On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 6:40 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > Bruno Marchal (BM) decided to take some Holiday in Helsinki, where BM was > proposed a Washington-Moscow duplication experience. > > Someone asked in Helsinki to BM to make a prediction about where BM would > *feel* to be after the duplication, > You write 8 paragraphs after that but never do say which turned out to be the correct answer, Moscow or Washington. > > BM could thus infer in Helsinki that the functioning body of BM will > appear in both cities, and that, obviously, each of those BM would not > *feel* to be in the two cities at once, > True, nevertheless BM would feel to be in Moscow AND BM would feel to be in Washington. That could be verified by simply asking the 2 people involved if they were BM and if they remembered being the Helsinki man and what city they felt like they were in now. That result would be a logical contradiction if Bruno Marchal duplicating machines didn't exist, but they do so it's not. It's not paradoxical, it's just very very weird. > > > BM could predict in advance that the prediction "BM will feel to be in one > city" get a probability 1. > Not that predictions, correct or incorrect, have anything to do with a feeling of self but BM could further predict that BM will feel to be in Moscow AND BM will feel to be in Washington. That would be a logical contradiction if Bruno Marchal duplicating machines didn't exist, but they do so it's not paradoxical, it's just very very weird. > > And so he wrote it in his diary "BM will feel to be in one city". > Is "he" BM? If it is then obviously BM will see both cities. That could be verified by simply asking those 2 fellows if they were BM and if they wrote the diary. I f "he" is somebody else then I don't have enough information to say anything about it. > > > Obviously, from what has been said, the city could only be Washington, or > only be Moscow, > But the experiment is over now so what one and only one city turned out to be the correct one, Washington or Moscow? > > So BM tried, by thought, to imagine if the prediction "BM will be in > Washington" could be correct, but understood immediately that this would be > directly refuted by the BM that will be reconstituted in Moscow. > Yesterday I predicted that today there would be a cat in Washington but you directly refuted my prediction by proving that today there is a cat in Moscow, and obviously there can't be a cat in both Washington AND Moscow. Can you find any flaw in that reasoning or do you consider it airtight? > > > BM will feel to be in one city > True. > > BM will feel to be in Washington and feel to be in Moscow > > (*) > Also true, and such a situation would be commonplace in a world with BM duplicating machines. > > > (here it is important to remind the precise question asked) > BM will feel to be in Washington And the precise answer is yes, BM will feel to be in Washington . > > BM will feel to be in Moscow > . > And the precise answer is yes, BM will feel to be in Moscow. The Moscow man will feel to be in only one city but BM will see both cities, this is not a contradiction because the Moscow man is just a subset of BM; after the duplication BM is the Moscow man, AND more. > > Yet, given the protocol, BM could easily derive from digital mechanism > that the prediction "BM will feel to be in Washington or feel to be in > Moscow" will be assessed by the two copies, and then, unable to find any > better prediction verifiable by the two copies > [...] > Better prediction ? What would have been the better prediction that's what I want to know! Which would have turned out to be the better prediction, Moscow or Washington? If you can't answer that question with one and only one city then it's not a experiment, it's not even a thought experiment, it's just pointless activity. > > In Helsinki, BM realized that the duplication makes impossible to predict > in advance the specific personal feeling of any of the copies of BM in > Helsinki. > Nonsense. In Helsinki BM can predict that the Washington man will feel to be in Washington and the Moscow man will feel to be in Moscow and both will remember once being the Helsinki man. Logically everything is clear as a bell, it just seems odd to us because we're not accustomed to people duplicating machines, but there is nothing in the idea that violates the laws of physics. > > > BM in Helsinki concluded in Helsinki, before the copy was done, that BM in > Helsinki is indeterminate on the specific location where BM in Helsinki can > ever feel to be when the duplication will be executed. > I have 2 apples and put one in box A and one in box B, can you see any indeterminacy in this? I can if the question is "which box contains *THE* apple, A or B?" because the word "the" specifies something specific and in this context that something is indeterminate . John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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