On 25 Apr 2017, at 19:21, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 5:48 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> I use "I" because there is no ambiguity,
Then prove it, replace "I" with "Bruno Marchal" and see how far
"you" get in a world that contains "I" duplicating machines.
Bruno Marchal (BM) decided to take some Holiday in Helsinki, where BM
was proposed a Washington-Moscow duplication experience.
Someone asked in Helsinki to BM to make a prediction about where BM
would *feel* to be after the duplication, assuming computationalism,
and the step 3 protocol (reading+annihilation in Helsinki,
reconstitution of BM in Washington and Moscow).
BM could thus infer in Helsinki that the functioning body of BM will
appear in both cities, and that, obviously, each of those BM would not
*feel* to be in the two cities at once, but only feel to be in one
city: the unique one behind the door after reconstitution in the two
cities, before the opening, for each of those copies of BM.
So BM excluded the answer that the BMs reconstituted would *feel* to
be in both cities. BM could also imagine in Helsinki that one BM will
feel to be in Washington, and one BM will feel to be in Moscow, and
no BM would feel anything else, as we supposed the protocol properly
implemented. BM could predict in advance that the prediction "BM will
feel to be in one city" get a probability 1. And so he wrote it in his
diary "BM will feel to be in one city". Obviously, from what has been
said, the city could only be Washington, or only be Moscow, given BM
knows that it cannot be Vienna, nor Sidney, ...
So BM tried, by thought, to imagine if the prediction "BM will be in
Washington" could be correct, but understood immediately that this
would be directly refuted by the BM that will be reconstituted in
Moscow. Similarly, the prediction "BM will be in Moscow" will, with
certainty, be refuted by the BM in Washington.
Having derived this from computationalism+protocol, BM, when still in
Helsinki, rejected them both. So, to recapitulate, in Helsinki, BM
accepted, as correct certain prediction:
BM will feel to be in one city
and rejected the following certain prediction
BM will feel to be in Washington and feel to be in Moscow (*) (here
it is important to remind the precise question asked)
BM will feel to be in Washington
BM will feel to be in Moscow
Yet, given the protocol, BM could easily derive from digital mechanism
that the prediction "BM will feel to be in Washington or feel to be in
Moscow" will be assessed by the two copies, and then, unable to find
any better prediction verifiable by the two copies, BM, still in
Helsinki concluded that "BM will feel to be in Washington or feel to
be in Moscow" was the best certain prediction possible for the
specific feeling that BM in Helsinki will feel after the duplication.
In Helsinki, BM realized that the duplication makes impossible to
predict in advance the specific personal feeling of any of the copies
of BM in Helsinki.
And, as computationalism makes those two copies into dignified member
of the BM survivor group, BM in Helsinki concluded in Helsinki, before
the copy was done, that BM in Helsinki is indeterminate on the
specific location where BM in Helsinki can ever feel to be when the
duplication will be executed.
(It was easier to redo the reasoning than to find the post on the
group archive!). I guess it could be made shorter, also. I also guess
that your reply will dismiss the (*) above.
Bruno
> given the definition given, and it is useful to remind that
the experience is on the future 1p.
And there we go again with "the future 1p"; it hasn't
happened yet and nobody knows for sure what it will be like, so what
does the future have to do with the sense of self experienced
right now?
> I just refuse to use the proper noun, because it introduces
the slope toward the 3_1 view,
Bruno Marchal uses the personal pronoun and refuses to
use the proper noun it refers to, even though Bruno claims it is
unambiguous so would be easy to do so, because assuming the very
thing the proof is supposed to prove is the only way Bruno
Marchal can get the "proof" to work. And
casually slipping in a personal pronoun in a "proof"
about unique personal identity in a world that contains personal
identity duplicating machines is a good way to sneak the
conclusion of the "proof" into the very beginning of the "proof".
> I just refuse to help you in building your rhetorical trick.
There is another name for "rhetorical tricks", logic.
>> John Clark does not know what "THE 1p experience"
means if there are 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 John
Clarks. As said before, the setup is clear but the question is
not.
> It is all experiences obtained,
If all experience it then the term "THE 1p
experience" can differentiate nothing and thus conveys ZERO
information and is a utter waste of time to talk about.
>> Then you will have no difficulty in proving that
simply by retiring the personal pronoun "I" and always using the
proper noun instead in all future thought experiments!
> I did,
You must have done that in that mythical unicorn post I've been
hearing about for nearly a decade but have somehow been unable to
find, the post that demolished my position completely.
> and will not repeat.
I am not one bit surprised. And so that post joins UFOs,
ESP, Bigfoot, and the Lost Dutchman's Gold Mine.
> we use only a third person notion of "I"
Nobody knows what a third person notion of "I" means, and
that includes Bruno Marchal.
> (the content of the diary taken in the duplication box), and
so anyone can verify the reasoning just by 3p logical derivation.
To be useful, after the duplication either the Washington man
alone or the Moscow man alone would have had to be the author of the
diary. if you say they both wrote it (or if you say neither wrote
it) then the book can't differentiate between the two and it
contains no information about either of them. Thus there is no point
in the damn diary in the thought experiment.
John K Clark
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