On 24 Apr 2017, at 08:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist,
like chess and insurance and computations. The question was whether
the assumption that computations can instantiate a mind, i.e. the
possibility of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction of
something. The "something" having to do with physics, is part of
what I would like eulicidated. Bruno says it reverses the
relationship of physics and psychology...but that's more of a
polemic slogan than entailment of a contradiction. He also says it
entails the non-existence of "primary matter"....but what is
"primary matter". I've studied physics for many years and
primary matter was never mentioned.
Indeed. It is not a physical notion. It is a metaphysical or
theological notion, introduced mainly by Aristotle. Physics do not
rely on it. Only physicalism relies on it. Sometimes I define "primary
matter" by what is supposed to exist when we adopt physicalism.
But it is said to be logically contrary to the assumption that
computations can instantiate a mind...whatever that means.
It is, epistemologically contradictory. If you grasp that all
computations are instantiated in the arithmetical reality, to predict
the future, you need to know (in principle) all computations going
through your current state, and making one of them, or a subset of
them, more real by invoking a metaphysial assumption, is similar to
invoking god to avoid solving a problem in math. If the measure on all
computations (all dreams actually, that is computation + self-
reference) does not fit what we observe then we can say that we have
reason to believe in some God-Matter, or God-special-oracles, or God-
malevolent simulator.
I have to go, best,
bruno
Brent
On 4/23/2017 3:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract
mathematical notion.
Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett"
<[email protected]> a écrit :
On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]>
a écrit :
But that does not prove that the computation does not run on a
physical computer. I take JC's point to be that your assumption of
the primacy of the abstract computation is unprovable. We at least
have experience of physical computers, and not of non-physical
computers. (Whatever you say to the contrary,
You're making an ontological commitment and closing any discussion
on it...
All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that
you all claim exists between computationalism and physicalism -- a
contradiction that does not simply depend on a definition of
computationalism that explicitly states "physicalism is false". In
other words, where is the contradiction? A demonstration that does
not just beg the question.
Bruce
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