> On 3 Apr 2018, at 10:37, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 3 Apr 2018, at 08:25, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Russell, >>> >>> On Sat, Mar 31, 2018 at 10:30 AM, Russell Standish >>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 05:14:21PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Now, is a jellyfish conscious? >>>>> >>>>> I bet they are, but not far away from the dissociative and constant >>>>> arithmetical consciousness (of the universal machines). >>>> >>>> As I'm sure you're aware, I disagree with this. Jellyfish appear to be >>>> quite simple automatons, with a distributed neural network, not any >>>> brain as such. However, my main reason for disagreeing is that >>>> anthropic reasoning leads us to conclude that most species of animal >>>> are not conscious. Our most typical animal is a nematode (for instance >>>> your favourite - the planarians), but even most insects cannot be >>>> conscious either. >>> >>> I follow your anthropic reasoning, but am not convinced by the >>> implicit 1:1 correspondence between one minute of human consciousness >>> and one human of insect consciousness. I have no rigorous way of >>> saying this, but my intuition is the following: there is more content >>> in one minute of one than the other. I think it makes sense for the >>> probabilities to be weighted by this content, somehow. >>> >>> Imagine a simple possibility: your anthropic reasoning being weighed >>> by the number of neurons in the given creature. See what I'm getting >>> at? >> >> >> Then the brain seems to be a filter of the natural raw consciousness which >> is at the start of the consciousness differentiation. The less neurons there >> are, the more consciousness is intense from the first person view, but also >> the more it is disconnected. > > I agree, as you know. > I have no scientific argument here, just personal experience.
OK. > >> I have no doubt that this is very counter-intuitive for people having no >> memory of a dissociative state of consciousness, > > Yes. What makes this particularly tricky is that such memories are > from the neighborhood of the experience. The actual thing cannot be > remembered -- at least I cannot. Consciousness is a cousin of consistency (<>t) . It obeys to <>t -> ~[]<>t. This means that a consistent machine cannot prove its consistency, in the strong sense of “proof”. Franzen said that it cannot even been asserted by which he means that it cannot even be taken as an axiom (this way of talking is slightly misleading, as PA can both assert con(‘PA’) and even take it as a new axiom, but then it is a new machine which still cannot prove its consistency. So it is really the fixed point of consistency which is not provable or rationally communicable. It is PA+ = PA+ +con(PA+) which becomes inconsistent (and such fixed point exists by Gödel diagonal lemma). Now, by the Completeness theorem (which can be shown to apply on the type of machines considered); consistency is equivalent with “there is a reality satisfying me (with me = my beliefs), and that is intuitively coherent: nobody can prove that a reality or a God exist. But consciousness is not consistency. It lacks the 1p feature, and consistency is indeed a purely 3p syntactical notion: it means that there is no proof of f (no finite sequence of beliefs starting from PA (say) and obtained by repeated application of the rules of PA and ending by f. So consciousness is more like <>p v p, the dual of []p & p, with a non constructive “or”. It makes <>t v t trivial from the first person point of view, and indeed it is a theorem (of G), but non expressible by the machine. In this case, it cannot be taken as an axiom only because it is not definable by the machine, at least concerning itself. This makes me wondering if the dissociative state is just a state of inconsistency, or a state when we wake up and realise we were consistent but unsound, like if we were becoming a “queer reasoner” (in the sense of Smullyan’s “Forever Undecided”. In that case, consciousness is definitely based on the notion of truth, and any particular instantiation of consciousness can work only by forgetting its “true nature”, making the ultimate experience unmemorable. Now, with salvia, any theory we make of the experience is contradicted by the next experience, but eventually I cycle on those two options, with the rather frustrating feeling that the solution here cannot be brought back at all, despite that, as you say, from the neighbourhood of the experience, we can remember having known the solution! That one is stable, and never contradicted by further experience, but the price is that we cannot bring back here. We can only “know” that it is either total madness ([]f, cul-de-sac world), or that consciousness is (sigma_1) truth itself, which indeed belongs to G*. G* proves p <-> <>p, on the p sigma_1. So, I tend to “believe” that the second solution is the correct one, and this simplify the consciousness theory a lot, and the relation between matter and sensibility becomes simpler too. At that point, asserting this makes me inconsistent of course, but it is no more a threat to consistency if we remember that Mechanism itself (needed for the sigma_1 restriction) is not knowable. This makes Mechanism equivalent with a Gödelian sentence: it says that we cannot believe rationally in Mechanism, which corroborates its theological aspect, i.e. its demand for an act of faith, at least in all neighbourhood of “death”. If that is true, the dissociative state can genuinely be identified with the death state, and, as far as we get there (with salvia for example), the experience cannot be memorised at all. In fact, it entails that we truly die, and the one who come back is truly “someone else”, and this is a common felling reported by salvia experiencers. It is what I call the MAX Effect, (because it is well illustrated in a comic book “Max, the explorer”, by Bara (a Belgian comics book). A mystery is that no NDE reports ever report anything similar to this. It would mean that in the NDE, the experiencer never die: they really comes back from only the neighbourhood. With salvia, apparently we would just die, and it makes us live the difference between death, and near death, but without the ability to recall, only to recall that we have recalled it! Another problem with the NDE reports is that the person talk like if they are certain of the experience, which should not be possible. At the G* level, living, conscious and *doubting* are equivalent. But some beginners with salvia seems also victim of certainty, if I can say that (but then most people seems certain that the moon is existing …). Well, since month I have stopped taking salvia. It becomes too much like I remember that I remember that I remember that … I can’t remember! Then stopping salvia is also a strange and interesting experience ... Best, Bruno > >> but then it makes much more simple the explanation of the origin of the >> physical appearances. Peano arithmetic is less conscious than Robinson >> arithmetic, even if Robinson arithmetic if of a type of white light so >> luminous that we can distinguish nothing, not even 0 and 1. It might be the >> state of "very near inconsistency”. This is not part of what I ahem >> published so far, but again, logic, observations and simplicity concur on >> this. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Cheers, >>> Telmo. >>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >>>> Principal, High Performance Coders >>>> Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected] >>>> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au >>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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