> On 5 Apr 2018, at 21:52, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 4/5/2018 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 3 Apr 2018, at 19:40, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 4/3/2018 12:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> On 3 Apr 2018, at 07:22, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 3/31/2018 1:30 AM, Russell Standish wrote: >>>>>> On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 05:14:21PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> Now, is a jellyfish conscious? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I bet they are, but not far away from the dissociative and constant >>>>>>> arithmetical consciousness (of the universal machines). >>>>>> As I'm sure you're aware, I disagree with this. Jellyfish appear to be >>>>>> quite simple automatons, with a distributed neural network, not any >>>>>> brain as such. However, my main reason for disagreeing is that >>>>>> anthropic reasoning leads us to conclude that most species of animal >>>>>> are not conscious. Our most typical animal is a nematode (for instance >>>>>> your favourite - the planarians), but even most insects cannot be >>>>>> conscious either. >>>>>> >>>>> In these discussions I always wonder what kind of consciousness is meant? >>>>> >>>>> 1. Perception. light/dark acid/base touch... >>>>> 2. Self location relative to things. Prey/predators >>>>> 3. Self relative to others. Sex and territory and rivals >>>>> 4. Abstractions. Number geometries >>>>> 5. Self reflection. Theory of minds. Language >>>> It is any form of knowledge. It is the raw consciousness of the worms >>>> disliking the lack of comfort impression when, say, it is eaten by a >>>> little mammals. >>> Or my thermostat not liking that it too cool in the house. >> I doubt this. To have consciousness you need some “[]p”, that is, a >> representation of yourself > > But what does that mean? Does it mean an idea of where your are? memory and > the passage of time? Does it mean a kind of simulation in which you have an > avatar? And why would you suppose a jellyfish or a nematode would have such > a representation?
The behaviour. My observation of protozoans and invertebrates (hydra, planaria). Attributing consciousness is of course a bit subjective. I might be wrong of course. > >> plus some connection with truth. > > ?? Facts or axioms or proofs? I was alluding to Theaetetus: knowledge is true-belief. So I meant “facts”, although that is a double-edged word, as some would say that the existence of the moon is a fact, but “existence” is too much ambiguous in metaphysics, as things can exist in many phenomenological senses. > >> The thermostat has the connection with truth (usually) > > It is connected to temperature and the furnace...so you mean facts. OK. > >> but lacks the representability means. Now, the consciousness of the >> non-Löbian universal machine is so disconnected that IT can believe being a >> thermostat (like in some salvia reports), but that is still an illusion. > > Having an illusion implies consciousness, at least according to Descarte. He is completely right on this. No problem. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> Brent >>> >>>> It is []t, with any weak Theaetetical reading of the box. It is needed for >>>> any of your 5 more special use that you mention. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
