I think the concept of computationalism in a physicalist frame is meaningless, or only can be viewed as a cute story about the real thing... computation is not a physical notion, so either the mind is a computation, in which case physicalism is in that setting is not the ontology, or the mind is a physical thing, which could be approximated by the notion of computation... but this is not computationalism...
Quentin 2017-04-24 8:31 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <[email protected]>: > I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist, like > chess and insurance and computations. The question was whether the > assumption that computations can instantiate a mind, i.e. the possibility > of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction of something. The > "something" having to do with physics, is part of what I would like > eulicidated. Bruno says it reverses the relationship of physics and > psychology...but that's more of a polemic slogan than entailment of a > contradiction. He also says it entails the non-existence of "primary > matter"....but what is "primary matter". I've studied physics for many > years and primary matter was never mentioned. But it is said to be > logically contrary to the assumption that computations can instantiate a > mind...whatever that means. > > Brent > > On 4/23/2017 3:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a computation > with physics first, without relying on abstract mathematical notion. > > Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]> a > écrit : > >> On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]> a >> écrit : >> >> But that does not prove that the computation does not run on a physical >> computer. I take JC's point to be that your assumption of the primacy of >> the abstract computation is unprovable. We at least have experience of >> physical computers, and not of non-physical computers. (Whatever you say to >> the contrary, >> >> >> You're making an ontological commitment and closing any discussion on >> it... >> >> >> All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that you all >> claim exists between computationalism and physicalism -- a contradiction >> that does not simply depend on a definition of computationalism that >> explicitly states "physicalism is false". In other words, where is the >> contradiction? A demonstration that does not just beg the question. >> >> Bruce >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
