> On 19 Mar 2018, at 13:01, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 9:29 PM, Lawrence Crowell
> <[email protected]> wrote:
>> On Sunday, March 18, 2018 at 10:34:17 AM UTC-6, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 5:18 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 11:16 AM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Evolution produced me. I know with 100% certainty that I am
>>>>>>>> conscious. I very strongly suspect billions of other things are
>>>>>>>> conscious
>>>>>>>> too. I know for a fact Evolution can detect intelligent behavior
>>>>>>>> but it
>>>>>>>> can’t detect consciousness and yet I am consciousness. Therefor
>>>>>>>> consciousness MUST be a byproduct intelligence. Evolution says as
>>>>>>>> much about
>>>>>>>> consciousness as there is to say, it is the best purely logical
>>>>>>>> argument
>>>>>>>> against solipsism, in fact it is the only one, all the others are
>>>>>>>> just
>>>>>>>> variations of “my initiation says its untrue” or “solipsism is too
>>>>>>>> strange
>>>>>>>> to be true”.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> This assumes that if evolution produced X, then any property of X is
>>>>>> also a product of evolution.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Not any property
>>>> of
>>>> X, just any property the parts of X didn't have before Evolution
>>>> started
>>>> its work. You walk into a bakery and see a cake and you assume the baker
>>>> made the cake. Do you also assume the baker made the flower in the cake,
>>>> and
>>>> the carbon in the flower, and the protons in the carbon, and the quarks
>>>> in
>>>> the protons?
>>> 
>>> No, because the cake is an improbable thing, while protons are
>>> probable things. I don't know how probable consciousness is. As you
>>> said, I cannot detect it.
>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> It is trivially not the case. For example, you have mass and an
>>>>>> electromagnetic field and a temperature, and yet neither mass nor
>>>>>> electromagnetism nor temperature are products
>>>>> of evolution.
>>>> 
>>>> I know Evolution produced my physical brain and I know with 100%
>>>> certainty
>>>> my brain is conscious,
>>> 
>>> But you don't know what else is conscious.
>>> 
>>>> however I do not know with 100% certainty that mass
>>>> or electromagnetism or temperature are conscious, in fact I rather
>>>> suspect
>>>> they are not and there is only one reason I have that suspicion, they do
>>>> not
>>>> behave intelligently.
>>> 
>>> Intelligent behavior is relative to humans. It just means that you are
>>> good at the things that are necessary to succeed in a specific
>>> evolutionary niche that the Lovecraftian-horror a.k.a. nature
>>> produced. It also produced myriad other things.
>>> 
>>> Humans are terribly complex, and it might be that consciousness arises
>>> from terribly complex things, or from certain types of terribly
>>> complex things. But I don't really know and neither do you.
>>> 
>>> Telmo.
>> 
>> 
>> In a part what you say is spot on. The problem with consciousness is there
>> is a lot more ignorance about it than much in the way of certain knowledge.
>> It may be a sort of epiphenomenon that emerges from some class of complex
>> systems, which at this time we do know understand. Roger Penrose thinks it
>> is something is a triality of physics, mathematics and mind, which is a sort
>> of Platonic look. Dennett on the other hand thinks consciousness is a sort
>> of illusion, which is a sort of epiphenomenon. Dennett calls it a
>> hetererophenomenon as it involves a sort of game of multiple drafts. We
>> really do not know for sure what consciousness is.
> 
> I am on the Platonist camp, but fully realize that this is a personal
> bet / intuition. I agree with Bruno that if computationalism is true,
> then consciousness cannot be an epiphenomenon. But we don't know if
> computationalism is true.
> 
> Dennett I just find just silly. I think he plays with words, and
> accepting his arguments would force me to deny something (the only
> thing) that I absolutely know to be true.
> 
>> I can think of things that strike me as obstructions to the idea of
>> uploading brain states to a computer. The issue of NP-completeness seems
>> plausible, and classic NP-complete problems are combinatorial systems which
>> the brain is an example of. Other questions seem to make this problematic.
>> It does seem to me the barrier of ignorance is far higher than our ability
>> to vault over it.
> 
> Agreed. I'm not sure we will ever be able to understand consciousness
> -- there is really no reason to assume that this is possible.

I am not sure why you say this. Maybe you still believe in a material universe? 
This still makes only matter incomprehensible. Consciousness is, fundamentally 
just knowledge, or true personal first person belief.



> If it
> is, I bet that it will require a quantitative jump in our
> understanding of reality.

A jump back to the neopythagorean or neoplatonist theology. A jump back to 1500 
years ago.



> I most definitely do not believe that it can
> be solved by incrementalist research in neuroscience.


Yes, that would be like trying to understand how deep blue win a chess game by 
looking at the electronic of the universal machine running it: that will not 
work. 

Bruno



> 
> Telmo.
> 
>> LC
>> 
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