On 28 Apr 2017, at 20:55, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Apr 28, 2017 at 10:19 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> OK that is the answer, but what is the question? Who is
it we're talking about, who will or will not see Moscow and/or
Washington?
> Why do you ask? That was in the previous post.
No it was not, in fact the question is never made clear in any of
your posts, not when people duplicating machines are thrown into the
mix.
It would help if you could make specific quote and comment. I have no
clue at all what is not clear for you.
> The question was "where do BM predicts BM will feel
personally to be after the experience",
OK but tell me Bruno, how many correct answers to the question
"which city will BM feel feel to be personally in after
the duplication?" Do you think there is only one correct answer or
are there two? I say two and I can subpoena W-BM and M-BM as
witnesses to bolster my case. If you say only one then which
city did it turn out to be, Moscow or Washington?
The whole point is that for both copies, they can be only one answern
given that the question is on the future 1p views, which exists and
are well defined given that we assume computationalism and the protocol.
You are again describing the 3-1 view, and dismissing both 1-view of
the copies.
I agree that if back in Helsinki if the question was "how many
cities will W-BM feel to be in after the duplication?" then the
correct answer would have been one, but that wasn't the question.
> BM can only predict with certainty that BM will see only one
city.
Not that prediction has anything to do with a sense of self or
personal identity but if BM were smart BM could predict that W-BM
will see only one city and it will be Washington and M-BM will see
only one city and it will be Moscow and BM will see both cities.
But not at once, and the question is not about the cities that BM will
see, but on the only cities that both BM tried to predict, and both
can understand in advance that it can only be W or M, but not both.
It is really hard for to guess if you are sincere and dumb, or
insincere. I think you are really the only one who has a problem with
this.
> The best prediction BM can do is "only once city,
W-BM says I am Bruno Marchal and I see Washington. M-BM says I
am Bruno Marchal and I see Moscow.
More precisely: W-BM says I am Bruno Marchal and I see only Washington
and I could not have predicted this. Indeed if I would have predicted
this my fellow in Moscow would refute it.
M-BM says I am Bruno Marchal and I see only Moscow and I could not
have predicted this. Indeed if I would have predicted this my fellow
in Washington would refute it.
A good thing that I predicted "W or M", which makes us both right, and
was the most specific prediction possible.
So if the question is "how many cities will BM see how can the
correct answer be "only one"?
Because the question is on the future personal experience of BM, and
In Helsinki, BM knows that wherever BM will feel to survive, he will
feel seeing only one city.
And if it was only one which one did it turn out to be, was it
Washington or Moscow?
Obviously it was W for the W-BM, and M for the M-BM, but the point is
that when BM was unique in Helsinki, he could not know if he would
feel to become the W-BM, or the M-BM in advance. the duplication offer
one bit of information to *both* copies. It is not strnage, it comes
from the fact that computationalism makes people duplicable, and
expains wht the duplicated people does not feel the split, and break
the symmetries from their first person views.
> but I am currently unable to predict which one".
Currently? As you've set it up nobody can say which one and only
one city turned out to be correct even AFTER the experiment is
over.
What? Both are locally correct. The prediction is asked in Helsinki,
and verified in both city. W, M and W&m are refuted, WvM is verified.
Subjectvely, it is equvalent (in this precise protocol) to a coin
throwing.
And if the terms are so muddled in a experiment that after
completion nobody can tell if a theory made a correct prediction or
not then it's not a experiment, it's not even a thought experiment,
it's just a lot of sound and fury signifying nothing.
> And, that is confirmed by both BM after the experience is
done.
Then which ONE City was it?
W for the W-guy and M for the M-guy, and that is why the Helsinki guy
was clever when predicting "W v M", and nothing more precise.
You should be able to answer that question with one word and that
one word is Moscow OR that one word is Washington. And if you can't
do that then it's not a thought experiment or a experiment of any
kind.
?
