Hi all—I've been lurking for awhile and this isn't my primary field, but I
work in digital humanities and literary studies, and I've been working on
conceptualizing the connections between coding,
mathematics/philosophy/logic, and literature.
I'm not convinced one way or the other yet about materialist/idealist
ontologies, but does someone here have a sense of the role of
symbols/letters in the equation? For example, any "code" or "math" that we
say is computable is notated as:
2 + 2 = 4
print("hello world!")
...but regardless if this is "immaterial" or "material", we still say use
letters/symbols/glyphs to represent them. Moreover, the actual notation is
arbitrary, but for our purposes, it's not clear if humans could compute
anything without this kind of notation-based logic.
Interestingly, letters are scalable, but they also can be homoglyphs
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homoglyph>—symbols that look like each other
but aren't necessarily so. In many fonts the Greek letter 'Α', the Cyrillic
letter 'А' and the Latin letter 'A' are visually identical, as are the
Latin letter 'a' and the Cyrillic letter 'а',
Using homoglyphs, we can create a trick by which 1 = 0:
0000 0000
0000 00 00
0000 00 00
0000 00 00
0000 ======= 00 00
0000 00 00
0000 ======= 00 00
0000 00 00
0000 00 00
0000 00 00
0000 0000
Before you dismiss this as totally trivial, let us remember that even
"standard" letter notation is basically the same, where "1" and "0" are
both merely made up of the same kinds of subatomic particles and energy.
Moreover, we might imagine a "letter" that is composed of a computable
function in the form of a string, and if we create a different "letter"
with the same computable string, then they would be isomorphic functions
that are embedded in different symbols.
I have more to say, but I'm really curious if anyone here has particular
insight into this. Thanks!
On Tuesday, September 18, 2018 at 12:18:07 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 2:00 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be
> <javascript:>> wrote:
>
>
> >>Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos,
>>> gravitational waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the
>>> change can't be with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with
>>> respect to what?
>>
>>
>
> *The state of a Turing machine with respect to the universal number which
>> implements it,*
>>
>
> The state of a Turing machine is matched to a number and always has and
> always will be matched that very same number forever. Nothing changes.
>
>
>> > *equivalently, a computation can be defined by [...]*
>>
>
> Definitions are a dime a dozen. I don't want you to define a computation
> made without matter, I want you to perform a calculation without matter.
>
> > *I define a universal machinery by* [blah blah]
>>
>
> Definitions are a bore . SHOW ME!
>
> >> how can you make a calculation without changing something?
>>
>>
>> *>Are you assuming time to be fundamental? In GR,*
>>
>
> GR assumes Spacetime is fundamental.
>
>
>> *>there is a notion of block universe, where time can be defined
>> indexically.*
>>
>
> Yes, the block universe is a 4D non-Euclidean shape, so every spot on the
> time axis corresponds to a 3D shape and every 3D shape corresponds to a
> spot on the time axis, so without time and space, which is physical, the
> block universe would not exist.
>
> > >yet you agree that "even qualia is matter”.
>>
>>
>> >*It is intelligible matter.*
>>
>
> I don't think qualia is matter, I think qualia is what matter does.
>
> >>note that the brain is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>>
>>
>> >*Yes, no problem with this. But that does not make the matter of our
>> brain fundamental,*
>>
>
> Fundamental or not a brain needs computation, and computation needs
> change, and change needs matter. The trouble with arithmetic is it doesn't
> change.
>
> > If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of,
>>
>>
>> *>That was not asked. The question is why do you assume this for saying
>> that material brain can have consciousness but the immaterial one in
>> arithmetic can’t.*
>>
>
> Because consciousness can change with time and in fact if it doesn't then
> consciousness stops. Matter can change with time too but arithmetic can't.
>
> *> You cannot invoke a God, nor any metaphysical ontological assumption,
>> to select a computation in arithmetic*
>>
>
> Bruno, if you want to convince me you're unlikely to do it with yet
> another reference to God, if you really want to do that find some dusty old
> ancient Greek that agrees with you. Now that would do the trick!
>
>
>> >*Then tell me what the Helsinki guy can expect.*
>>
>
> By "Helsinki guy" I mean anyone who remembers being the Helsinki guy, but
> nobody INCLUDING YOU knows what you mean by "the Helsinki guy", all I know
> is you demand the name of one and only one city even though "the Helsinki
> guy" duplicating machines are involved. Therefore I am unable to do what
> you request because I don't understand what the hell you're requesting.
>
> >>There is no there there. If you could specify who exactly what "the
>>> first person" is in a world that contains "the first person" duplicating
>>> machines I might perhaps be able to tell you what I think about it, but
>>> until then the idea is far worse than just being wrong, it is gibberish.
