On 17 Jul 2017, at 23:29, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>>> In the 3p description, obviously, both are you
>> In any description as far as I can tell.
> Obviously not. From the 1p view of each copies, as you have
already agreed, they have differentiated.
I don't know what you're talking about, I haven't even figured out
what "the 1p view" is supposed to be much less agreed that such a
thing exists.
Then you suffer from amnesia, or it is just a peak in your bad faith
attitude. In the UDA, the first person is described by the content of
the personal diary (the one which is duplicated in the experience as
the candidate takes it with him in the "cut and copy" box.
Which of the 2 has THE 1p view?
Of course, both. Nobdy has ever suggested that one of them has become
a zombie.
You do. Which one is "you"? The one with THE 1p view.
And round and round we go.
You imagine thing. Since day one, we have agreed that both copies have
an 1-view, and it is *the* 1-view in each of those perspective.
>> Then "the 1p description" cannot distinguish
between the two.
?> Perhaps. It is ambiguous.
If "the 1p view" is ambiguous (and that's the kindest thing you
can say about it) then it has no place in something that claims to
be a proof.
It is your sentence which is ambiguous. The 1-view defined and used in
the UDA is a crystal clear and simple notion.
>> Therefore it is not a description at all.
> It is an experience.
If the arrangement of atoms in 2 brains is identical then the mind
produced by those 2 brains is identical, then the experiences the
minds have is identical, then it makes no sense to say there are 2
experiences; there is only one.
Absolutely. But the two identical brains bemongs to two different
cities, so when they open the door of the reconstitution boxes, each
brain imprint quite different input (indeed, one is W, the other is
M). It is *because* the brains are 100% identical, and then
differentiate, that the H-Guy, or the one in the reconstitution boxes
before the ipening of the door, cannot predict the specific city they
will find themselves in.
>> All they confirm is that they are both you.
> ?They confirm indeed they are both the H-guy, but they
confirmed also that now, they have differentiated,
If they have differentiated that means the way the atoms are
arranged in the 2 brains are no longer identical, therefore what
those 2 brains are doing (mind) is also no longer identical, so it
would be correct to say there are now two separate conscious beings.
Exactly. And both are the H-guy. It is the usual failure of the
Leibniz identity rule. That makes the point.
> The qualia, conscious part of the experience, is true, but
unexpressible.
Then why why why do you write post after post expressing your
opinion on the nature of consciousness?? Philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein had good advice when he said "What we cannot speak
about we must pass over in silence".
What was Wittgenstein talking about?
See the math part of how this paradoxical state of affair is solved by
exploiting G* minus G. Machine can talk about things they live despite
they cannot define or justify rationally. But that is not needed here,
as we can understand intuitively what happens in this situation.
Neither the W-guy, nor the M-guy can explain who he is. Something that
most people can find by themselves with the koan "who am I". The first
person experience cannot be representational. It is not identifiable
to any 3p definable object.
> G does not prove it, making it impossible to believe (justify
rationally) its assumption of Digital Mechanism.
You're talking about consciousness and belief is a subjective
emotional state with little or no relationship with proof, just look
at any religious believer.
"belief" in the mundane sense is not used with the same meaning than
"belief" in religion. As I have often explained to Brent, and
discussed with David and others, provable has been made into "belief"
by incompleteness. Gödel saw this in 1933, when realizing that
incompleteness demolishes the "[]p -> p" axiom of knowledge. Proving
is a relative (to a theory, or machine, or subject) notion (contrary
to computable).
Or look at Kurt Godel perhaps the greatest logician of all time, he
believed in all sorts of absurd things; people presented evidence to
him that nobody was trying to poison him but he nevertheless
continued to believe they were and that incorrect belief ended up
killing him. Godel starved himself to death.
>> But if both are identical what on earth can it mean to
have access to one but not the other? If there are 2 copies of
Newton's Principia and I have access to one but not the other
how have I been deprived? What information is unavailable to me?
> Just open the door.
When the doors are opened one sees Moscow and the other sees
Washington
Exactly. That is why we have a prediction exercise to solve.
and those are not identical views,
If they were, there would be no prediction, like with a coin having to
heads.
so the way the atoms are arranged in the 2 brains are no longer
identical.
That was easy to predict. It is equivalent with the H-guy saying that
he will not see two cities at once, which makes the point.
But we were talking about what would happen when they are identical.
We were not. The prediction is about what will be seen after the self-
localization is made, of course.
Bruno
John K Clark
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