On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 3 Apr 2018, at 08:25, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Hi Russell, >> >> On Sat, Mar 31, 2018 at 10:30 AM, Russell Standish >> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 05:14:21PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> Now, is a jellyfish conscious? >>>> >>>> I bet they are, but not far away from the dissociative and constant >>>> arithmetical consciousness (of the universal machines). >>> >>> As I'm sure you're aware, I disagree with this. Jellyfish appear to be >>> quite simple automatons, with a distributed neural network, not any >>> brain as such. However, my main reason for disagreeing is that >>> anthropic reasoning leads us to conclude that most species of animal >>> are not conscious. Our most typical animal is a nematode (for instance >>> your favourite - the planarians), but even most insects cannot be >>> conscious either. >> >> I follow your anthropic reasoning, but am not convinced by the >> implicit 1:1 correspondence between one minute of human consciousness >> and one human of insect consciousness. I have no rigorous way of >> saying this, but my intuition is the following: there is more content >> in one minute of one than the other. I think it makes sense for the >> probabilities to be weighted by this content, somehow. >> >> Imagine a simple possibility: your anthropic reasoning being weighed >> by the number of neurons in the given creature. See what I'm getting >> at? > > > Then the brain seems to be a filter of the natural raw consciousness which is > at the start of the consciousness differentiation. The less neurons there > are, the more consciousness is intense from the first person view, but also > the more it is disconnected.
I agree, as you know. I have no scientific argument here, just personal experience. > I have no doubt that this is very counter-intuitive for people having no > memory of a dissociative state of consciousness, Yes. What makes this particularly tricky is that such memories are from the neighborhood of the experience. The actual thing cannot be remembered -- at least I cannot. > but then it makes much more simple the explanation of the origin of the > physical appearances. Peano arithmetic is less conscious than Robinson > arithmetic, even if Robinson arithmetic if of a type of white light so > luminous that we can distinguish nothing, not even 0 and 1. It might be the > state of "very near inconsistency”. This is not part of what I ahem published > so far, but again, logic, observations and simplicity concur on this. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> Cheers, >> Telmo. >> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >>> Principal, High Performance Coders >>> Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected] >>> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