>>
>>
>> >*You are the only person I know who does not understand this.*
>>
>
> Then with the exception of me everybody you know is a uncritical thinker.
> Understanding gibberish is not a virtue.
>
> > *I remind you that you have agreed that the Helsinki guy does not die
>> in that process,*
>>
>
> That's because I know what I mean by "the Helsinki guy" so I can figure
> out if he dies or not, but if there is a God even He doesn't know what you
> mean by the term.
>
> >>I predict that before the doors open there will only be one conscious
>>> mind regardless of how many brains have been duplicated. And I predict the
>>> moment the doors are opened revealing 2 different things there will be 2
>>> conscious minds. And I predict the mind that observes Moscow will become
>>> the Moscow Man. And I predict the mind that observes Washington will
>>> become the Washington Man. And there is nothing more to predict.
>>
>>
>> >*That is a description of the protocol which remain true for everyone,
>> notably both copies. But each copies will realised that they were unable to
>> predict that very city they see now,*
>>
>
> What are you talking about? I predicted the guy who saw Moscow would
> become the Moscow guy and the guy who saw Washington would become the
> Washington
> guy, and that is exactly precisely what happened. And don't complain that's
> a tautology, it's your thought experiment and your question not mine. It's
> not my fault you asked a stupid question.
>
>
>> >*and both identify themselves with the Helsinki guy,*
>>
>
> And that also was 100% predictable.
>
>
>> > *and understand now (hopefully) what the question was about.*
>>
>
> I didn't understand the question before I was duplicated and being
> duplicated will not bring enlightenment to either of us.
>
> >>I will show you such a algorithm as soon as you show me a algorithm to
>>> determine what one and only one thing will happen to 1 banana after 1
>>> banana becomes 2 bananas.
>>
>>
>> > *Using the bananas illustrate only that you miss the first person
>> account, on which the probability is asked for.*
>>
>
> Regardless of if X stands for a banana or one of the 7.5 billion "the
> first persons" on the Earth at the current time, if X becomes 2 X it's
> brain dead dumb to ask what one and only one thing will happen to X.
>
> >>But even then you'd have no way of knowing if my prediction turned out
>>> to be correct or not because even after the "experiment" is long over
>>> you *STILL* couldn't say if the correct prediction turned out to be
>>> Moscow or Washington.
>>
>>
>> >*That is why the only way to solve the problem is in asking the reports
>> of all copies.*
>>
>
> But you have demanded over and over for years the name of one and only
> one city. It's your "experiment" and its all over now so you tell me, what
> one and only one city turned out to be correct?
>
> > *That is why we say that a prediction is correct when it is verified by
>> all copies,*
>>
>
> The prediction can never be correct, and doing the "experiment" and then
> just looking won't help figure out what the correct answer turned out to be
> because you have no idea what the question was or what you're trying to
> predict. And I don't even understand why you're so obsessed with prediction
> when that has nothing to do with our sense of self, we get that by looking
> into the past and a good thing too because nobody can look into the future.
>
>
>
>> > like the prediction “I will see one city”.
>>
>
> And you have no idea who Mr. I is either, not if there are Mr. I
> duplicating machines.
>
> >>I have agreed that if survival today means being able to remember being
>>> the Helsinki Man yesterday and somebody remembers today then the Helsinki
>>> Man has survived today. And obviously if that's what the word means and if
>>> we have Helsinki Man duplicating machines then the Helsinki Man will have
>>> more than one path into the future.
>>
>>
>> >*Yes, and the question is what the probability of such path.*
>>
>
> Obviously there is a 100% chance the Helsinki Man will see both cities, a
> 0% chance the Moscow Man will see Washington and a 0% chance the Washington
> Man will see Moscow. And there is nothing else to predict.
>
> >>Do you agree there is a first person experience of the Helsinki Man
>>> being in Moscow and (not or, AND) a first person experience of the Helsinki
>>> man being in Washington?
>>
>>
>> *>Yes, that is what I have called the 3-1 view,*
>>
>
> And I just call that the Helsinki Man, the 3-1 crap adds nothing.
>
> >but the question is on the very 1-view themselves.
>>
>
> Which one of the two "1-views themselves" do you want to know about? If
> you say "both" you can't still demand one and only one answer unless logic
> means nothing to you. Don't you think the fact that you can't answer the
> question even AFTER the "experiment" is over is a pretty good indication
> that it's not a experiment at all and the question makes no sense?
