On 4/24/2017 3:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Apr 2017, at 08:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist,
like chess and insurance and computations. The question was whether
the assumption that computations can instantiate a mind, i.e. the
possibility of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction of
something. The "something" having to do with physics, is part of
what I would like eulicidated. Bruno says it reverses the
relationship of physics and psychology...but that's more of a polemic
slogan than entailment of a contradiction. He also says it entails
the non-existence of "primary matter"....but what is "primary
matter". I've studied physics for many years and primary matter was
never mentioned.
Indeed. It is not a physical notion. It is a metaphysical or
theological notion, introduced mainly by Aristotle. Physics do not
rely on it. Only physicalism relies on it. Sometimes I define "primary
matter" by what is supposed to exist when we adopt physicalism.
But it is said to be logically contrary to the assumption that
computations can instantiate a mind...whatever that means.
It is, epistemologically contradictory. If you grasp that all
computations are instantiated in the arithmetical reality, to predict
the future, you need to know (in principle) all computations going
through your current state,
First, I know what a logical contradiction is, e.g. (x and not-x), and I
know what a nomological contradiction is, e.g. signaling faster than
light, but I don't know what an epistemological contradiction is ( the
same evidence supports x and not-x?).
And what is one's "current state". That seems to invoke an concept of
time which is antithetical to arithmetical realism. And I certainly
don't know my current state and if I did I still wouldn't know how to
compute my next state. So I don't know what it has to do with
epistemology.
Brent
and making one of them, or a subset of them, more real by invoking a
metaphysial assumption, is similar to invoking god to avoid solving a
problem in math. If the measure on all computations (all dreams
actually, that is computation + self-reference) does not fit what we
observe then we can say that we have reason to believe in some
God-Matter, or God-special-oracles, or God-malevolent simulator.
I have to go, best,
bruno
Brent
On 4/23/2017 3:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract
mathematical notion.
Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett"
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
a écrit :
But that does not prove that the computation does not run
on a physical computer. I take JC's point to be that your
assumption of the primacy of the abstract computation is
unprovable. We at least have experience of physical
computers, and not of non-physical computers. (Whatever you
say to the contrary,
You're making an ontological commitment and closing any
discussion on it...
All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that
you all claim exists between computationalism and physicalism --
a contradiction that does not simply depend on a definition of
computationalism that explicitly states "physicalism is false".
In other words, where is the contradiction? A demonstration
that does not just beg the question.
Bruce
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