On 27 Sep 2017, at 21:07, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> The non-ambiguous question is how many cities can any
"Helsinky-candidate" believing in computationalism, expect to see
from a first person viewpoint just after pushing the button. The
answer is the non ambguous "1",
Congratulation on saying "a first person viewpoint"
not "the first person viewpoint"! I think the word "expect" is
unnecessary but in general I have no problem with that question nor
the answer, and it's all 100% predictable.
Nice. So what is the prediction that you write in the diary (in
Helsinki)?
I also have no problem with the question "How many first person
viewpoints of the Helsinki-remembering man will there be just
after pushing the button?". The non-ambiguous completely
predictable answer is "2".
Correct, but that is the 3p description given in the details of the
experiment. The question is what do you expect to live when going
through such experiment.
But I still have a huge problem with "How any cities will I see
after I have been duplicated?".
That is weird, as it is very easy. You seem to agree that there will
be two copies, each one in one city. So they (the copies) will both
see one city. So, assuming mechanism, it is obvious that for all first
person experiences possibly accessible by the Helsinki-guy, in all
cases, the H-guy, which has survived in both cities, can see only one
city (and can only imagine his doppelganger seeing the other city). So
P("one city") = 1, despite being objectively in the two cities from a
third person perspective. There is no paradox, just objective
(provable) "subjective indeterminacy".
Bruno
John K Clark
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