On Monday, March 19, 2018 at 3:02:28 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote: > > On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 11:02 AM, Lawrence Crowell < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> NP-completeness is sorta weird and consciousness is sorta weird, but >>> other than that is there any reason to think the two things are related? >> >> > > *> This seems to be something you are not registering.* > > You’ve got that right. > >> *> Classic NP-complete problems involve cataloging subgraphs and >> determining the rules for all subgraphs in a graph. There are other similar >> combinatoric problems that are NP complete. * > > That’s nice. I repeat my question, NP-completeness is sorta weird and > consciousness is sorta weird, but other than that is there any reason to > think the two things are related? >
If you can't compute efficiently the map, the how do you know this system will really upload brain states in such as way that consciousness seemlessly carries from brain to computer? Even if the entity in the computer is conscious it might not actually be me. If I could duplicate myself which of the two would "be me?" The map problem is one involving graph theoretic problems that are NP-complete. As I see it there is a lot of hype here concealing the fact we really know every little about this. LC > *> A map from a brain to a computer is going to require knowing how >> to handle these problems. * > > That is utterly ridiculous! Duplicating a map is not a NP-complete > problem, in fact its not much of a problem at all, a Xerox machine can do > it. In this case we're not trying to find the shortest path or even a > shorted path than the one the trailing salesman took. All we need do is > take the path the salesman already took. > >> *> Quantum computers do not help much.* > > > It would be great to have a quantum computer but would not be necessary > for uploading or for AI, it would just be icing on the cake. > > *> It could have some bearing on the ability to emulate consciousness in > a computer.* > > Yes, and the Goldbach conjecture might have some bearing on the ability to > emulate consciousness in a computer too, but there is not one particle of > evidence to suggest that either of the two actually does. There are a > infinite number of things and concepts in the universe and not one of them > has been ruled out as having somethings to do with consciousness, and > that’s why consciousness theories are so easy to come up with and why they > are so completely useless. Intelligence theories are a different matter > entirely, they are testable. > >> >> How do you figure that? Both my brain and my computer are made of >>> matter that obeys the laws of physics, and matter that obeys the laws of >>> physics has never been observed to compute NP-complete problems in >>> polynomial time, much less less find the answer to a >>> non-computable question, like “what is the 7918th Busy Beaver number?”. >> >> >> >> > *And for this reason it could be impossible to map brain states into a >> computer and capture a person completely. * > > How do you figure that? A computer can never find the 7918th Busy Beaver > number but my consciousness can never find it either. I’ll be damned if I > see how one thing has anything to do with the other. It seems to me that > you don’t want computers to be conscious so you looked for a problem that a > computer can never solve and just decreed that problem must have something > to do with consciousness. But computers can’t find the 7918th Busy Beaver > number because the laws of physics can’t find it, even the universe itself > doesn’t know what that finite number is. But I know for a fact that the > universe does know how to arrange atoms so they behave in a johnkclarkian > way and become conscious. The universe doesn't know how to solve NP > complete problems in polynomial time, much less NP hard problems, much less > flat out non-computable problems like the busy Beaver, so I don't see how > any of them could have anything to do with consciousness. > >> *> Of course brains and computers are made of matter. So is a pile of >> shit also made of matter.* >> > Exactly, and the only difference between my brain and a pile of shit is > the way the generic atoms are arranged, and the only difference between a > cadaver and a healthy living person is the way the generic atoms are > arranged. One carbon atom is identical to another so the only thing that > specifies something as being me or a cadaver or pile of shit is the > information on how to arrange those atoms. > >> *> Based on what we know about bacteria and their network communicating >> by electrical potentials the pile of shit may have more in the way of >> consciousness than a computer. * > > Maybe maybe maybe. The above is a excellent example of what I was talking > about, consciousness theories are utterly and completely useless. Is this > really the best you can do? Are piles of shit and the interior of Black > Holes the only places you can find arguments against Cryonics? > >> *> As things stand now I would not do the upload. * > > But is that because you believe there is no change of it working or > because you believe there is? I think the chances are greater than zero but > less than 100% and I’m not afraid to give it a try. After all, I have the > money and if it doesn’t work it won’t make me any deader. > > There is a excellent article by Kenneth Hayworth on the nuts and bolts of > how this uploading procedure might work from the present day when you > undergo the procedure to about 70 years in the future where you’re revived > and uploaded into a robot body: > > > http://www.brainpreservation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/vitrifyingtheconnectomicself_hayworth.pdf > Kenneth Hayworth is the guy who developed the new Aldehyde-stabilized > cryopreservation method. I remember when people talked about how ice > crystals would rupture cells and freezing the brain would turn it into > mush; well Hayworth froze a pig brain down to −130 C (−202 F) then he > warmed it back up to room temperature and took a series of 3D pictures of > it with a electron microscope. The detail is amazing! I would have been > delighted if the pictures were made when the brain was still frozen but > this is even better because the rewarming is when most of the damage > happens. See for yourself: > > http://www.brainpreservation.org/ > > John K Clark > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
