> On 18 Sep 2018, at 02:17, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 9/17/2018 2:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 16 Sep 2018, at 22:31, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 9/16/2018 11:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> No problem. I can explain why you will need a non computationalist theory >>>> of mind. >>>> >>>> Given that there is no evidence at all for primary matter, nor for a non >>>> computationalist theory of mind, that seems very speculative to me. >>>> >>>> I am aware that many materialist use (explicitly or implicitly) a >>>> mechanist theory of mind, but I can explain why materialism (or >>>> physicalism) is (are) incompatible with Indexical Digital Mechanism. (The >>>> doctrine that the brain function is Turing emulable at *some* level of >>>> description). >>> But it seems to me that a subconscious is incompatible with your theory of >>> mind. >> By definition of computationalism, if there is a subconscious related to the >> brain, it will “survive” in the digital emulation of the brain. >> >> >> >> >>> So far as I can see you only propose to explain conscious thought as >>> computation, i.e. some computations instantiate conscious thoughts and some >>> don't. >> Yes, but the theory use the fact that computability is an absolute notion, >> and that provability, consistency, definability, are relative notion. >> >> In the five hypostases: everything comes from the nuance imposed on []p >> (that is []p & p, etc.) >> >> Consciousness is defined by true, non provable, non dubitable, immediately >> knowable, and non definable. All universal machine are confronted with this. >> Identify a person with its set of beliefs, and I study ideally correct >> machine (on arithmetic and on themselves). >> >> >> >> >>> But it appears that many, if not most, of our thinking is subconscious. >>> Where in your theory is this distinction encoded? >> By the fact that no machine knows which machine she is, nor which number >> relation she is. Consciousness is only the part which is true, immediately >> knowable, non definable, etc. >> >> The closer to consciousness, but still 3p, is “consistency”. But >> consciousness is even closer to the lodange of the “[]p & p” mode, that is >> <>p v p, or even better <>p v true(p). The or can be shown non constructive, >> and the true(p) is not definable, by Tarski, making consciousness (like >> knowledge) not definable. >> >> “Subconscious” can be defined by sleeping subroutine, of by secondary >> activity on which attention is not focused. > > Which I think is the crux of the question. What is attention and how is it > implemented in your theory?
“My theory” is only that it is implemented. How? We don’t need to know this to derive physics and test the theory. The" how” is a problem in IA. It is interesting, but not relevant for shaping the metaphysics with Mechanism. > It seems that humans do most of their thinking subconsciously. If you put the firing of the neurons in the subconscious, that becomes trivial. There are not much things that a brain can understand about its own functioning. We can only bet on some level of substitution. No need to understand a brain for copying it. > If physics is emulated in computationalism, then subconscious thinking > would be realized in the physics, but not in the consciouness. Right? Disambiguing this in a favorable interpretation, I would say yes. Anything a brain does, if relevant for consciousness, will be done in an apparent physical reality. But of course there is only numbers/combinators, and the physical reality becomes. A fist person plural reality, where the “duplication” are contagious to anything an observer can interact with, a bit like in Everett. Bruno > > Brent > >> If you have a better definition, a more freudian one, if correct, the >> digital copy will obey to it, unless computationalism is false. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
