> On 21 Aug 2018, at 07:56, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/20/2018 9:54 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>> On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 09:03:04PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> We must be looking at some different enumeration of the argument.  I have:
>>> 
>> Clearly. I was referring to the enumeration in the SANE2004 paper, which is 
>> kind of canonical:
> 
> OK. I also have the SANE paper.
> 
>> 
>> 7) The seventh step introduces the Universal Dovetailer (UD). Let N denotes 
>> the set of
>> natural numbers. A function from N to N is said to be total if it is defined 
>> on all natural
>> numbers. A function is said to be computable iff there is a programme 
>> FORTRAN which
>> computes it12. Church thesis (CT) makes the particular choice of FORTRAN 
>> irrelevant. CT
>> claims that all computable functions, total or not, are computed by 
>> algorithm expressible in
>> FORTRAN. In particular all total computable functions are computed by such 
>> FORTRAN
>> program...
> 
> Yes I understood it introduced the UD and per the C-T inferred that all 
> possible computations are performed by it.
> 
> Bruno wrote,"In that case consciousness is associated with a digital 
> self-referential entity which cannot distinguish
>  a “bottom” (primary) physical reality from an arithmetical reality"
> 
> I objected, "But you didn't show that."
> 
> You responded, "This is directly the result at step 7 of the UDA. And it is 
> pretty much required for the Church Turing thesis to hold."
> 
> So I still don't see why the UD implies consciousness is associated with a 
> digital self-referential entity which cannot distinguish a “bottom” (primary) 
> physical reality from an arithmetical reality.


It is not the UD which implies this, but just the digital mechanist hypothesis. 
A person whose brain is in a vat, with the right configuration, cannot know 
that she is in a brain in a vat. Similarly, we cannot know if we are processed 
by something primarily physical or not. If I implement the combinators in 
FORTRAN or in LISP, no combinators can distinguish the two from their personal 
experience (that without observation). Same for the arithmetical/physical. 

The UD is used to formulate the measure problem, not to argue that a digital 
machine cannot distinguish an arithmetical from a physical “master machine”, 
which is a direct consequence of digital mechanism.



> It seems to me like the rock that computes everything.  The UD is effectively 
> running every possible simulation at once

So to speak. The universal dovetailer has to dovetail, of course.



> and so is simulating everything at once.  Whether some thread within it 
> simulates you or simulates a rock on alpha centauri becomes a matter of 
> interpretation. 

? If it simulates you, you will feel to be conscious. The point will be that 
there is no rock which could ever be simulable by any computer, except those 
exloiting directly the infinities of computations below our level of 
substitution, like plausibly, a quantum computer.




> The computations of the UD can have no unique interpretation.


A computation *is* an interpretation, made by a universal machine. That is what 
the universal do: computation. Then with mechanism, some can be associated to 
consciousness, when they emulate self-referential entity.  If curiosity is 
conscious on Mars, it has to be conscious in the virtual mars during its 
training on Earth, and it has to be conscious in arithmetic, in virtue of the 
same number relations.




> 
>> 
>> 8) Yes, but what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe? Up 
>> to this
>> stage, we can still escape the conclusion of the seven preceding reasoning 
>> steps, by
>> postulating that a ‘‘physical universe’’ really ‘‘exists’’ and is too little 
>> in the sense of not being
>> able to generate the entire UD*,
> 
> The entire UD is infinite.  So it cannot exist in the physical universe.


Better to not assume a “god" when doing metaphysics; It biases the whole 
reasoning.The idea that seeing is the criterion of reality is the Aristotelian 
speculation that Plato warned us to not fall in. 

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> nor any reasonable portions of it, so that our usual physical
>> predictions would be safe from any interference with its UD-generated 
>> ‘‘little’’ computational
>> histories. Such a move can be considered as being ad hoc and disgraceful. It 
>> can also be...
>> 
> 
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