>>> computationalism makes impossible that any BM will
feel to see both cities,
>> That's not true either. After the duplication the two
Bruno Marchals enjoyed both Washington and Moscow for 24 hours,
> Yes, but not at once,
At exactly the same time.
But not at once in any obtained 1p view. No diaries will contained "W
and M". The question is on the 1-view(s), and it looks you just try to
forget this.
You like diaries so I'll give both Brunos diaries and watches
synchronized by atomic clocks so they can both write about what they
saw and the exact time they saw it.
>> after that the process was reversed and they merged back
together again into one person, but all the memories of both were
retained. So today you (that personal pronoun can be safely used
because there is only one Bruno marchal again) have vivid memories
of both Moscow and Washington at exactly the same time. So 2 days
ago back in Helsinki the correct answer to the question "what city
will you see?" would be "both".
> That does not follow.
Why not? The remerged Bruno Marchal vividly remembers
writing in his diary "It is 17:23:33 Coordinated Universal Time
on 4-28-2017 and I am looking at the White House". And
the remerged Bruno Marchal also vividly remembers writing
in his diary "It is 17:23:33 Coordinated Universal Time on
4-28-2017 and I am looking at the Kremlin". And I have access to
both diaries so I know Bruno's memory is not faulty.
Yes, and he remembers vividly getting locally, at that moment, one bit
of information, and living an asymmetrical situation. Making it
symmetrical later does not change thise vivid memories.
> he has to perceive his double trips are having been non
simultaneous at the time they were lived.
Why does he have to? If they were non simultaneous then
which city came first, Moscow or Washington? And everything in the
setup is symmetrical so what is the source of this time asymmetry?
It is not a time asymmetry, it is first person asymmetry. A first
person asymmetrical experience, lived immediately by both copies.
> If the experience is repeated, BM will still be indeterminate
about the future immediate outcome.
BM is equally clueless about the past outcome. The only thing that
is indeterminate is the muddled nature of the question.
> > I don't even know if BM can experience anything at all,
maybe BM is a zombie. But I do know both W-JKC and M-JKC would
say the correct answer back in Helsinki would have been JKC will see
both cities.
> Correct for the prediction of the 1-view from the 3p view,
If you put a gun to my head I couldn't say what "1-view from the
3p view" means, and Google doesn't know either.
It is when a third party attribute a mind to other people than one
self. After the WM duplication, the 1-views are "I am only in W" and
"I am only in M", but the 3-1 view is that the guy lives
simultaneously the two views. They remain asymmetrical though, and the
3-1 view is definitely not what we were asked to predict in Helsinki.
> but incorrect, as both the W-JKC and M-JKC have to admit they
got a bit of information,
Not if the bit of information W-JKC got was M-JKC saw Moscow, then
W-JKC would say that the correct answer back in Helsinki would have
been "JKC will see both cities".
When talking on all the 1-views, but that is the third person view of
the experience, not the 1-view personally lived by all copies, which
are asymmetrical, even if we use robots.
> So here, you just ignore again the question asked.
Ask me a clear question and I'll either give you a clear answer or
say I don't know. But not every sequence of words is a question,
not even if it has a question mark at the end.
> the W-BM, and the M-BM understand that BM could not have
predicted in Helsinki the current W specific result that the W-BM is
living now,
What are you talking about? In Helsinki it would have been
very easy for BM to predict that W-BM will see W,
But BM is not asked about what the W-BM will see, but about what the H-
BM will see. He still don't know if if we feel to be the W-guy or the
M-guy. All he can be sure about, is that he will see only once city,
and he cannot which one. It is subjectively, in the first person view,
indeterminate.
after all the Helsinki man doesn't become W-BM and then see W,
instead he sees W and that experience turns him into W-BM.
Exactly, that makes the point. You do understand. So I have no clue
why you make all that fuss. You can move to step 4 now.
Bruno
John K Clark
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