On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 12:06 AM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > From: Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > > > It is possible that consciousness is fully preserved until a threshold is > reached then suddenly disappears. So if half the subject’s brain is > replaced, he behaves normally and has normal consciousness, but if one more > neurone is replaced he continues to behave normally but becomes a zombie. > Moreover, since neurones are themselves complex systems it could be broken > down further: half of that final neurone could be replaced with no change to > consciousness, but when a particular membrane protein is replaced with a > non-biological nanomachine the subject will suddenly become a zombie. And we > need not stop here, because this protein molecule could also be replaced > gradually, for example by non-biological radioisotopes. If half the atoms in > this protein are replaced, there is no change in behaviour and no change in > consciousness; but when one more atom is replaced a threshold is reached and > the subject suddenly loses consciousness. So zombification could turn on the > addition or subtraction of one neutron. Are you prepared to go this far to > challenge the idea that if the observable behaviour of the brain is > replicated, consciousness will also be replicated? > > > If the theory is that if the observable behaviour of the brain is > replicated, then consciousness will also be replicated, then the clear > corollary is that consciousness can be inferred from observable behaviour.
For this to be a theory in the scientific sense, one needs some way to detect consciousness. In that case your corollary becomes a tautology: (a) If one can detect consciousness then one can detect consciousness. The other option is to assume that observable behaviors in the brain imply consciousness -- because "common sense", because experts say so, whatever. In this case it becomes circular reasoning: (b) Assuming that observable behaviors in the brain imply consciousness, consciousness can be inferred from brain behaviors. > Which implies that I can be as certain of the consciousness of other people > as I am of my own. This seems to do some violence to the 1p/1pp/3p > distinctions that computationalism rely on so much: only 1p is "certainly > certain". > But if I can reliably infer consciousness in others, then other > things can be as certain as 1p experiences..... If one can detect 1p experiences then one can detect 1p experiences... Telmo. > Bruce > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
