On Sunday, September 16, 2018 at 1:07:34 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 15 Sep 2018, at 22:56, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Saturday, September 15, 2018 at 10:27:07 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: >> >> On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 12:22 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >>> >>> you claim nonphysical calculations can be performed, but you also >>>> say space and time and even spacetime are physical, so how can you have >>>> change without them and how can you have calculations without change? >>> >>> >> >> >> *The changes are digital, discrete.* >>> >> >> Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos, >> gravitational waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the >> change can't be with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with >> respect to what? And how can you make a calculation without changing >> something? >> >> >>Electromagnetic waves of 650 nanometers is physical , the color red is >>>> a qualia and can be produced without Electromagnetic waves of any sort. >>> >>> >> >> >*One reason more to understand that the qualia can raise just with any >>> number relations mimicking the relevant brain parts relation in >>> arithmetic. * >>> >> >> And yet you agree that "even qualia is matter". And please note that in >> a MRI scanner similar parts of the brain light up when one sees a red >> lights and when one just thinks about a red light. And also note that the >> brain is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. >> >> >>> *>If some primary matter is at play for consciousness, can you explain >>> what role it has, and what it is?* >> >> >> If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of, if I >> could it wouldn't be primary. And if it's primary then it's needed to >> perform calculations. And after saying consciousness is the way that data >> feels when it is being processed there is simply nothing more that can be >> said about consciousness. >> >> >>the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London. >>> >>> >>> *>The analogy does not work. A machine is more than a blueprint.* >>> >> >> A machine needs 2 things, data and matter. The blueprints supply the data >> but I can't fly to London on half a machine. >> >> >*But the step 3 can be done with robots instead of human, and if you >>> disbelieve in first person indeterminacy,* >>> >> >> I don't believe in "first person indeterminacy" and I don't >> disbelieve in it either because there is nothing in it to believe or >> disbelieve. There is no there there. If you could specify who exactly what >> "the first person" is in a world that contains "the first person" >> duplicating machines I might perhaps be able to tell you what I think about >> it, but until then the idea is far worse than just being wrong, it is >> gibberish. >> >> >>> > tell me how you program the robot so that he [....] >>> >> >> As always in your thought "experiments" the gibberish kicks in >> immediately. Right at the start you postulate a world that contains both " >> *THE*" and "*HE*" duplicating machines so your reference to "*the*" >> robot and "*he*" no longer refers to anything unique. >> >> >>> > i*s able to predict the results of opening the door after pushing on >>> the button.* >>> >> >> Well I predict that before the doors open there will only be one >> conscious mind regardless of how many brains have been duplicated. And I >> predict the moment the doors are opened revealing 2 different things there >> will be 2 conscious minds. And I predict the mind that observes Moscow will >> become the Moscow Man. And I predict the mind that observes Washington >> will become the Washington Man. And there is nothing more to predict. >> >> >>> *> The robot survive, by computationalism (or even without in this >>> case), and the robot can predict with certainty that he will not write in >>> his personal diary that he is seeing both city at once,* >> >> >> No, that is incorrect, "*THE* robot" can't predict that and neither can >> anybody else because you haven't specified what or who the prediction is >> supposed to be about. >> >> > So, if you have an algorithm just show it to us. >>> >> >> I will show you such a algorithm as soon as you show me a algorithm to >> determine what one and only one thing will happen to 1 banana after 1 >> banana becomes 2 bananas. But even then you'd have no way of knowing if my >> prediction turned out to be correct or not because even after the >> "exparament" is long over you *STILL* couldn't say if the correct >> prediction turned out to be Moscow or Washington. And that my dear Bruno is >> why this isn't a exparament at all and it's not even a thought exparament, >> it is just a showcase displaying your massive confusion and the difficulty >> you have in handling philosophical matters. >> >> >>> *>The question makes sense, as you have agreed that we survive such an >>> experience,* >> >> >> I have agreed that if survival today means being able to remember being >> the Helsinki Man yesterday and somebody remembers today then the Helsinki >> Man has survived today. And obviously if that's what the word means and if >> we have Helsinki Man duplicating machines then the Helsinki Man will have >> more than one path into the future. However I no longer know what you mean >> by "survive" and I don't think you know either. >> >> >>> *>and you agreed that any copies will not be directly aware of the other >>> copies,* >>> >> >> Yes. >> >> >*they differentiate once the box is open.* >>> >> >> Yes >> >> > *So, there is no first person experience of being in the two cities.* >>> >> >> That depends entirely on what first person experience you're talking >> about. Do you agree there is a first person experience of the Helsinki Man >> being in Moscow and (not or, AND) a first person experience of the Helsinki >> man being in Washington? If you don't agree to that then I no longer know >> what you mean by "the Helsinki Man". >> >> >>> > To be in only one city is thus true for both copies, and is a >>> predicted with certainty in Helsinki. So which one will it be? What is your >>> technic of prediction? >>> >> >> Why ask me? Forget prediction and forget theories too, this can be solved >> empirically. You've already completed the thing that you claim is a >> exparament so you tell me what the correct answer turned out to be! Was it >> Washington or Moscow? >> >> John K Clark >> >> >> > > Even though there a mystery (*noumenality*) to matter, I can understand > how mathematics (arithmetic) comes out of matter better than how matter (or > an immaterial conception of matter) comes out of (an immaterial) > mathematics. > > > > No problem. I can explain why you will need a non computationalist theory > of mind. > > Given that there is no evidence at all for primary matter, nor for a non > computationalist theory of mind, that seems very speculative to me. > > I am aware that many materialist use (explicitly or implicitly) a > mechanist theory of mind, but I can explain why materialism (or > physicalism) is (are) incompatible with Indexical Digital Mechanism. (The > doctrine that the brain function is Turing emulable at *some* level of > description). > > Bruno > > >
I have been working on a Note "Realistic Computationalism" - a variation of Galen Strawson's "Realistic Monism": Galen Strawson *Realistic Monism* http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s0/Realistic-Monism---Why-Physicalism-Entails-Panpsychism-Galen-Strawson.pdf cf. http://www.academia.edu/25420435/Physicalist_panpsychism_2017_draft Realistic Computationalism incorporates Strawson's concept of material *experientiality*. I will post a draft here. - pt > > > > > Even in science there is the idea that matter is *what there is* and has > always been *what there is*. > > > Why did matter form after the big bang? > <https://www.quora.com/Why-did-matter-form-after-the-big-bang> > [image: Viktor T. Toth] <https://www.quora.com/profile/Viktor-T-Toth-1> > Viktor T. Toth <https://www.quora.com/profile/Viktor-T-Toth-1>, IT pro, > part-time physicist > Answered Sep 5 > <https://www.quora.com/Why-did-matter-form-after-the-big-bang/answer/Viktor-T-Toth-1> > > Matter did not form after the Big Bang. > > The fields of the Standard Model, i.e., all the matter that there is, have > always been part of the universe, even in the earliest moment of its > existence. Sure, these fields evolved over time, as the temperature and > pressure decreased, electroweak symmetry breaking took place, then baryons, > and later atoms, formed, and further cooling allowed those atoms to > coalesce into molecules. But *all the matter was always there*. > > - pt > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
