On 30 Sep 2017, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Sep 30, 2017 at 7:08 AM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:

​> ​Actually there have been some quite interesting discussions outside the JC echo chamber, I think, Quentin. I don't bother with the troll,

​So you believe Quentin's ideas are so brilliant that nobody could sincerely disagree with them and I have written hundreds of posts over the years defending a position I did not believe had any value. Hmm... I bet you voted for Trump. ​

​> ​although I occasionally read your contributions because the degree of, no doubt understandable, vitriol you have accumulated towards his attitude to the discussion is quite entertaining.

​Entertaining in the way intestinal worms are entertaining perhaps.

​> ​Personally I've never been able to understand all the fuss. In a world with duplication machines we'd just have to accept that other people might have a legitimate claim to be the successors of the same predecessor as ourselves.

​If you know there will be more than one successor then​ ​ asking the predecessor what one and only one thing will happen to that predecessor​ would be a brain dead dumb thing to do.

​> ​But that couldn't possibly have any bearing on the necessity of finding ourselves to be one single individual at any given moment.

No bearing? You​ ​just​ ​said "finding ourselves" and that's plural, so when you ask "what one and only one thing" what the hell are you asking and who are you asking it of?​ ​Some very stupid people, such as those that think Quentin​ ​is clever, believe it's like a coin flip, but it's nothing like a coin flip! Today I don't know if​ ​the flip​ ​will​ ​end up​ ​heads or tails and the best I can do is assign probabilities, but tomorrow I won't need probabilities at all,​ ​tomorrow​ ​I can state with 100% certainty​ ​exactly how it turned out; however with Bruno's thought experiment tomorrow after its completed everybody still will be as ignorant of the answer as they were the day before because​ ​it's still not clear what the question was.


Everybody?

The H-man and the W-man knows the answer. They remembered distinctly being in Helsinki, asking themselves "where will I feel to have survived?", and now, both copies knows very well the answers. The fact that they cannot communicate it to you as such is just the usual impossibility to communicate our own personal subjective experience. But you cannot use this to dismiss the objective fact that from the H- man and W-man perspective, they did not know where they will survived, could only write "W v M" in the diary, and after, each of them have perfect knowledge of the result, W for one, M for the other. they trivially got that bot of information, and destroy the 3p symmetry in their 1p perspective.

(The 1p perspective is of course a key ingredient to formulate the mechanist version of some aspect of the mind-body problem).

By forgetting the H-man and the W-man in your "everybody", you illustrate that you forget that the question was about the 1p experience.



​>​ I suppose it's just barely within the bounds of possibility that some poor soul might be incapable of understanding what is entailed in BEING someone as distinct from DESCRIBING someone. But if that were indeed the case one could only shake one's head and pass on by.

​Even in a world with people duplicating machines I have no trouble understanding what BEING someone means, and I have no trouble understanding what having BEEN somebody means, but I have enormous difficulty understanding what the one and only one person I WILL BE means.

It is not what you will be. It is what you will *feel* to be, as made clear when using the diaries and the definition given.

Then it is like in the simple (no duplication) teleportation experience, except that it looks like the destination has been taken by a coin, and that we inherit of a doppelganger living in the other city.

That follows logically, with "I" being the Helsinki candidate, from "I survive + I cannot survive and feel being in both city simultaneously (in this precise protocol and assuming mechanism (of course))".

Bruno



John K Clark







​John K Clark ​






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