On 04 Sep 2017, at 21:37, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/4/2017 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Sep 2017, at 01:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/3/2017 3:07 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 3 September 2017 at 17:46, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 9/3/2017 7:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Sep 2017, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/1/2017 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This leaves, as Bruno says, lots of white rabbits.
That leaves us in the position of showing that there is no white
rabbits or, to refute computationalism by showing there are still
white rabbits, and then you can try to invent some matter or god
able to eliminate them, but that will in any case refute mechanism.
What if getting rid of those white rabbits tightly constrains
consciousness and physics to something like what we observe?
Exactly. Getting rid of the white rabbit = proving the existence
of the relevant measure = deriving physics from machine theology
(alias elementary arithmetic).
Then it will have been shown that physics entails consciousness
as well as the other way around.
OK. But arithmetic is a subtheory of any physical theory. The
progress are the following
Copenhagen QM: assume a physical reality + a dualist and unclear
theory of mind
Everett QM: assume a universal wave + the mechanist theory of
mind (+ an identity thesis).
Me: the mechanist theory of mind (elementary arithmetic).
Brent wrote to David:
I am agreeing with you. I only disagree with Bruno in that he
wants to take arithmetic or computation as more really real than
physics or consciousness and not derivative. It seems to me that
the very possibility of computation depends on the physics of the
world and is invented by evolution.
But that is plainly false. I can prove the existence of
computation in arithmetic.
After you assume arithmetic. I can prove anything if I get to
choose the axioms.
On the contrary, we can only speculate on a primary physical
reality for which there are no evidences at all.
You can't prove primary arithmetic either. "Primary" is just a
word you stick on "physical" to make it seem inaccessible.
I don't think that's right. Primary just means that part of a
theory that is assumed rather than derived.
But in that case I can just assume that the particles of the
Standard Model are primary. Then there's a lot of evidence for
primary matter. It's as though physicists are being criticized
because they are willing to look deeper for an explanation of
their best theory. But computationalist are to be congratulated
for asserting that there's no origin for arithmetic.
In the case at hand the theory is mechanism, in which it is
assumed that concrete or phenomenal reality is ultimately an
epistemological consequence of computation. That being the case,
the theory relies on computation, or its combinatorial basis, as
its ontology (i.e. that part of the theory that is taken to exist
independently of point-of-view). It then sets out to derive its
phenomenology by means of an epistemological analysis (i.e. that
part of the theory that is understood to be point-of-view
relative) based on the generic or universal machine as unique
subject or agent. Physics, as an observationally-selected subset
both of the computational ontology and its derived phenomenology,
cannot thus be considered primary, in the sense given here.
Of course it's not primary given a theory that assumes something
else as primary. Note that computationalism has yet to succeed in
deriving phenomenology.
Is that not slightly disingenuous?
The phenomenology is given by the 8 hypostases, with p sigma_1: p,
Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt, Bp & Dt & p. That gives 8 person points of
view as three of them split along G/G*. That splits, on the
material hypostases, makes quanta into particular qualia, and the
physical reality as a special first person plural reality (exactly
what you get with QM without collapse), both obeying a different
quantum like logics.
It is interesting that there are eight different logics, but calling
them persons and points of view is just metaphor - not proof.
It is not a metaphor. When you say "yes" to the surgeon, he will not
replace your brain by a metaphor, but by a digital machine. Then we
use the math of self-reference to study what a digital machine can
prove and not prove about itself, and the 8 different views are
extracted from this. Bp & p gives the classical Theaetetus standard
definition of knowledge, for exemple. Socrates criticized it, but the
incompleteness theorem makes it able to work in the mechanist context.
You say that they model human experience,
It associate a soul to all (Löbian) machine. Humans are only very
particular Löbian machine. Unless you think that the physical laws are
pure *human* construction, that is enough to get the laws of the
machine observable (and indeed we find a quantum logic there).
but I think the model is very imperfect. Humans don't believe all
theorems of axioms they believe.
That would be a good argument if I was claiming doing a theory on
human thinking and consciousness. But that is not the goal, although
an ideally correct human would have the same theology, though. But
ideally correct human do not exist, or are no more human ...
In general their beliefs are contradictory. If you're going to
claim to derive human experience, then you need to define human
experience so we can judge whether it is correctly modelled or not.
I show that incompleteness associate a precise theology, including
physics, to all (Löbian) machine. I am not studying the humans, but
the origin of the physical laws, from the number dreams in
arithmetic. With the work of the physicists, we never know if the
laws are geographical or really physical. At least with mechanism we
have a reason to believe that there are physical *laws*, and a stable
universal physical reality.
Explaining numbers from physics seems to me as weird as explaining
general relativity by studying Einstein's brain biochemistry.
Numbers evolutionarily predate Einstein by millions of years, c.f.
William S. Cooper.
I am glad you say that, despite it leans to a category mistake. I
would say that numbers are out of the domain to which time and space
notions can be applied. I think it is not sensical to say that "at
4h20 pm, in my room, 17 is prime".
Anyway, a part of the point is that if we assume mechanism in
cognitive science, we don't have much choice in the matter.
Because you implicitly assume as part of "mechanism" that arithmetic
and computation exist independent of physics.
Computations existence is derived entirely from
0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1)
x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
x * 0 = 0
x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x
That 0 is not a successor (0 ≠ (x + 1)) is hardly a physical fact.
Nobody can measure or verify that the "{10^(10^100) nth prime number}
+ 1" is different of zero, although that follows from the axioms above.
But I think this is false, and your movie graph argument does not
prove it.
We might have been influenced by the physical to grasp that 2+2=4, but
once grasped, we can understand that we don't need to refer to
anything physical to reason on the numbers, indeed if you add the
axioms of logic to the axioms given above, you get all we need to
assume, and there is nothing physical referred to in the theory. A
good thing given that the goal is to explain non circularly the origin
of the physical appearances, and thus without committing ourself in a
ontological physical commitment.
Bruno
Brent
I do not claim any truth, just testability, in a field where many
want to believe we can believe what we want. Well. No, if we want
to respect some reality or truth without which research has no sense.
Bruno
Brent
Rather, it makes its appearance as a tightly-constrained
extensional infrastructure in terms of which the machine's
phenomenology is enabled to play out in action.
David
I don't need to prove the physical, I observe it.
Your argument is 100% the same as saying "It seems to me that the
very possibility of computation depends on God".
If God or Matter plays a role in a computation, then you are not
taking the word "computation" in its standard meaning (cf Church-
Turing-Post-Kleene thesis), and I have no clue at all what you
are talking about.
So you put words in my mouth and then complain that you don't
know what I'm talking about?
Brent
Bruno
Brent
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