On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 12 August 2017 at 13:13, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On 12/08/2017 12:23 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 12 August 2017 at 12:12, Bruce Kellett < <[email protected]> >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you* expect when >>>>>> pushing the button in Helsinki? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The guys in W >>>>> and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to make any >>>>> prediction whatsoever. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Fair enough. >>>> >>>> You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong. >>>> >>> >>> Correct. >>> >>> There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought >>> experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the scenario >>> inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The first person (1p) >>> concerns only things that the person can experience directly for himself. >>> It cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by other people, >>> because such things are necessarily third person (3p) knowledge -- >>> knowledge which he does not have by direct personal experience. So our >>> subject does not know the protocol of the thought experiment from direct >>> experience (he has only been told about it, 3p). When he presses the button >>> in the machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what will happen >>> (because he has not yet experienced it). He presses the button in the >>> spirit of pure experimental enquiry -- "what will happen if I do this?" His >>> prior probability for any particular outcome is zero. So when he presses >>> the button in Helsinki, and opens the door to find himself in Moscow, he >>> will say, "WTF!". In particular, he will not have gained any 1p knowledge >>> of duplication. In fact, he is for ever barred from any such knowledge. >>> >>> If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his >>> experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some probability >>> that he can estimate by keeping records over a period of time. If you take >>> the strict 1p view of the thought experiment, the parallel with the early >>> development of QM is more evident. In QM, no-one has the 3p knowledge that >>> all possible outcomes are realized (in different worlds). >>> >>> So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are p(M) = >>> p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1. On the other hand, if you allow 3p >>> knowledge of the protocol to influence his estimation of probabilities >>> before the experiment, you can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can gain at >>> any time after pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p confusion is >>> complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both cities. In that >>> case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant. >> >> >> The subject directly experiences the details of the experimental >> protocol, through hearing or reading about it. All knowledge is 1p; >> information from the external world comes to me via my senses and affects >> my knowledge. >> >> >> You render the 1p-3p distinction meaningless. >> > > First person experience is individual and private. The third person point > of view is the view of an external observer. Suppose person A is observed > laughing by person B. The behaviour - the laughing - can be observed by > anyone; this is the third person point of view. Person A might be > experiencing happiness or amusement; this is the first person point of view > and only person A himself has it. Finally, person B has visual and auditory > experiences and knowledge of the outside world (there are laughing entities > in it), and this is again from the first person point of view. I would say > that knowledge is a type of experience, and therefore always first person > and private; information is that which is third person communicable. But > perhaps this last point is a matter of semantics. > > > If your knowledge is gained from someone else, it is necessarily > communicable information, and thus third person. First person is your > personal experience, which is not communicable. However, knowledge gained > by experience is communicable, and thus third person. Otherwise, all that > you say above is mere logic chopping. > Most first person experiences are based on third person information, namely sensory data. Even a priori knowledge, such mathematical knowledge, starts with learning about the subjectvfrom outside sources. Returning to the point, why were you claiming that the subject on a duplication experiment cannot have first person knowledge of duplication? That would mean no-one could ever have first person knowledge of anything. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
