On 8/20/2018 11:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Aug 2018, at 19:55, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/20/2018 2:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Aug 2018, at 21:23, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/19/2018 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Aug 2018, at 21:27, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/17/2018 2:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Aug 2018, at 20:50, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/16/2018 3:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Aug 2018, at 21:33, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/15/2018 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And you have not recovered the quantitative aspect of the quantum structure,
I did at the propositional level, which is enough to have the quantum logic. It
is richer than the quantum logic of the physicians, so this predicts new things.
What are they?
The consequence of the Löb’s formula translated in the quantum
logical terms. Those are long and ugly formula, still beyond
the reach of my (old) theorem prover.
So they are not testable.
?
Some are testable and tested, and some are not *yet* derived,
and thus not tested, but they are testable of course. Not sure
how you arrive at your conclusion.
because you have not defined a measure on the computations of the UD.
Not yet, but I am willing to hear some constructive suggestion to progress.
Then how can you claim to have recovered quantum mechanics if
you cannot even define a probability amplitude that is linear?
Because I have recovered enough to classify those logics as
quantum logic.
That's a far cry from quantum mechanics.
But the UDA shows that if we don’t get quantum mechanics, it has
to be false, or mechanism is false. The whole point is that we
can test this.
The goal is to get a coherent picture in the computationalist
frame. Physicalism is *already* refuted.
No. It is only your version of physicalism that is refuted. The
assumption that what is physical cannot account for what is
mental because the mental is substrate independent and therefore
is independent of all substrate. The last doesn't follow.
What is a substrate?
Supporting material.
That is short. Arithmetic supports material (appearances), but here
you seem to say that a substrate would support some primary matter.
The physical accounts for the Material in non physicalist theories
too. It is just that the “material” appears to be a mode of the
observable, definable from self-reference.
How you test its primary existence?
Whether it's existence is primary or not is irrelevant.
But then why criticise my use of it against physicalism?
Because your argument was that matter cannot account for the mental.
When we assume compationalism. Yes. In that case consciousness is
associated with a digital self-referential entity which cannot
distinguish a “bottom” (primary) physical reality from an arithmetical
reality
But you didn't show that. You only showed that it would be true if the
digital entity were immersed in an environment. You argued that the
environment could also be digital...but the doctor couldn't provide
that. But then your argument fails. You've only shown that the digital
entity can exist in a digital environment consisting of digital matter
(including the entities digital brain). So you've just replicated the
world except you've appended "digital" in front of every noun and
relation. If everything is digital, then digital matter may be primary
in this digital world. The adjective "digital" has lost it's
metaphysical significance...unless you can derive some observable
consequence of "digital".
Brent
(or you have to tell me how that matter intervenes and if that is not
computing emulable, you can’t say no more yes to the doctor).
A computation is realised in a semantical structure (a model in the
sense of the logicians, when the relative truth making up the relevant
computations are satisfied (like the neurons acts due to this or that
conditions, etc.).
The machine cannot feel that distinction, but what I show is that it
can verify it by observation, by comparing the arithmetical physical
modes and the physical inferred from observation.
That question is independent of whether matter or thought or
arithmetic or whatever is fundamental.
?
Your argument seems to be that computationalism implies that thoughts
can be instantiated by many different material events (e.g. cosmic
rays striking neurons, a record)
No. The cosmic way is used to criticize that idea. The movie graph
show that invoking matter to solve the computationalist mind-body
problem is as much absurd than invoking holy water or god in a
metaphysical argument. It does not work, even if locally, the *human*
consciousness is implemented in the physical realm. That physical
realm cannot be invoked, but must be explained by the measure on all
sigma_1 sentences/computations.
therefore a thought is characterized by something independent of matter
Yes, a relatively self-referentially correct computation(s). But for
the first person, (plural or singular) there are many of them, which
leads to the mathematical problems of justifying the discourse on
quanta and qualia.
and it can be instantiated in the immaterial relations of languages,
e.g. arithmetic, combinatorics,…
Yes, as we know since long. Any sigma_1 complete structure is enough
to assume, but the observer (which provably exist there) believes also
in the induction axioms (making them Löbian, and aware of the
mind-body problems and its solutions, when not too much lazy).
But that is a cheat because "characterized" =/="instantiated".
Anything can be characterized in language.
The language is only the messenger. Consciousness is related to
computations, which, like geometry, admits a lot of theorem which are
independent of the choice of any language. Indeed, all machines have a
theology (in the greek sense), which prove that most truth to which
the machine is confronted are not definable in any language.
The language we talk about are understandable by universal machine,
but the truth of the propositions on the machines will not depend on
any language. The language is only in the choice of an initial
language, to talk about all universal machine and universal languages.
That fits very well with this list which was started by people who
liked the idea of everything and anything from a philosophical
perspective because it excused them from explaining why this rather
than that.
Not at all. It formulates the problem, and gives the unique solution,
that we can compare with nature, so that we might be able to evaluate
a possible departure of mechanism, but up to now, Nature seems to
looks like needed (for the mechanist) solution of the mind-body
problem when stated in *any* Turing universal theory or extensions.
You confuse mechanism with digital physics, which would assume the
physical universe is given by a particular universal machine or program.
But explaining why this rather than that is exactly what is science's
job.
Arithmetic + mechanism explained why the universal machine is
confronted with the observable mode, and why it obeys a quantum logic,
and why it separates into quanta and qualia. And the explanation is
testable.
Bruno
Brent
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