> On 15 Sep 2018, at 17:26, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 12:22 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >>> you claim nonphysical calculations can be performed, but you also say > >>> space and time and even spacetime are physical, so how can you have > >>> change without them and how can you have calculations without change? > > >> The changes are digital, discrete. > > Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos, gravitational > waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the change can't be > with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with respect to what?
The state of a Turing machine with respect to the universal number which implements it, in arithmetic to fx the things. Or equivalently, a computation can be defined by a sequence of reduction, i.e. an application of the two laws of combinator reduction. Again with respect to the universal number which implements it. I define a universal machinery by what Rogers called “an acceptable enumeration”. That is a (recursively enumerable) sequence of the partial computable functions phi_i such that 1) it exist a u such that phi_u(<x,y>) = phi_x(y) 2) it exist computable function S such that for all i: phi_i(<x, y>) = phi_S(i,x) (y). (Curryfication on the phi_i, this is offered for free with the combinators). Note that Kleene, using his famous “Kleene’s predicate” make clear how statement about the phi_i can be translated in purely arithmetical sense. > And how can you make a calculation without changing something? Are you assuming time to be fundamental? In GR, there is a notion of block universe, where time can be defined indexically. The same for the multi-dreams or multi-histories canonical interpretation by universal number in arithmetic occur. Computations needs a clock of some sort, and it is provided by the number of steps of the relative computation. I say that x emulate y on z when phi_x(y, z) = phi_y(z). Then we can associate to each computation of phi_i(j) a notion of number of step, made by i, or made by the universal u emulating i. At no moment we need to assume anything,ng more than some induction axioms, and the usual axioms I have given. More details in the combinator threads, or in the phi_i (Church’s thesis) thread. > > >>Electromagnetic waves of 650 nanometers is physical , the color red is a > >>qualia and can be produced without Electromagnetic waves of any sort. > > >One reason more to understand that the qualia can raise just with any number > >relations mimicking the relevant brain parts relation in arithmetic. > > And yet you agree that "even qualia is matter”. It is intelligible matter. It is eventually defined by the logic of []p & <>t & p, with p a sigma_1 arithmetiical proposition, and this at the level of G*. The qualia are defined in (second order) arithmetic by qZ1*. See my papers for all details, or ask any question. > And please note that in a MRI scanner similar parts of the brain light up > when one sees a red lights and when one just thinks about a red light. Yes, that is an argument in favour of Mechanism. > And also note that the brain is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. Yes, no problem with this. But that does not make the matter of our brain fundamental, nor do that entail the identity thesis between the brain and consciousness, as the thought experiences illustrates and the math proves (assuming Mechanism of course). > > >If some primary matter is at play for consciousness, can you explain what > >role it has, and what it is? > > If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of, That was not asked. The question is why do you assume this for saying that material brain can have consciousness but the immaterial one in arithmetic can’t. > if I could it wouldn't be primary. And if it's primary then it's needed to > perform calculations. And after saying consciousness is the way that data > feels when it is being processed there is simply nothing more that can be > said about consciousness. But infinitely many data are processed relatively in arithmetic. That leads to the problem of justifying the stability of the appearances by a statistic on all computations. You cannot invoke a God, nor any metaphysical ontological assumption, to select a computation in arithmetic. Or you give a role to that matter, which is not Turing emulbale, nor representable in arithmetic (which is far rocher than the Turing emulable). > > >>the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London. > > >The analogy does not work. A machine is more than a blueprint. > > A machine needs 2 things, data and matter. That is plain wrong. > The blueprints supply the data but I can't fly to London on half a machine. > > >But the step 3 can be done with robots instead of human, and if you > >disbelieve in first person indeterminacy, > > I don't believe in "first person indeterminacy” > and I don't disbelieve in it either because there is nothing in it to believe > or disbelieve. Then tell me what the Helsinki guy can expect. > There is no there there. If you could specify who exactly what "the first > person" is in a world that contains "the first person" duplicating machines I > might perhaps be able to tell you what I think about it, but until then the > idea is far worse than just being wrong, it is gibberish. You are the only person I know who does not understand this. The question you ask is very simple. Both are, by definition of Mechanism. So to get the statistics we have to interrogate both. Yu just never asks the copies. Both note in their personal diaries the name of one city, and that the symmetry was broken, and that they could not have predicted their observation result in advance in Helsinki. > > > tell me how you program the robot so that he [....] > > As always in your thought "experiments" the gibberish kicks in immediately. > Right at the start you postulate a world that contains both "THE" and "HE" > duplicating machines so your reference to "the" robot and "he" no longer > refers to anything unique. You tell me