On 26 Apr 2017, at 23:57, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 6:40 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Bruno Marchal (BM) decided to take some Holiday in Helsinki,
where BM was proposed a Washington-Moscow duplication
experience. Someone asked in Helsinki to BM to make a
prediction about where BM would *feel* to be after the duplication,
You write 8 paragraphs after that but never do say which turned
out to be the correct answer, Moscow or Washington.
The correct answer, the best prediction is "Moscow or Washington".
Leading to the 1p indeterminacy. That was the point. You could as well
criticize quantum mechanics by telling us it does not predict where
the particle collide with the screen.
> BM could thus infer in Helsinki that the functioning body of
BM will appear in both cities, and that, obviously, each of those BM
would not *feel* to be in the two cities at once,
True, nevertheless BM would feel to be in Moscow AND BM would feel
to be in Washington.
Yes, but you can't derive from this that BM would feel to be in both
Moscow and Washington at once.
That could be verified by simply asking the 2 people involved if
they were BM and if they remembered being the Helsinki man and what
city they felt like they were in now. That result would be a logical
contradiction if Bruno Marchal duplicating machines didn't exist,
but they do so it's not. It's not paradoxical, it's just very very
weird.
Yes, but phenomenologically that is the 1p indeterminacy.
> BM could predict in advance that the prediction "BM will feel
to be in one city" get a probability 1.
Not that predictions, correct or incorrect, have anything to do
with a feeling of self but BM could further predict that BM
will feel to be in Moscow AND BM will feel to be in
Washington. That would be a logical contradiction if Bruno Marchal
duplicating machines didn't exist, but they do so it's not
paradoxical, it's just very very weird.
> And so he wrote it in his diary "BM will feel to be in one
city".
Is "he" BM? If it is then obviously BM will see both cities.
On the contrary, computationalism makes impossible that any BM will
feel to see both cities, and BM was asked about BM's future feeling,
which exists as we have agreed that BM survives, and BM can only feel
to be in one city. The fact that BM is duplicated, and is certain to
feel one city in the lose future explains entirely why in Helsinki BM
cannot make a better prediction than "W or M".
That could be verified by simply asking those 2 fellows if they were
BM and if they wrote the diary. If "he" is somebody else then I
don't have enough information to say anything about it.
> Obviously, from what has been said, the city could only be
Washington, or only be Moscow,
But the experiment is over now so what one and only one city
turned out to be the correct one, Washington or Moscow?
You need only to see that when BM predicted "W or M", both copies
agrees, and simple logic shows it to be the best possible prediction.
Of course the W-BM will answer washington, for that unique city, and M-
BM will answer Moscow, both will assess that the prediction "only one
city among W and M" was correct. which explains completely the first
person indeterminacy.
> So BM tried, by thought, to imagine if the prediction "BM
will be in Washington" could be correct, but understood immediately
that this would be directly refuted by the BM that will be
reconstituted in Moscow.
Yesterday I predicted that today there would be a cat in
Washington but you directly refuted my prediction by proving that
today there is a cat in Moscow,
?
and obviously there can't be a cat in both Washington AND Moscow.
Can you find any flaw in that reasoning or do you consider it
airtight?
I don't see the relevance of this, nor do I understand the meaning.
> BM will feel to be in one city
True.
> BM will feel to be in Washington and feel to be in
Moscow (*)
Also true, and such a situation would be commonplace in a world with
BM duplicating machines.
> (here it is important to remind the precise question asked)
BM will feel to be in Washington
And the precise answer is yes, BM will feel to be in
Washington.
> BM will feel to be in Moscow.
And the precise answer is yes, BM will feel to be in Moscow.
The Moscow man will feel to be in only one city but BM will see both
cities, this is not a contradiction because the Moscow man is just a
subset of BM; after the duplication BM is the Moscow man, AND
more.
> Yet, given the protocol, BM could easily derive from digital
mechanism that the prediction "BM will feel to be in Washington or
feel to be in Moscow" will be assessed by the two copies, and then,
unable to find any better prediction verifiable by the two copies
[...]
Better prediction? What would have been the better
prediction that's what I want to know!
W or M. That is the better prediction, which is assessed by the two
copies, like "tail or head" is the better prediction when throwing a
fair coin.
Which would have turned out to be the better prediction, Moscow or
Washington? If you can't answer that question with one and only one
city then it's not a experiment, it's not even a thought experiment,
it's just pointless activity.
?
> In Helsinki, BM realized that the duplication makes
impossible to predict in advance the specific personal feeling of
any of the copies of BM in Helsinki.
Nonsense. In Helsinki BM can predict that the Washington
man will feel to be in Washington and the Moscow man will feel to
be in Moscow and both will remember once being the Helsinki man.
But that does not predict any possible experience that the BM in
Helsinki will live, as BM knows with certainty in Helsinki that after
pushing the button, he will survive and feel to be in once city.
Logically everything is clear as a bell, it just seems odd to us
because we're not accustomed to people duplicating machines, but
there is nothing in the idea that violates the laws of physics.
You can say odd, but "indeterminate on the first person outcome" is
more precise. It is not even weird, just unusual because we have
forgotten we were amoebas ...
> BM in Helsinki concluded in Helsinki, before the copy was
done, that BM in Helsinki is indeterminate on the specific location
where BM in Helsinki can ever feel to be when the duplication will
be executed.
I have 2 apples and put one in box A and one in box B, can you see
any indeterminacy in this?
There is no first person indeterminacy here, because the apple have no
personal diaries, or first person experiences ...
Bruno
I can if the question is "which box contains THE apple, A or B?"
because the word "the" specifies something specific and in this
context that something is indeterminate .
John K Clark
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