On 22 Apr 2017, at 16:44, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 2:04 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 21 Apr 2017, at 12:42, Telmo Menezes wrote:
I will gently help a little bit John here, if you don't mind. Not
only I
did
claim that, but will claim it again!
No problem :)
I have no worry that you will see what I mean. In fact I can
recast a sum
up
of dialog with John Clark in the following way:
I say that the first person is not duplicated *from the first
person
perspective*. Like Brent and/or Quentin, probably others, saw is
that I
am
just saying that, very obviously, the first person does not feel
the
duplication. The 1-I is not duplicated in the 1-view, it is the
1-1 view,
which is actually the main invariant, so that along its history,
the 1
view
is the same as the 1-1 views, and 1-1-1 views, etc.
But John Clark will reply that such 1-view is duplicated. He is
right,
but
that is the 3 view on the 1 views. Yes, the 3 external observer is
computationalist enough to attribute an 1private experience to both
copies.
Then John Clark go up to the 3 view again, and I could say, you are
right,
but that is the 3-1-1 views, take the 1-1-1 views, which are the
1-views,
and John will go up to the 3-1-1-1 views which of course are
duplicated,
forcing me to say that we talk about the 1-views, seen by the 1-
views,
seen
by the 1-views, etc.
John predicted once that in the movie thought experience (iterated
self-duplications); where you are duplicated 24 times per second
(24)
during
1h30 (60 * 90), into as many copies can be sent in front of one
of the
2^(16180 * 10000) possible images on a screen with 16180 * 10000
pixels,
which can be black or white each.
That he will see with certainty Ingmar Bergman movie in french "les
fraises
sauvages", with chinese subscripts. And then, if after the
experience we
ask
to one among most John Clarks,(who saw white noise) that one will
say
that
he knows that his prediction was true, as he knows (how? BTW)
that a John
Clark has seen les fraises sauvages. You will tell him that this
is the
3-1
views and that the question was for the 1-1-1-... view, and
explain that
the
question was asked to the 1p about the 1p, and John will go up to
the
3-1-1,
etc.
To say that consciousness is not duplicated from the view of the
conscious
experience is just saying that we don't feel the split, and
cannot be
assured that a duplication has occured without 3p clues (like a
phone
call
of the doppelganger, or like with the statistical interference of
wave of
possible "states/histories").
If you accept the "Theaetetus definition of knowledge" applied on
provability (which by Gödel's incompleteness behave like a
belief, even
in
the correct case), that is to define the knowability of p by the
[(believability in p) with p], i.e. [1]p = []p & p, you get the
1-views
and
the 1-1-views, by iterating [1], like [1][1][1]p. You get the 3-1
views
with
[][1]p. G is really a multimodal logic, where all the other
"views/hypostases" are macro-definition, and mixing them makes
(arithmetical) sense.
I'd say we are talking about different things.
John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that
there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul")
that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this:
under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied.
Even without physicalism. Everything is copied in the 3p views. It
is more
like under the assumption that the 1p views do not exist, or that
their are
not interesting.
Exactly. When John uses ridicule/jokes, it's always to prevent serious
discussion around the first-person view. Eleminativists go to the
extreme of denying that 1p views exist (which is the dumbest possible
statement I can imagine).
The more a materialist is rigorous, the more it has to deny
consciousness. But I agree with you, it makes no sense at all to deny
our own consciousness, and that eliminativism is close to deny the
most important data we can be sure of, like Descartes understood
already.
Physicalism can be invoked of course, it is the main tool
to put the 1p/3p problem under the rug, even if all progresses in
physics
can be seen as an amendment to this. Galilee, then Einstein, then
Everett
... bring back the "taking into account the perspective of the
subject.
Of course in cognitive science or philosophy of mind, we start from
accepting the existence of a subject.
The problem is
that physicalism leads to a contradiction, and then we can start
thinking about what you describe above. Do you agree?
I agree, up to invoking physicalism. I can imagine arithmeticalists
doing
the same error. Of course JC uses physicalism in its background
assumption,
and you allude to that fact.