>
>
>> >*the question is about what to expect in Helsinki, given that we know
>> that there will be two futures, but only one from all first person
>> experiences accessible from Helsinki.*
>>
>
> If the question was not gibberish you could forget about theories and
> philosophy and metaphysics and simply perform the experiment and tell me
> the one and only one city name that turned out to be correct, but you can't
> do that. The conclusion is obvious.
>
>
>> >>Forget prediction and forget theories too, this can be solved
>>> empirically. You've already completed the thing that you claim is a
>>> experiment so you tell me what the correct answer turned out to be! Was
>>> it Washington or Moscow?
>>
>>
>> >*It was Washington for he Helsinki guy reconstitute in Washington, and
>> he admit he could not have predict this in Helsinki. The same for the
>> Moscow guy.*
>>
>
> Well maybe that's true, maybe the Helsinki man was unable to predict that,
> but then the Helsinki man is a idiot. I am not a idiot so I could have
> predicted it. Not that prediction has anything to do with the sense of self.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
On Tuesday, September 18, 2018 at 12:18:07 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 2:00 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be
> <javascript:>> wrote:
>
>
> >>Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos,
>>> gravitational waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the
>>> change can't be with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with
>>> respect to what?
>>
>>
>
> *The state of a Turing machine with respect to the universal number which
>> implements it,*
>>
>
> The state of a Turing machine is matched to a number and always has and
> always will be matched that very same number forever. Nothing changes.
>
>
>> > *equivalently, a computation can be defined by [...]*
>>
>
> Definitions are a dime a dozen. I don't want you to define a computation
> made without matter, I want you to perform a calculation without matter.
>
> > *I define a universal machinery by* [blah blah]
>>
>
> Definitions are a bore . SHOW ME!
>
> >> how can you make a calculation without changing something?
>>
>>
>> *>Are you assuming time to be fundamental? In GR,*
>>
>
> GR assumes Spacetime is fundamental.
>
>
>> *>there is a notion of block universe, where time can be defined
>> indexically.*
>>
>
> Yes, the block universe is a 4D non-Euclidean shape, so every spot on the
> time axis corresponds to a 3D shape and every 3D shape corresponds to a
> spot on the time axis, so without time and space, which is physical, the
> block universe would not exist.
>
> > >yet you agree that "even qualia is matter”.
>>
>>
>> >*It is intelligible matter.*
>>
>
> I don't think qualia is matter, I think qualia is what matter does.
>
> >>note that the brain is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>>
>>
>> >*Yes, no problem with this. But that does not make the matter of our
>> brain fundamental,*
>>
>
> Fundamental or not a brain needs computation, and computation needs
> change, and change needs matter. The trouble with arithmetic is it doesn't
> change.
>
> > If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of,
>>
>>
>> *>That was not asked. The question is why do you assume this for saying
>> that material brain can have consciousness but the immaterial one in
>> arithmetic can’t.*
>>
>
> Because consciousness can change with time and in fact if it doesn't then
> consciousness stops. Matter can change with time too but arithmetic can't.
>
> *> You cannot invoke a God, nor any metaphysical ontological assumption,
>> to select a computation in arithmetic*
>>
>
> Bruno, if you want to convince me you're unlikely to do it with yet
> another reference to God, if you really want to do that find some dusty old
> ancient Greek that agrees with you. Now that would do the trick!
>
>
>> >*Then tell me what the Helsinki guy can expect.*
>>
>
> By "Helsinki guy" I mean anyone who remembers being the Helsinki guy, but
> nobody INCLUDING YOU knows what you mean by "the Helsinki guy", all I know
> is you demand the name of one and only one city even though "the Helsinki
> guy" duplicating machines are involved. Therefore I am unable to do what
> you request because I don't understand what the hell you're requesting.
>
> >>There is no there there. If you could specify who exactly what "the
>>> first person" is in a world that contains "the first person" duplicating
>>> machines I might perhaps be able to tell you what I think about it, but
>>> until then the idea is far worse than just being wrong, it is gibberish.
>>
>>
>> >*You are the only person I know who does not understand this.*
>>
>
> Then with the exception of me everybody you know is a uncritical thinker.
> Understanding gibberish is not a virtue.
>
> > *I remind you that you have agreed that the Helsinki guy does not die
>> in that process,*
>>
>
> That's because I know what I mean by "the Helsinki guy" so I can figure
> out if he dies or not, but if there is a God even He doesn't know what you
> mean by the term.
>
> >>I predict that before the doors open there will only be one conscious
>>> mind regardless of how many brains have been duplicated. And I predict the
>>> moment the doors are opened revealing 2 different things there will be 2
>>> conscious minds. And I predict the mind that observes Moscow will become
>>> the Moscow Man. And I predict the mind that observes Washington will
>>> become the Washington Man. And there is nothing more to predict.
