I am not particularly in the Platonist camp. I see Platonism and other philosophical ideas as just grist for the mill.
Dennett's approach has some merit as at least opening a door for some possible testable approaches to consciousness. I have no idea whether this entire construction is realistic or not. LC On Monday, March 19, 2018 at 7:01:04 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: > > On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 9:29 PM, Lawrence Crowell > > > > > > > In a part what you say is spot on. The problem with consciousness is > there > > is a lot more ignorance about it than much in the way of certain > knowledge. > > It may be a sort of epiphenomenon that emerges from some class of > complex > > systems, which at this time we do know understand. Roger Penrose thinks > it > > is something is a triality of physics, mathematics and mind, which is a > sort > > of Platonic look. Dennett on the other hand thinks consciousness is a > sort > > of illusion, which is a sort of epiphenomenon. Dennett calls it a > > hetererophenomenon as it involves a sort of game of multiple drafts. We > > really do not know for sure what consciousness is. > > I am on the Platonist camp, but fully realize that this is a personal > bet / intuition. I agree with Bruno that if computationalism is true, > then consciousness cannot be an epiphenomenon. But we don't know if > computationalism is true. > > Dennett I just find just silly. I think he plays with words, and > accepting his arguments would force me to deny something (the only > thing) that I absolutely know to be true. > > > I can think of things that strike me as obstructions to the idea of > > uploading brain states to a computer. The issue of NP-completeness seems > > plausible, and classic NP-complete problems are combinatorial systems > which > > the brain is an example of. Other questions seem to make this > problematic. > > It does seem to me the barrier of ignorance is far higher than our > ability > > to vault over it. > > Agreed. I'm not sure we will ever be able to understand consciousness > -- there is really no reason to assume that this is possible. If it > is, I bet that it will require a quantitative jump in our > understanding of reality. I most definitely do not believe that it can > be solved by incrementalist research in neuroscience. > > Telmo. > > > LC > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an > > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
