On 9/17/2018 2:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Sep 2018, at 22:31, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
On 9/16/2018 11:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. I can explain why you will need a non computationalist theory of
mind.
Given that there is no evidence at all for primary matter, nor for a non
computationalist theory of mind, that seems very speculative to me.
I am aware that many materialist use (explicitly or implicitly) a mechanist
theory of mind, but I can explain why materialism (or physicalism) is (are)
incompatible with Indexical Digital Mechanism. (The doctrine that the brain
function is Turing emulable at *some* level of description).
But it seems to me that a subconscious is incompatible with your theory of mind.
By definition of computationalism, if there is a subconscious related to the
brain, it will “survive” in the digital emulation of the brain.
So far as I can see you only propose to explain conscious thought as
computation, i.e. some computations instantiate conscious thoughts and some
don't.
Yes, but the theory use the fact that computability is an absolute notion, and
that provability, consistency, definability, are relative notion.
In the five hypostases: everything comes from the nuance imposed on []p (that is
[]p & p, etc.)
Consciousness is defined by true, non provable, non dubitable, immediately
knowable, and non definable. All universal machine are confronted with this.
Identify a person with its set of beliefs, and I study ideally correct machine
(on arithmetic and on themselves).
But it appears that many, if not most, of our thinking is subconscious. Where
in your theory is this distinction encoded?
By the fact that no machine knows which machine she is, nor which number
relation she is. Consciousness is only the part which is true, immediately
knowable, non definable, etc.
The closer to consciousness, but still 3p, is “consistency”. But consciousness is even closer
to the lodange of the “[]p & p” mode, that is <>p v p, or even better <>p v
true(p). The or can be shown non constructive, and the true(p) is not definable, by Tarski,
making consciousness (like knowledge) not definable.
“Subconscious” can be defined by sleeping subroutine, of by secondary activity
on which attention is not focused.
Which I think is the crux of the question. What is attention and how is
it implemented in your theory? It seems that humans do most of their
thinking subconsciously. If physics is emulated in computationalism,
then subconscious thinking would be realized in the physics, but not in
the consciouness. Right?
Brent
If you have a better definition, a more freudian one, if correct, the digital
copy will obey to it, unless computationalism is false.
Bruno
Brent
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