> On 20 Aug 2018, at 21:20, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 8/20/2018 11:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 20 Aug 2018, at 19:55, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 8/20/2018 2:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 19 Aug 2018, at 21:23, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 8/19/2018 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 17 Aug 2018, at 21:27, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>>>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 8/17/2018 2:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 16 Aug 2018, at 20:50, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>>>>>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 8/16/2018 3:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 15 Aug 2018, at 21:33, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 8/15/2018 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> And you have not recovered the quantitative aspect of the quantum >>>>>>>>>>>>> structure, >>>>>>>>>>>> I did at the propositional level, which is enough to have the >>>>>>>>>>>> quantum logic. It is richer than the quantum logic of the >>>>>>>>>>>> physicians, so this predicts new things. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> What are they? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The consequence of the Löb’s formula translated in the quantum >>>>>>>>>> logical terms. Those are long and ugly formula, still beyond the >>>>>>>>>> reach of my (old) theorem prover. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So they are not testable. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Some are testable and tested, and some are not *yet* derived, and thus >>>>>>>> not tested, but they are testable of course. Not sure how you arrive >>>>>>>> at your conclusion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> because you have not defined a measure on the computations of the >>>>>>>>>>>>> UD. >>>>>>>>>>>> Not yet, but I am willing to hear some constructive suggestion to >>>>>>>>>>>> progress. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Then how can you claim to have recovered quantum mechanics if you >>>>>>>>>>> cannot even define a probability amplitude that is linear? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Because I have recovered enough to classify those logics as quantum >>>>>>>>>> logic. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That's a far cry from quantum mechanics. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But the UDA shows that if we don’t get quantum mechanics, it has to be >>>>>>>> false, or mechanism is false. The whole point is that we can test this. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The goal is to get a coherent picture in the computationalist frame. >>>>>>>> Physicalism is *already* refuted. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> No. It is only your version of physicalism that is refuted. The >>>>>>> assumption that what is physical cannot account for what is mental >>>>>>> because the mental is substrate independent and therefore is >>>>>>> independent of all substrate. The last doesn't follow. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> What is a substrate? >>>>> >>>>> Supporting material. >>>> >>>> That is short. Arithmetic supports material (appearances), but here you >>>> seem to say that a substrate would support some primary matter. The >>>> physical accounts for the Material in non physicalist theories too. It is >>>> just that the “material” appears to be a mode of the observable, definable >>>> from self-reference. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> How you test its primary existence? >>>>> >>>>> Whether it's existence is primary or not is irrelevant. >>>> >>>> But then why criticise my use of it against physicalism? >>> >>> Because your argument was that matter cannot account for the mental. >> >> >> When we assume compationalism. Yes. In that case consciousness is associated >> with a digital self-referential entity which cannot distinguish a “bottom” >> (primary) physical reality from an arithmetical reality > > But you didn't show that. You only showed that it would be true if the > digital entity were immersed in an environment.
