On 13 August 2017 at 16:48, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 13/08/2017 10:01 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:19 am, Bruce Kellett < > <[email protected]>[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 13/08/2017 9:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 13 August 2017 at 08:48, Bruce Kellett < <[email protected]> >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 13/08/2017 12:04 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> First person experience is individual and private. The third person >>>> point of view is the view of an external observer. Suppose person A is >>>> observed laughing by person B. The behaviour - the laughing - can be >>>> observed by anyone; this is the third person point of view. Person A might >>>> be experiencing happiness or amusement; this is the first person point of >>>> view and only person A himself has it. Finally, person B has visual and >>>> auditory experiences and knowledge of the outside world (there are laughing >>>> entities in it), and this is again from the first person point of view. I >>>> would say that knowledge is a type of experience, and therefore always >>>> first person and private; information is that which is third person >>>> communicable. But perhaps this last point is a matter of semantics. >>>> >>>> >>>> If your knowledge is gained from someone else, it is necessarily >>>> communicable information, and thus third person. First person is your >>>> personal experience, which is not communicable. However, knowledge gained >>>> by experience is communicable, and thus third person. Otherwise, all that >>>> you say above is mere logic chopping. >>>> >>> >>> Most first person experiences are based on third person information, >>> namely sensory data. >>> >>> >>> How is sensory data 'third person information'? That would make >>> everything 3p, and you have eliminated the first person POV. If I >>> experience the pleasure of sitting in the sun on a fine spring morning, >>> that is surely a first person experience, and entirely sensory in origin. >>> >>> Even a priori knowledge, such mathematical knowledge, starts with >>> learning about the subjectvfrom outside sources. >>> >>> Returning to the point, why were you claiming that the subject on a >>> duplication experiment cannot have first person knowledge of duplication? >>> That would mean no-one could ever have first person knowledge of anything. >>> >>> >>> If you go into the duplicating machine without being told what it is, >>> then you are duplicated and come out in Moscow, you will know that you have >>> been transported from Helsinki, but how can you know anything about any >>> duplicates? As far as you know -- not knowing the protocol -- you could >>> simply have been rendered unconscious and flown to Moscow. How does 1p >>> experience tell the difference? >>> >>> This is why I think some 3p is being mixed in with 1p experiences in >>> this duplication protocol. The subject only knows the protocol by being >>> told about it. How does he know he is not being lied to? >>> >> >> This is the case with any experience whatsoever: you come to a conclusion >> about what has happened based on your observations and deductions, but you >> could be mistaken. >> >> >> That would appear to put a large hole in Bruno's distinction between >> quanta and qualia. The sensation of the sun on my face is veridicial -- I >> might be mistaken about it being the sun, but the sensation is >> incontrovertible. But things that I am told about are in a different >> category -- I have no immediate incontrovertible experience associated with >> them. I am aware of words being spoken, but I am not immediately aware of >> their veracity. >> > > You feel the Sun on your face, see the Sun in the sky and make deductions > about a hot, bright object in space. It is an analogous process when you > hear human speech and come to conclusions about the world. > > > And I compare notes with other people so that I can be assured that I am > not totally deceived. Thus such knowledge becomes 3p. It is not just what I > suspect on the basis of immediate experience, but what can be agreed among > a large number of people -- those who are independent of me. > > First person, second person, and third person are basically grammatical > categories: first person, I/we, second person, you/you, third person, > him/them. The third independent person plays a central role in the > interpretation of perceptual evidence in terms of reliable conceptual > models of the world. What do you think 3p means? > I don't think we really disagree on the distinction between first and third person, but I don't understand your claim that there is a special problem acquiring knowledge in duplication experiments, which is not a problem in other experiences such as taking the train. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
