On 11 Aug 2017, at 02:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 11/08/2017 9:45 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
"What will I see tomorrow?" is meaningful and does not contain any
false propositions. Humans who are fully aware that there will be
multiple copies understand the question and can use it
consistently, and as I have tried to demonstrate even animals have
an instinctive understanding of it. Probabilities can be
consistently calculated using the assumption that I will experience
being one and only one of the multiple future copies, and these
probabilities can be used to plan for the future and to run
successful business ventures. If you still insist it is gibberish
that calls into question your usage of the word "gibberish ".
Not everyone will be successful in this scenario. No matter how mane
duplications cycles are gone through, there will always be one
individual at the end who has not received any reward at all (he has
never seen Washington :-)). This is the problem of "monster
sequences" that is so troublesome for understanding probability in
Everett QM.
? You might elaborate. It looks like the white rabbit problem. I see
the problem with mechanism, (indeed that is the result of the UDA:
there is a measure on first person experience problem), but in Everett
the problem is solved by Feynman phase randomization, itself
justifiable from Gleason theorem. Then the math of self-reference
shows that, very possibly, Gleason theorem will probably solve the
classical case too, given that we find quantum logics at the place
needed.
Are-you defending John Clark? That would be nice! He convinces nobody
since years, and some helps might be handy.
Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you* expect
when pushing the button in Helsinki?
Bruno
Bruce
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