> On 18 Sep 2018, at 02:17, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 9/17/2018 2:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 16 Sep 2018, at 22:31, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 9/16/2018 11:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> No problem. I can explain why you will need a non computationalist theory >>>> of mind. >>>> >>>> Given that there is no evidence at all for primary matter, nor for a non >>>> computationalist theory of mind, that seems very speculative to me. >>>> >>>> I am aware that many materialist use (explicitly or implicitly) a >>>> mechanist theory of mind, but I can explain why materialism (or >>>> physicalism) is (are) incompatible with Indexical Digital Mechanism. (The >>>> doctrine that the brain function is Turing emulable at *some* level of >>>> description). >>> But it seems to me that a subconscious is incompatible with your theory of >>> mind. >> By definition of computationalism, if there is a subconscious related to the >> brain, it will “survive” in the digital emulation of the brain. >> >> >> >> >>> So far as I can see you only propose to explain conscious thought as >>> computation, i.e. some computations instantiate conscious thoughts and some >>> don't. >> Yes, but the theory use the fact that computability is an absolute notion, >> and that provability, consistency, definability, are relative notion. >> >> In the five hypostases: everything comes from the nuance imposed on []p >> (that is []p & p, etc.) >> >> Consciousness is defined by true, non provable, non dubitable, immediately >> knowable, and non definable. All universal machine are confronted with this. >> Identify a person with its set of beliefs, and I study ideally correct >> machine (on arithmetic and on themselves). >> >> >> >> >>> But it appears that many, if not most, of our thinking is subconscious. >>> Where in your theory is this distinction encoded? >> By the fact that no machine knows which machine she is, nor which number >> relation she is. Consciousness is only the part which is true, immediately >> knowable, non definable, etc. >> >> The closer to consciousness, but still 3p, is “consistency”. But >> consciousness is even closer to the lodange of the “[]p & p” mode, that is >> <>p v p, or even better <>p v true(p). The or can be shown non constructive, >> and the true(p) is not definable, by Tarski, making consciousness (like >> knowledge) not definable. >> >> “Subconscious” can be defined by sleeping subroutine, of by secondary >> activity on which attention is not focused. > > Which I think is the crux of the question. What is attention and how is it > implemented in your theory?
“My theory” is only that it is implemented. How? We don’t need to know this to derive physics and test the theory. The" how” is a problem in IA. It is interesting, but not relevant for shaping the metaphysics with Mechanism. > It seems that humans do most of their thinking subconsciously. If you put the firing of the neurons in the subconscious, that becomes trivial. There are not much things that a brain can understand about its own functioning. We can only bet on some level of substitution. No need to understand a brain for copying it. > If physics is emulated in computationalism, then subconscious thinking > would be realized in the physics, but not in the consciouness. Right? Disambiguing this in a favorable interpretation, I would say yes. Anything a brain does, if relevant for consciousness, will be done in an apparent physical reality. But of course there is only numbers/combinators, and the physical reality becomes. A fist person plural reality, where the “duplication” are contagious to anything an observer can interact with, a bit like in Everett. Bruno > > Brent > >> If you have a better definition, a more freudian one, if correct, the >> digital copy will obey to it, unless computationalism is false. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
