On 12 August 2017 at 13:13, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 12/08/2017 12:23 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 12 August 2017 at 12:12, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you* expect when >>>>> pushing the button in Helsinki? >>>>> >>>> >>>> I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The guys in W >>>> and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to make any >>>> prediction whatsoever. >>>> >>> >>> Fair enough. >>> >>> You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong. >>> >> >> Correct. >> >> There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought >> experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the scenario >> inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The first person (1p) >> concerns only things that the person can experience directly for himself. >> It cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by other people, >> because such things are necessarily third person (3p) knowledge -- >> knowledge which he does not have by direct personal experience. So our >> subject does not know the protocol of the thought experiment from direct >> experience (he has only been told about it, 3p). When he presses the button >> in the machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what will happen >> (because he has not yet experienced it). He presses the button in the >> spirit of pure experimental enquiry -- "what will happen if I do this?" His >> prior probability for any particular outcome is zero. So when he presses >> the button in Helsinki, and opens the door to find himself in Moscow, he >> will say, "WTF!". In particular, he will not have gained any 1p knowledge >> of duplication. In fact, he is for ever barred from any such knowledge. >> >> If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his >> experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some probability >> that he can estimate by keeping records over a period of time. If you take >> the strict 1p view of the thought experiment, the parallel with the early >> development of QM is more evident. In QM, no-one has the 3p knowledge that >> all possible outcomes are realized (in different worlds). >> >> So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are p(M) = >> p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1. On the other hand, if you allow 3p >> knowledge of the protocol to influence his estimation of probabilities >> before the experiment, you can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can gain at >> any time after pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p confusion is >> complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both cities. In that >> case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant. > > > The subject directly experiences the details of the experimental protocol, > through hearing or reading about it. All knowledge is 1p; information from > the external world comes to me via my senses and affects my knowledge. > > > You render the 1p-3p distinction meaningless. > First person experience is individual and private. The third person point of view is the view of an external observer. Suppose person A is observed laughing by person B. The behaviour - the laughing - can be observed by anyone; this is the third person point of view. Person A might be experiencing happiness or amusement; this is the first person point of view and only person A himself has it. Finally, person B has visual and auditory experiences and knowledge of the outside world (there are laughing entities in it), and this is again from the first person point of view. I would say that knowledge is a type of experience, and therefore always first person and private; information is that which is third person communicable. But perhaps this last point is a matter of semantics. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
