> On 15 Sep 2018, at 22:56, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, September 15, 2018 at 10:27:07 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: > On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 12:22 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > >>> you claim nonphysical calculations can be performed, but you also say > >>> space and time and even spacetime are physical, so how can you have > >>> change without them and how can you have calculations without change? > > >> The changes are digital, discrete. > > Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos, gravitational > waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the change can't be > with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with respect to what? > And how can you make a calculation without changing something? > > >>Electromagnetic waves of 650 nanometers is physical , the color red is a > >>qualia and can be produced without Electromagnetic waves of any sort. > > >One reason more to understand that the qualia can raise just with any number > >relations mimicking the relevant brain parts relation in arithmetic. > > And yet you agree that "even qualia is matter". And please note that in a MRI > scanner similar parts of the brain light up when one sees a red lights and > when one just thinks about a red light. And also note that the brain is made > of matter that obeys the laws of physics. > > >If some primary matter is at play for consciousness, can you explain what > >role it has, and what it is? > > If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of, if I could > it wouldn't be primary. And if it's primary then it's needed to perform > calculations. And after saying consciousness is the way that data feels when > it is being processed there is simply nothing more that can be said about > consciousness. > > >>the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London. > > >The analogy does not work. A machine is more than a blueprint. > > A machine needs 2 things, data and matter. The blueprints supply the data but > I can't fly to London on half a machine. > > >But the step 3 can be done with robots instead of human, and if you > >disbelieve in first person indeterminacy, > > I don't believe in "first person indeterminacy" and I don't disbelieve in it > either because there is nothing in it to believe or disbelieve. There is no > there there. If you could specify who exactly what "the first person" is in a > world that contains "the first person" duplicating machines I might perhaps > be able to tell you what I think about it, but until then the idea is far > worse than just being wrong, it is gibberish. > > > tell me how you program the robot so that he [....] > > As always in your thought "experiments" the gibberish kicks in immediately. > Right at the start you postulate a world that contains both "THE" and "HE" > duplicating machines so your reference to "the" robot and "he" no longer > refers to anything unique. > > > is able to predict the results of opening the door after pushing on the > > button. > > Well I predict that before the doors open there will only be one conscious > mind regardless of how many brains have been duplicated. And I predict the > moment the doors are opened revealing 2 different things there will be 2 > conscious minds. And I predict the mind that observes Moscow will become the > Moscow Man. And I predict the mind that observes Washington will become the > Washington Man. And there is nothing more to predict. > > > The robot survive, by computationalism (or even without in this case), and > > the robot can predict with certainty that he will not write in his personal > > diary that he is seeing both city at once, > > No, that is incorrect, "THE robot" can't predict that and neither can anybody > else because you haven't specified what or who the prediction is supposed to > be about. > > > So, if you have an algorithm just show it to us. > > I will show you such a algorithm as soon as you show me a algorithm to > determine what one and only one thing will happen to 1 banana after 1 banana > becomes 2 bananas. But even then you'd have no way of knowing if my > prediction turned out to be correct or not because even after the > "exparament" is long over you STILL couldn't say if the correct prediction > turned out to be Moscow or Washington. And that my dear Bruno is why this > isn't a exparament at all and it's not even a thought exparament, it is just > a showcase displaying your massive confusion and the difficulty you have in > handling philosophical matters. > > >The question makes sense, as you have agreed that we survive such an > >experience, > > I have agreed that if survival today means being able to remember being the > Helsinki Man yesterday and somebody remembers today then the Helsinki Man has > survived today. And obviously if that's what the word means and if we have > Helsinki Man duplicating machines then the Helsinki Man will have more than > one path into the future. However I no longer know what you mean by "survive" > and I don't think you know either. > > >and you agreed that any copies will not be directly aware of the other > >copies, > > Yes. > > >they differentiate once the box is open. > > Yes > > > So, there is no first person experience of being in the two cities. > > That depends entirely on what first person experience you're talking about. > Do you agree there is a first person experience of the Helsinki Man being in > Moscow and (not or, AND) a first person experience of the Helsinki man being > in Washington? If you don't agree to that then I no longer know what you mean > by "the Helsinki Man". > > > To be in only one city is thus true for both copies, and is a predicted > > with certainty in Helsinki. So which one will it be? What is your technic > > of prediction? > > Why ask me? Forget prediction and forget theories too, this can be solved > empirically. You've already completed the thing that you claim is a > exparament so you tell me what the correct answer turned out to be! Was it > Washington or Moscow? > > John K Clark > > > > > Even though there a mystery (noumenality) to matter, I can understand how > mathematics (arithmetic) comes out of matter better than how matter (or an > immaterial conception of matter) comes out of (an immaterial) mathematics.
No problem. I can explain why you will need a non computationalist theory of mind. Given that there is no evidence at all for primary matter, nor for a non computationalist theory of mind, that seems very speculative to me. I am aware that many materialist use (explicitly or implicitly) a mechanist theory of mind, but I can explain why materialism (or physicalism) is (are) incompatible with Indexical Digital Mechanism. (The doctrine that the brain function is Turing emulable at *some* level of description). Bruno > > > > Even in science there is the idea that matter is what there is and has always > been what there is. > > > Why did matter form after the big bang? > <https://www.quora.com/Why-did-matter-form-after-the-big-bang> > <https://www.quora.com/profile/Viktor-T-Toth-1> > Viktor T. Toth <https://www.quora.com/profile/Viktor-T-Toth-1>, IT pro, > part-time physicist > Answered Sep 5 > <https://www.quora.com/Why-did-matter-form-after-the-big-bang/answer/Viktor-T-Toth-1> > <>Matter did not form after the Big Bang. > > The fields of the Standard Model, i.e., all the matter that there is, have > always been part of the universe, even in the earliest moment of its > existence. Sure, these fields evolved over time, as the temperature and > pressure decreased, electroweak symmetry breaking took place, then baryons, > and later atoms, formed, and further cooling allowed those atoms to coalesce > into molecules. But all the matter was always there. > > > - pt > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