Then put the digital rendering of the environment in the entity. If you cannot do that, then you assume something infinite, or magical, in the environment, and computationalism is false. > You argued that the environment could also be digital… No. The physical real environment will be given by the First Person indeterminacy (FPI) on all digital continuations in arithmetic. That is not susceptible of complete digital emulation. > but the doctor couldn't provide that. But then your argument fails. Because you introduce some “God” (primary matter, or a unique Turing machine for the universe, like in digital physics) in the picture. Your argument is like rejecting evolution because the theory is unable to explain how God made all this in six day. > You've only shown that the digital entity can exist in a digital environment > consisting of digital matter (including the entities digital brain). Digital matter? You lost me. The argument is done by step, you might explain where you disagree specifically. If you feel a need for some metaphysical assumption, like the primary existence of a physical universe, it is up to you to explain its role in consciousness. But that role will have to refer not only to a non digitally emulable reality, but also to a non FPI recoverable reality. > So you've just replicated the world except you've appended "digital" in front > of every noun and relation. Come on Brent, I insist that this make no sense at all once we postulate mechanism. There is no digital universe, nor digital matter. Only numbers or combinators. > If everything is digital, 99,9999999998 % of the arithmetical reality is not digitally emulable. Only brain and computers are digital with mechanism. Our body are not. That is how the non cloning can be proved from mechanism. No piece of matter at all could ever be simulated by a computer. > then digital matter may be primary in this digital world. There is no digital matter with mechanism. > The adjective "digital" has lost it's metaphysical significance...unless you > can derive some observable consequence of "digital”. The consequence of the brain being digitally emulable at some relevant level entails that matter obeys the laws of the formal mathematics of Z1 and Z1* (and others). That gives a quantum logic verified by nature up to now. To assume a primary physical universe, alien, or any gods, is premature, and should be done in last resorts. Bruno > > Brent > >> (or you have to tell me how that matter intervenes and if that is not >> computing emulable, you can’t say no more yes to the doctor). >> >> A computation is realised in a semantical structure (a model in the sense of >> the logicians, when the relative truth making up the relevant computations >> are satisfied (like the neurons acts due to this or that conditions, etc.). >> >> The machine cannot feel that distinction, but what I show is that it can >> verify it by observation, by comparing the arithmetical physical modes and >> the physical inferred from observation. >> >> >> >>> That question is independent of whether matter or thought or arithmetic >>> or whatever is fundamental. >> >> ? >> >> >> >>> >>> Your argument seems to be that computationalism implies that thoughts can >>> be instantiated by many different material events (e.g. cosmic rays >>> striking neurons, a record) >> >> No. The cosmic way is used to criticize that idea. The movie graph show >> that invoking matter to solve the computationalist mind-body problem is as >> much absurd than invoking holy water or god in a metaphysical argument. It >> does not work, even if locally, the *human* consciousness is implemented in >> the physical realm. That physical realm cannot be invoked, but must be >> explained by the measure on all sigma_1 sentences/computations. >> >> >> >>> therefore a thought is characterized by something independent of matter >> >> >> Yes, a relatively self-referentially correct computation(s). But for the >> first person, (plural or singular) there are many of them, which leads to >> the mathematical problems of justifying the discourse on quanta and qualia. >> >> >> >>> and it can be instantiated in the immaterial relations of languages, e.g. >>> arithmetic, combinatorics,… >> >> Yes, as we know since long. Any sigma_1 complete structure is enough to >> assume, but the observer (which provably exist there) believes also in the >> induction axioms (making them Löbian, and aware of the mind-body problems >> and its solutions, when not too much lazy). >> >> >> >> >>> But that is a cheat because "characterized" =/="instantiated". Anything >>> can be characterized in language. >> >> The language is only the messenger. Consciousness is related to >> computations, which, like geometry, admits a lot of theorem which are >> independent of the choice of any language. Indeed, all machines have a >> theology (in the greek sense), which prove that most truth to which the >> machine is confronted are not definable in any language. >> >> The language we talk about are understandable by universal machine, but the >> truth of the propositions on the machines will not depend on any language. >> The language is only in the choice of an initial language, to talk about all >> universal machine and universal languages. >> >> >> >> >> >>> That fits very well with this list which was started by people who liked >>> the idea of everything and anything from a philosophical perspective >>> because it excused them from explaining why this rather than that. >> >> >> Not at all. It formulates the problem, and gives the unique solution, that >> we can compare with nature, so that we might be able to evaluate a possible >> departure of mechanism, but up to now, Nature seems to looks like needed >> (for the mechanist) solution of the mind-body problem when stated in *any* >> Turing universal theory or extensions. >> >> You confuse mechanism with digital physics, which would assume the physical >> universe is given by a particular universal machine or program. >> >> >> >>> But explaining why this rather than that is exactly what is science's job. >> >> >> Arithmetic + mechanism explained why the universal machine is confronted >> with the observable mode, and why it obeys a quantum logic, and why it >> separates into quanta and qualia. And the explanation is testable. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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