than you >>> put >>> in, even I can prove that the Ryman hypothesis is true if you let me >>> start >>> with the assumption that the Ryman hypothesis is true, but that is >>> unlikely >>> to earn me the Fields Medal. >> >> >> Man, I wish you won a Nobel Prize or a Fields Medal. Then maybe you >> could relax and truly listen to other ideas. >> >> Another 10 minutes wasted. >> >> Telmo. >> >>> John K Clark >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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