>>
>>
>> >*That is a description of the protocol which remain true for everyone,
>> notably both copies. But each copies will realised that they were unable to
>> predict that very city they see now,*
>>
>
> What are you talking about? I predicted the guy who saw Moscow would
> become the Moscow guy and the guy who saw Washington would become the
> Washington
> guy, and that is exactly precisely what happened. And don't complain that's
> a tautology, it's your thought experiment and your question not mine. It's
> not my fault you asked a stupid question.
>
>
>> >*and both identify themselves with the Helsinki guy,*
>>
>
> And that also was 100% predictable.
>
>
>> > *and understand now (hopefully) what the question was about.*
>>
>
> I didn't understand the question before I was duplicated and being
> duplicated will not bring enlightenment to either of us.
>
> >>I will show you such a algorithm as soon as you show me a algorithm to
>>> determine what one and only one thing will happen to 1 banana after 1
>>> banana becomes 2 bananas.
>>
>>
>> > *Using the bananas illustrate only that you miss the first person
>> account, on which the probability is asked for.*
>>
>
> Regardless of if X stands for a banana or one of the 7.5 billion "the
> first persons" on the Earth at the current time, if X becomes 2 X it's
> brain dead dumb to ask what one and only one thing will happen to X.
>
> >>But even then you'd have no way of knowing if my prediction turned out
>>> to be correct or not because even after the "experiment" is long over
>>> you *STILL* couldn't say if the correct prediction turned out to be
>>> Moscow or Washington.
>>
>>
>> >*That is why the only way to solve the problem is in asking the reports
>> of all copies.*
>>
>
> But you have demanded over and over for years the name of one and only
> one city. It's your "experiment" and its all over now so you tell me, what
> one and only one city turned out to be correct?
>
> > *That is why we say that a prediction is correct when it is verified by
>> all copies,*
>>
>
> The prediction can never be correct, and doing the "experiment" and then
> just looking won't help figure out what the correct answer turned out to be
> because you have no idea what the question was or what you're trying to
> predict. And I don't even understand why you're so obsessed with prediction
> when that has nothing to do with our sense of self, we get that by looking
> into the past and a good thing too because nobody can look into the future.
>
>
>
>> > like the prediction “I will see one city”.
>>
>
> And you have no idea who Mr. I is either, not if there are Mr. I
> duplicating machines.
>
> >>I have agreed that if survival today means being able to remember being
>>> the Helsinki Man yesterday and somebody remembers today then the Helsinki
>>> Man has survived today. And obviously if that's what the word means and if
>>> we have Helsinki Man duplicating machines then the Helsinki Man will have
>>> more than one path into the future.
>>
>>
>> >*Yes, and the question is what the probability of such path.*
>>
>
> Obviously there is a 100% chance the Helsinki Man will see both cities, a
> 0% chance the Moscow Man will see Washington and a 0% chance the Washington
> Man will see Moscow. And there is nothing else to predict.
>
> >>Do you agree there is a first person experience of the Helsinki Man
>>> being in Moscow and (not or, AND) a first person experience of the Helsinki
>>> man being in Washington?
>>
>>
>> *>Yes, that is what I have called the 3-1 view,*
>>
>
> And I just call that the Helsinki Man, the 3-1 crap adds nothing.
>
> >but the question is on the very 1-view themselves.
>>
>
> Which one of the two "1-views themselves" do you want to know about? If
> you say "both" you can't still demand one and only one answer unless logic
> means nothing to you. Don't you think the fact that you can't answer the
> question even AFTER the "experiment" is over is a pretty good indication
> that it's not a experiment at all and the question makes no sense?
>
>
>> >*the question is about what to expect in Helsinki, given that we know
>> that there will be two futures, but only one from all first person
>> experiences accessible from Helsinki.*
>>
>
> If the question was not gibberish you could forget about theories and
> philosophy and metaphysics and simply perform the experiment and tell me
> the one and only one city name that turned out to be correct, but you can't
> do that. The conclusion is obvious.
>
>
>> >>Forget prediction and forget theories too, this can be solved
>>> empirically. You've already completed the thing that you claim is a
>>> experiment so you tell me what the correct answer turned out to be! Was
>>> it Washington or Moscow?
>>
>>
>> >*It was Washington for he Helsinki guy reconstitute in Washington, and
>> he admit he could not have predict this in Helsinki. The same for the
>> Moscow guy.*
>>
>
> Well maybe that's true, maybe the Helsinki man was unable to predict that,
> but then the Helsinki man is a idiot. I am not a idiot so I could have
> predicted it. Not that prediction has anything to do with the sense of self.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
--
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