I think the concept of computationalism in a physicalist frame is meaningless, or only can be viewed as a cute story about the real thing... computation is not a physical notion, so either the mind is a computation, in which case physicalism is in that setting is not the ontology, or the mind is a physical thing, which could be approximated by the notion of computation... but this is not computationalism...
Quentin 2017-04-24 8:31 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>: > I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist, like > chess and insurance and computations. The question was whether the > assumption that computations can instantiate a mind, i.e. the possibility > of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction of something. The > "something" having to do with physics, is part of what I would like > eulicidated. Bruno says it reverses the relationship of physics and > psychology...but that's more of a polemic slogan than entailment of a > contradiction. He also says it entails the non-existence of "primary > matter"....but what is "primary matter". I've studied physics for many > years and primary matter was never mentioned. But it is said to be > logically contrary to the assumption that computations can instantiate a > mind...whatever that means. > > Brent > > On 4/23/2017 3:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a computation > with physics first, without relying on abstract mathematical notion. > > Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a > écrit : > >> On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a >> écrit : >> >> But that does not prove that the computation does not run on a physical >> computer. I take JC's point to be that your assumption of the primacy of >> the abstract computation is unprovable. We at least have experience of >> physical computers, and not of non-physical computers. (Whatever you say to >> the contrary, >> >> >> You're making an ontological commitment and closing any discussion on >> it... >> >> >> All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that you all >> claim exists between computationalism and physicalism -- a contradiction >> that does not simply depend on a definition of computationalism that >> explicitly states "physicalism is false". In other words, where is the >> contradiction? A demonstration that does not just beg the question. >> >> Bruce >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
