> On 14 Sep 2018, at 16:09, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 4:28 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >>> Speed is a physical attribute. > > >>Then numbers are physical attributes too because 1 Hydrogen atom behaves > >>differently than 2 Hydrogen atoms. > > >The number of atoms is physical, yes, but that does not mean that a number > >is physical per se. > > Why not? You say speed is physical and speed modifies matter (2 electrons > that collide slowly behave differently than 2 electrons that collide swiftly) > and its exactly the same with numbers, they also modify matter (2 electrons > behave differently than 1 electron). > > I also note that you claim nonphysical calculations can be performed, but you > also say space and time and even spacetime are physical, so how can you have > change without them and how can you have calculations without change?
The changes are digital, discrete. You can use the natural numbers to quantify them. No need to presuppose a physical universe. >> >> >>>>Wow, even qualia is matter! >> >> >>>Yes, >> >> >>So now qualia, the last remaining holdout, joins the ranks of "physical >> >>attributes" and the term loses the last shred of meaning it had. >> >> >Please quote the whole sentence. Qualia are physical sensatio > Electromagnetic waves of 650 nanometers is physical , the color red is a > qualia and can be produced without Electromagnetic waves of any sort. One reason more to understand that the qualia can raise just with any number relations mimicking the relevant brain parts relation in arithmetic. > > >The greeks... > > ....were ignoramuses that only the foolish believe can cast any light on > modern cutting edge scientific questions. > > >In your Aristotelian metaphysics, I guess .... > > ... I guess Aristotle was the worst physicist who ever lived and only fools > with crackpot ideas think that referring to him and other ancient Greeks in > every other sentence helps to bolster their cause. Yes, and in the frame of mechanism his theology is as bad, but then it seems you accept it. If some primary matter is at play for consciousness, can you explain what role it has, and what it is? You, see , the problem is that either your explanation is based on computationalism, but then it will work also to explain consciousness in arithmetic, or you will introduce something non Turing emulable, but then you can no more say “yes”to the doctor. > > >Still the same confusion between a computation (a purely mathematical > >notion) and a physical computation, > > I'm not confused at all, I'm very clear on the fact that a "purely > mathematical notion of computation" can't compute a damn thing A notion of computation does not compute. A Turing machine or a number, or a combinator compute, with respect to some universal number. That follows from the definition of Turing, Post, Kleene, Davis, etc. You are not criticising me. You are criticising the whole field of mathematical logic. > anymore than the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London. The analogy does not work. A machine is more than a blueprint. The proposition phi_i(j) converge is a (sigma_1) proposition of arithmetic, and it is true or false, independently of your or me. > > > I must say I was disappointed you didn't comment on my discovery of "banana > indeterminacy" that stands with your own discovery of "first person > indeterminacy. I repeat it here: > > This is not limited just to issues concerning mind or consciousness. There is > also no algorithm for answering the question "what one and only one thing > will happen to one banana after one banana becomes 2 bananas?". And the > reason there is no such algorithm for a mind or a banana is exactly the same, > it is a idiotic question. That analogy does not work either, because there is no notion of first person associated with banana. But the step 3 can be done with robots instead of human, and if you disbelieve in first person indeterminacy, tell me how you program the robot so that he is able to predict the results of opening the door after pushing on the button. The robot survive, by computationalism (or even without in this case), and the robot can predict with certainty that he will not write in his personal diary that he is seeing both city at once, so the prediction can only be W or M, as “W” (res. “M”) alone will be contradicted by the corresponding doppelgänger, which we have to take into account by the definition given of first person. So, if you have an algorithm just show it to us. The question makes sense, as you have agreed that we survive such an experience, and you agreed that any copies will not be directly aware of the other copies, —they differentiate once the box is open. So, there is no first person experience of being in the two cities. To be in only one city is thus true for both copies, and is a predicted with certainty in Helsinki. So which one will it be? What is your technic of prediction? Bruno > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
