On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 12:20:19PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 8/20/2018 11:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > When we assume compationalism. Yes. In that case consciousness is > associated with a digital self-referential entity which cannot distinguish > a “bottom” (primary) physical reality from an arithmetical reality > > > But you didn't show that.
This is directly the result at step 7 of the UDA. And it is pretty much required for the Church Turing thesis to hold. Of course, step 7 relies on robustness of the *-verse, for which step 8 is the remedy. But already, I believe the *-verse must be robust, as otherwise quantum computing supremacy will never work. Empirical support of this contention is due real soon now™. So I suspect step 8 could well be consigned to the dustbin of history... > You only showed that it would be true if the digital > entity were immersed in an environment. You argued that the environment could > also be digital...but the doctor couldn't provide that. But then your > argument > fails. You've only shown that the digital entity can exist in a digital > environment consisting of digital matter (including the entities digital > brain). So you've just replicated the world except you've appended "digital" > in front of every noun and relation. If everything is digital, then digital > matter may be primary in this digital world. The adjective "digital" has lost > it's metaphysical significance...unless you can derive some observable > consequence of "digital". > This is a critique of step 8 (the MGA), which curryfies the environment into the computation. My money's on robustness being empirically confirmed in the next few decades... -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected] Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
