On 27 Apr 2017, at 21:02, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Apr 27, 2017 at 5:11 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> The correct answer, the best prediction is "Moscow or
Washington".
OK that is the answer, but what is the question? Who is it
we're talking about, who will or will not see Moscow and/or
Washington?
Why do you ask? That was in the previous post. The question was "where
do BM predicts BM will feel personally to be after the experience",
and was asked to BM, before BM push on the button.
> Leading to the 1p indeterminacy.
The Helsinki man is in Helsinki, the Washington man is the
Helsinki man who will see Washington, and the Moscow man is the
Helsinki man who will see Moscow. Nothing is indeterminate except
your inability to uniquely specify what "THE future 1p" means in a
world with people duplicating machines. And that idiot diary will be
of no help because BOTH the Washington man and the Moscow man
remember writing it.
If nothing is indeterminate, then in Helsinki, BM could make a
specific prediction on what BM will live personally. But BM can only
predict with certainty that BM will see only one city. Yet "only
Washington" will be refuted by the guy in Moscow, and vice versa. So
the best prediction BM can do is "only once city, but I am currently
unable to predict which one".
And, that is confirmed by both BM after the experience is done.
> You could as well criticize quantum mechanics by telling us
it does not predict where the particle collide with the screen.
And if a key part of quantum mechanics was "THE future 1p
photon" with no coherent explanation of what that meant I would
indeed criticize it.
Then so, because usually we ask about where *THE* electron will hit
the screen, etc. Even Everett does that.
>> BM would feel to be in Moscow AND BM would feel to be in
Washington.
> Yes, but you can't derive from this that BM would feel to be
in both Moscow and Washington at once.
You're a logician so see if you can solve this puzzle, it's hard I
know but give it a try. There is a parrot right now in Moscow and
there is a parrot right now in Washington; is there a parrot right
now in Moscow and Washington?
Going from a conscious entity to an unconscious one solve the problem
indeed, but at the price of eliminating consciousness or first person
views.
You make my point.
> computationalism makes impossible that any BM will feel to
see both cities,
That's not true either. After the duplication the two Bruno
Marchals enjoyed both Washington and Moscow for 24 hours,
Yes, but not at once, and both assess that they were unable to predict
which one with any certainty before they push the button.
after that the process was reversed and they merged back together
again into one person, but all the memories of both were retained.
So today you (that personal pronoun can be safely used because there
is only one Bruno marchal again) have vivid memories of both Moscow
and Washington at exactly the same time. So 2 days ago back in
Helsinki the correct answer to the question "what city will you
see?" would be "both".
That does not follow. The unique again BM will remember that in Moscow
(resp. washington) he got one bit of information. Then the fusion
after, does not eliminate that information, because even in his unique-
against state, he has to perceive his double trips are having been non
simultaneous at the time they were lived. If the experience is
repeated, BM will still be indeterminate about the future immediate
outcome.
The only difference this modification has over the previous thought
experiment is it removes all ambiguity over the word "you" and it
even makes clear what "the future 1p" means.
Not the immediate future on which the prediction was all about, as
needed for the next steps.
> Of course the W-BM will answer washington, for that unique
city, and M-BM will answer Moscow, both will assess that the
prediction "only one city among W and M" was correct.
Maybe W-BM and M-BM would answer that way I don't know,
You should, as they just reason logically from the computationalist
assumption.
I don't even know if BM can experience anything at all, maybe BM is
a zombie. But I do know both W-JKC and M-JKC would say the correct
answer back in Helsinki would have been JKC will see both cities.
Correct for the prediction of the 1-view from the 3p view, but
incorrect, as both the W-JKC and M-JKC have to admit they got a bit of
information, and the situation has become asymmetrical for both, even
if later you do a fusion, which reinsures the symmetry, but only
later, without losing the memory of the local asymmetry.
So here, you just ignore again the question asked.
>> Yesterday I predicted that today there would be a cat in
Washington but you directly refuted my prediction by proving that
today there is a cat in Moscow,
> ?
!
>> and obviously there can't be a cat in both Washington AND
Moscow. Can you find any flaw in that reasoning or do you consider
it airtight?
> I don't see the relevance of this, nor do I understand the
meaning.
That is a pity.
>> In Helsinki BM can predict that the Washington man
will feel to be in Washington and the Moscow man will feel to be in
Moscow and both will remember once being the Helsinki man.
> But that does not predict any possible experience that the BM
in Helsinki will live,
I thought you said during the duplication BM's body in Helsinki
is destroyed,
Indeed.
if that's so then I predict after that instant BM will no longer
experience Helsinki although all the memories of that city will be
retained by both the Washington man and the Moscow man. So I ask
again, where is the indeterminacy?
In the fact that both the W-BM, and the M-BM understand that BM could
not have predicted in Helsinki the current W specific result that the
W-BM is living now, nor the M specific result that the M-BM is living
now. I don't see any difficulty here. It is useful to predict "white
noise" in the avogadro-number-iteration of the self-duplication,
assessed by any usual statistical tools.
Bruno
John K Clark
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