What are arithmeticalists?
Those who believe that arithmetic, or number theory, is the
fundamental science.
With computationalism, that is *somehow* the case, but only with
computationalism made explicit at the meta-level, and computationalism
itself is more theology than arithmetic. Comp is theologicalist, but
can be restricted to the derivable (in arithmetic) theology of numbers.
Thanks for the help Telmo.
The only help I can provide is to talk like a lawyer -- in the sense
of, trying to answer in the most succinct way to remove the "attack
surface" for intentional misunderstandings. I'm not sure this is the
right thing to do.
It can help. I tend to agree with Quentin that John Clark seems
insincere.
But I am not sure that not-answering him is a good strategy,
especially for
newcomers. I can stop answering when we are in a loop, but not when
there is
a new post, since long, coming up with statement like "I have
refute this"
when it is not the case.
I know you're not interested in that, and I can
understand why.
Why? I am interested. Unless you sent me a enormous bill like
lawyers do :)
:)
I am interested. That's why I thanked you. Clarification are always
useful,
even if we can guess it will plausibly not help very much JC, but
we must
think about all people reading the posts. Some of my answer to JC
are really
for everybody ... except JC. I take the opportunity to make some
point
clearer, or to show that some confusion have to arise if we forget
the
assumptions and the definitions.
Ah, I meant that I have the impression that you always write assuming
good-faith on the part of the reader.
You can't reason against bad faith.
Playing the lawyer requires
modelling the person you are debating with as an adversary, who will
explore possible ambiguities on purposes, etc. Perhaps it's better to
not think too much like a lawyer in science. I don't know.
Not in ideal science, but in everyday science, sometimes you need to
look if the spot on the skin of the mice are real or fake ... Con
exists there, like anywhere.
And in fundamental science, you need to take into account the lasting
brainwashing by authorities, the human easily biased wishful thinking,
the susceptibilities of the boss, etc.
In any case, you're welcome :)
Thanks.
Bruno
Telmo.
Bruno
I agree with all what you say. I hope this
precision might help you to see that the difference between G and
G* does
provide an explanation of the different nature of quanta and
qualia, and
that this put some light on the "hard" consciousness problem.
Bruno
The differences start when the copies are exposed
to different environments, just the same as it happens to you
and me
as we go from observer moment to observer moment.
(I am repeating the "unicorn" posts, and know already that this
will go
nowhere)
Bruno assumes that there is some mysterious thing called "1-p
you" that
can't be duplicated, the "1-p you" is of course just a
euphemism for
"soul".
1-p is the first person perspective of reality. If you don't
know what
this is, then you're either a zombie or you're truly crazy.
Forget Bruno. Have you read Plato's "Allegory of the Cave"? I know
that Plato was an ignoramus from the distant past and so on and so
forth, but this is a well-defined though experiment. Does it go
wrong
somewhere? Please provide arguments, not ad hominem stuff.
I do admit if one starts with the assumption that the soul
exists then
it's
easy to conclude the soul exists, but I can find no reason to
doubt a
you
duplicating machine can duplicate everything about you
including your
soul,
sorry I meant to say including your 1-p you.
No, one just starts with the assumption that one perceives. The
ONLY
thing that I know directly to be true. The least dogmatic
statement
you could possibly imagine. As per above, the article is not about
proving that there is a "soul".
I think we made some progress though. My suspicion that you are
having
a knee-jerk reaction to something that sounds to you like a
religious
idea is more or less confirmed. I don't like religion either,
but I
guess there's no point on dwelling on this.
For a proof to be worth anything you need to get more out of it
than
you
put
in, even I can prove that the Ryman hypothesis is true if you
let me
start
with the assumption that the Ryman hypothesis is true, but that
is
unlikely
to earn me the Fields Medal.
Man, I wish you won a Nobel Prize or a Fields Medal. Then maybe
you
could relax and truly listen to other ideas.
Another 10 minutes wasted.
Telmo.
John K Clark
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