> On 3 Apr 2018, at 19:40, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 4/3/2018 12:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 3 Apr 2018, at 07:22, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 3/31/2018 1:30 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 05:14:21PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> Now, is a jellyfish conscious?
>>>>> 
>>>>> I bet they are, but not far away from the dissociative and constant 
>>>>> arithmetical consciousness (of the universal machines).
>>>> As I'm sure you're aware, I disagree with this. Jellyfish appear to be
>>>> quite simple automatons, with a distributed neural network, not any
>>>> brain as such. However, my main reason for disagreeing is that
>>>> anthropic reasoning leads us to conclude that most species of animal
>>>> are not conscious. Our most typical animal is a nematode (for instance
>>>> your favourite - the planarians), but even most insects cannot be
>>>> conscious either.
>>>> 
>>> In these discussions I always wonder what kind of consciousness is meant?
>>> 
>>> 1. Perception.  light/dark  acid/base touch...
>>> 2. Self location relative to things.  Prey/predators
>>> 3. Self relative to others.  Sex and territory and rivals
>>> 4. Abstractions.  Number geometries
>>> 5.  Self reflection.  Theory of minds.  Language
>> It is any form of knowledge. It is the raw consciousness of the worms 
>> disliking the lack of comfort impression when, say, it is eaten by a little 
>> mammals.
> 
> Or my thermostat not liking that it too cool in the house.

I doubt this. To have consciousness you need some “[]p”, that is, a 
representation of yourself plus some connection with truth. The thermostat has 
the connection with truth (usually) but lacks the representability means. Now, 
the consciousness of the non-Löbian universal machine is so disconnected that 
IT can believe being a thermostat (like in some salvia reports), but that is 
still an illusion.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> It is []t, with any weak Theaetetical reading of the box. It is needed for 
>> any of your 5 more special use that you mention.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> 
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