On 25 Apr 2017, at 04:56, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/24/2017 3:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Apr 2017, at 08:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist,
like chess and insurance and computations. The question was
whether the assumption that computations can instantiate a mind,
i.e. the possibility of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction
of something. The "something" having to do with physics, is part
of what I would like eulicidated. Bruno says it reverses the
relationship of physics and psychology...but that's more of a
polemic slogan than entailment of a contradiction. He also says
it entails the non-existence of "primary matter"....but what is
"primary matter". I've studied physics for many years and primary
matter was never mentioned.
Indeed. It is not a physical notion. It is a metaphysical or
theological notion, introduced mainly by Aristotle. Physics do not
rely on it. Only physicalism relies on it. Sometimes I define
"primary matter" by what is supposed to exist when we adopt
physicalism.
But it is said to be logically contrary to the assumption that
computations can instantiate a mind...whatever that means.
It is, epistemologically contradictory. If you grasp that all
computations are instantiated in the arithmetical reality, to
predict the future, you need to know (in principle) all
computations going through your current state,
First, I know what a logical contradiction is, e.g. (x and not-x),
and I know what a nomological contradiction is, e.g. signaling
faster than light, but I don't know what an epistemological
contradiction is ( the same evidence supports x and not-x?).
Logical contradiction: p & ~p
Epistemological, or doxastic, or more generally modal contradiction
[]p & []~p. (Incompleteness: [](p & ~p) does not entail f, so a modal
contradiction does not necessarily entails a contradiction. In the cul-
de-sac world we have modal contradiction ([]f) but no contradiction.
And what is one's "current state".
It is an indexical. Here and now, like when we are asked to make some
prediction.
That seems to invoke an concept of time which is antithetical to
arithmetical realism.
Your current state is S, say. But it appears infinitely often in
computations done in arithmetic, or done in the block-universe of
general relativity if you want. Time can be a parametrized view on the
indexicals, realize in arithmetic, but also in any block-universe, or
parmenidian ONE.
And I certainly don't know my current state and if I did I still
wouldn't know how to compute my next state. So I don't know what it
has to do with epistemology.
The epistemological contradiction comes from the fact that with
mechanism + weak materialism, you get a material universe that cannot
have any rôle related to your consciousness, and thus not related in
any way with any experience or experiments you can have or do. It is
not a contradiction, it is like with the invisible horses. It is
adding an invisible primary universe having no rôle at all, except
creating a mind-body problem, or blocking its mechanist possible
explanation.
bruno
Brent
and making one of them, or a subset of them, more real by invoking
a metaphysial assumption, is similar to invoking god to avoid
solving a problem in math. If the measure on all computations (all
dreams actually, that is computation + self-reference) does not fit
what we observe then we can say that we have reason to believe in
some God-Matter, or God-special-oracles, or God-malevolent simulator.
I have to go, best,
bruno
Brent
On 4/23/2017 3:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract
mathematical notion.
Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]
> a écrit :
On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett"
<[email protected]> a écrit :
But that does not prove that the computation does not run on a
physical computer. I take JC's point to be that your assumption
of the primacy of the abstract computation is unprovable. We at
least have experience of physical computers, and not of non-
physical computers. (Whatever you say to the contrary,
You're making an ontological commitment and closing any
discussion on it...
All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that
you all claim exists between computationalism and physicalism --
a contradiction that does not simply depend on a definition of
computationalism that explicitly states "physicalism is false".
In other words, where is the contradiction? A demonstration that
does not just beg the question.
Bruce
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