I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist, like
chess and insurance and computations. The question was whether the
assumption that computations can instantiate a mind, i.e. the
possibility of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction of something.
The "something" having to do with physics, is part of what I would like
eulicidated. Bruno says it reverses the relationship of physics and
psychology...but that's more of a polemic slogan than entailment of a
contradiction. He also says it entails the non-existence of "primary
matter"....but what is "primary matter". I've studied physics for many
years and primary matter was never mentioned. But it is said to be
logically contrary to the assumption that computations can instantiate a
mind...whatever that means.
Brent
On 4/23/2017 3:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract
mathematical notion.
Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
But that does not prove that the computation does not run on
a physical computer. I take JC's point to be that your
assumption of the primacy of the abstract computation is
unprovable. We at least have experience of physical
computers, and not of non-physical computers. (Whatever you
say to the contrary,
You're making an ontological commitment and closing any
discussion on it...
All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that
you all claim exists between computationalism and physicalism -- a
contradiction that does not simply depend on a definition of
computationalism that explicitly states "physicalism is false". In
other words, where is the contradiction? A demonstration that
does not just beg the question.
Bruce
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