> On 3 Apr 2018, at 19:40, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 4/3/2018 12:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 3 Apr 2018, at 07:22, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 3/31/2018 1:30 AM, Russell Standish wrote: >>>> On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 05:14:21PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> Now, is a jellyfish conscious? >>>>> >>>>> I bet they are, but not far away from the dissociative and constant >>>>> arithmetical consciousness (of the universal machines). >>>> As I'm sure you're aware, I disagree with this. Jellyfish appear to be >>>> quite simple automatons, with a distributed neural network, not any >>>> brain as such. However, my main reason for disagreeing is that >>>> anthropic reasoning leads us to conclude that most species of animal >>>> are not conscious. Our most typical animal is a nematode (for instance >>>> your favourite - the planarians), but even most insects cannot be >>>> conscious either. >>>> >>> In these discussions I always wonder what kind of consciousness is meant? >>> >>> 1. Perception. light/dark acid/base touch... >>> 2. Self location relative to things. Prey/predators >>> 3. Self relative to others. Sex and territory and rivals >>> 4. Abstractions. Number geometries >>> 5. Self reflection. Theory of minds. Language >> It is any form of knowledge. It is the raw consciousness of the worms >> disliking the lack of comfort impression when, say, it is eaten by a little >> mammals. > > Or my thermostat not liking that it too cool in the house.
I doubt this. To have consciousness you need some “[]p”, that is, a representation of yourself plus some connection with truth. The thermostat has the connection with truth (usually) but lacks the representability means. Now, the consciousness of the non-Löbian universal machine is so disconnected that IT can believe being a thermostat (like in some salvia reports), but that is still an illusion. Bruno > > Brent > >> It is []t, with any weak Theaetetical reading of the box. It is needed for >> any of your 5 more special use that you mention. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