that there is no indeterminacy on the future subjective experience, so tell me what the guy in Helsinki has to expect when pushing on the copy and annihilate button. I remind you that you have agreed that the Helsinki guy does not die in that process, which indeed would directly refute computationalism. > > > > is able to predict the results of opening the door after pushing on the > > button. > > Well I predict that before the doors open there will only be one conscious > mind regardless of how many brains have been duplicated. And I predict the > moment the doors are opened revealing 2 different things there will be 2 > conscious minds. And I predict the mind that observes Moscow will become the > Moscow Man. And I predict the mind that observes Washington will become the > Washington Man. And there is nothing more to predict. That is a description of the protocol which remain true for everyone, notably both copies. But each copies will realised that they were unable to predict that very city they see now, and both identify themselves with the Helsinki guy, and understand now (hopefully) what the question was about. You avoid the question. You replace “undetermined” by “non sensical”. But if that was correct, Everett interpretation would be non sensical, and, moreover, all experiences made by the individual copies would be non sensical. You just put the first person experience under the rug. You follow an authoritarian tradition which lasts since 1500 years. > > > The robot survive, by computationalism (or even without in this case), and > > the robot can predict with certainty that he will not write in his personal > > diary that he is seeing both city at once, > > No, that is incorrect, "THE robot" can't predict that and neither can anybody > else because you haven't specified what or who the prediction is supposed to > be about. False. Please read the explanations. I will not repeat. > > > So, if you have an algorithm just show it to us. > > I will show you such a algorithm as soon as you show me a algorithm to > determine what one and only one thing will happen to 1 banana after 1 banana > becomes 2 bananas. Using the bananas illustrate only that you miss the first person account, on which the probability is asked for. > But even then you'd have no way of knowing if my prediction turned out to be > correct or not because even after the "exparament" is long over you STILL > couldn't say if the correct prediction turned out to be Moscow or Washington. That is why the only way to solve the problem is in asking the reports of all copies. That is why we say that a prediction is correct when it is verified by all copies, like the prediction “I will see one city”. Both copies confirms this. And “I will see two cities (at once)” is refuted by all copies, etc. Just look at the definition of first person that I gave, and it is very easy. > And that my dear Bruno is why this isn't a exparament at all and it's not > even a thought exparament, it is just a showcase displaying your massive > confusion and the difficulty you have in handling philosophical matters. That is negative insulting comments which supports the thesis that you have no arguments at all. > > >The question makes sense, as you have agreed that we survive such an > >experience, > > I have agreed that if survival today means being able to remember being the > Helsinki Man yesterday and somebody remembers today then the Helsinki Man has > survived today. And obviously if that's what the word means and if we have > Helsinki Man duplicating machines then the Helsinki Man will have more than > one path into the future. Yes, and the question is what the probability of such path. Good, a small light still reside in your mind. > However I no longer know what you mean by "survive" and I don't think you > know either. That contradicts step 0, step 1, step 2, that you have agreed with. Implicitly or explicitly. > > >and you agreed that any copies will not be directly aware of the other > >copies, > > Yes. > > >they differentiate once the box is open. > > Yes > > > So, there is no first person experience of being in the two cities. > > That depends entirely on what first person experience you're talking about. Both, of course. Both HW and HM men are version of the H-man having survived. > Do you agree there is a first person experience of the Helsinki Man being in > Moscow and (not or, AND) a first person experience of the Helsinki man being > in Washington? Yes, that is what I have called the 3-1 view, but the question is on the very 1-view themselves. > If you don't agree to that then I no longer know what you mean by "the > Helsinki Man”. I agree when you make the pronouns precise. What you say is the 3-1 view, correct in the computationalist frame. But the question is about what to expect in Helsinki, given that we know that there will be two futures, but only one from all first person experiences accessible from Helsinki. Like before, you keep the 3p view when the question, like in Everett QM, is on the 1p views. You just keep avoiding the very simple question asked. > > > To be in only one city is thus true for both copies, and is a predicted > > with certainty in Helsinki. So which one will it be? What is your technic > > of prediction? > > Why ask me? Because you are the only guy in town who claims to be able to predict his first person experience in that protocol. So much that you confess not having read step 4, nor apparently any book in the field of my thesis (theoretical computer science, provability logic). > Forget prediction and forget theories too, this can be solved empirically. > You've already completed the thing that you claim is a exparament so you tell > me what the correct answer turned out to be! Was it Washington or Moscow? It was Washington for he Helsinki guy reconstitute in Washington, and he admit he could not have predict this in Helsinki. The same for the Moscow guy. When the experience is repeated, they cautiously bet on W OR M. As they got the point now. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
