> On 18 Sep 2018, at 18:17, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 2:00 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > >>Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos, > >>gravitational waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the > >>change can't be with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with > >>respect to what? > > The state of a Turing machine with respect to the universal number which > implements it, > > The state of a Turing machine is matched to a number and always has and > always will be matched that very same number forever. Nothing changes.
You can say the same for your state here and now. But consciousness is not supported by the state, but by the sequence of states, or more exactly, the logical relation brought by a universal machine relating those states. Your critics invalidate any block-view of reality. Are you, like Prigogine, assuming a fundamental time? > > > equivalently, a computation can be defined by [...] > > Definitions are a dime a dozen. I don't want you to define a computation made > without matter, I want you to perform a calculation without matter. I don’t need to perform them, but we need a correct definition so that you can grasp that all computations are done in arithmetic, in the block-manner. Time is an internal indexical, and matter arise from the relative statistics on all computations. > > > I define a universal machinery by [blah blah] > > Definitions are a bore . SHOW ME! That is just ridiculous. Without agreeing on what is a computation, This discussion can hardly no sense. You show that your goal is mockery, and not understanding. > > >> how can you make a calculation without changing something? > > >Are you assuming time to be fundamental? In GR, > > GR assumes Spacetime is fundamental. > > >there is a notion of block universe, where time can be defined indexically. > > Yes, the block universe is a 4D non-Euclidean shape, so every spot on the > time axis corresponds to a 3D shape and every 3D shape corresponds to a spot > on the time axis, so without time and space, which is physical, the block > universe would not exist. > > > >yet you agree that "even qualia is matter”. > > >It is intelligible matter. > > I don't think qualia is matter, I think qualia is what matter does. > > >>note that the brain is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. > > >Yes, no problem with this. But that does not make the matter of our brain > >fundamental, > > Fundamental or not a brain needs computation, and computation needs change, > and change needs matter. Human computation? Yes. But as I say, that does not make matter fundamental. Which was the point. > The trouble with arithmetic is it doesn't change. Nor do a block universe; > > > If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of, > > >That was not asked. The question is why do you assume this for saying that > >material brain can have consciousness but the immaterial one in arithmetic > >can’t. > > Because consciousness can change with time and in fact if it doesn't then > consciousness stops. Matter can change with time too but arithmetic can’t. Nor do a block universe. > > > You cannot invoke a God, nor any metaphysical ontological assumption, to > > select a computation in arithmetic > > Bruno, if you want to convince me you're unlikely to do it with yet another > reference to God, You were the one invoking your god. > if you really want to do that find some dusty old ancient Greek that agrees > with you. Now that would do the trick! > > >Then tell me what the Helsinki guy can expect. > > By "Helsinki guy" I mean anyone who remembers being the Helsinki guy, but > nobody INCLUDING YOU knows what you mean by "the Helsinki guy", all I know is > you demand the name of one and only one city even though "the Helsinki guy" > duplicating machines are involved. You agreed that P(x) = 1 for the Helsinki guy if x is realised in both place. Cf the coffee offered to both copies. The Helsinki guy know that he will be duplicated, and that both copies will be in once place. So P(x) = 1 with x = “being in once place”. > Therefore I am unable to do what you request because I don't understand what > the hell you're requesting. Just ask the copies, they know well what they are living. It strikes the eyes even more if you iterate the experience. Wat I request is that you tell me what the H-guy can expect to live as experience (not where his soul and bodies are from the third person perspective. You have already said that the H-guy survives, and we know that from the 1p view, it can only be in one place (for both copies). So, we understand that its diary cannot contain an exact prediction, unless it contains some (non constructive) “or”. > > > >>There is no there there. If you could specify who exactly what "the first > >>person" is in a world that contains "the first person" duplicating machines > >>I might perhaps be able to tell you what I think about it, but until then > >>the idea is far worse than just being wrong, it is gibberish. > > >You are the only person I know who does not understand this. > > Then with the exception of me everybody you know is a uncritical thinker. > Understanding gibberish is not a virtue. No, it is very easy, but you are stuck for some reason. > > > I remind you that you have agreed that the Helsinki guy does not die in > > that process, > > That's because I know what I mean by "the Helsinki guy" so I can figure out > if he dies or not, So. > but if there is a God even He doesn't know what you mean by the term. ? > > >>I predict that before the doors open there will only be one conscious mind > >>regardless of how many brains have been duplicated. And I predict the > >>moment the doors are opened revealing 2 different things there will be 2 > >>conscious minds. And I predict the mind that observes Moscow will become > >>the Moscow Man. And I predict the mind that observes Washington will > >>become the Washington Man. And there is nothing more to predict. > > >That is a description of the protocol which remain true for everyone, > >notably both copies. But each copies will realised that they were unable to > >predict that very city they see now, > > What are you talking about? I predicted the guy who saw Moscow would become > the Moscow guy and the guy who saw Washington would become the Washington guy, Sure, but that is tautological. The prediction is on which guy you can expect to be, from Helsinki. > and that is exactly precisely what happened. And don't complain that's a > tautology, it's your thought experiment and your question not mine. It's not > my fault you asked a stupid question. It is no more a tautology when the prediction is asked to the Helsinki guy. Saying the one in M see M, and the one in W see W is again a 3-1p description, not a 1p-description. > > >and both identify themselves with the Helsinki guy, > > And that also was 100% predictable. Yes, but from the 1p, after pushing the button, with will admit that the symmetry is broken, and this in a way they were unable to predict with certainty in Helsinki. > > > and understand now (hopefully) what the question was about. > > I didn't understand the question before I was duplicated and being duplicated > will not bring enlightenment to either of us. Try to think a bit more, or consider the n-iterated version. Let us ask the guy who has the history: WWWMWMMWMMMMWWMMMMMWWMWMWMMWW what he expects. > > > >>I will show you such a algorithm as soon as you show me a algorithm to > >>determine what one and only one thing will happen to 1 banana after 1 > >>banana becomes 2 bananas. > > > Using the bananas illustrate only that you miss the first person account, > > on which the probability is asked for. > > Regardless of if X stands for a banana or one of the 7.5 billion "the first > persons" on the Earth at the current time, if X becomes 2 X it's brain dead > dumb to ask what one and only one thing will happen to X. That is refuted by both copies, trivially. > > >>But even then you'd have no way of knowing if my prediction turned out to > >>be correct or not because even after the "experiment" is long over you > >>STILL couldn't say if the correct prediction turned out to be Moscow or > >>Washington. > > >That is why the only way to solve the problem is in asking the reports of > >all copies. > > But you have demanded over and over for years the name of one and only one > city. Yes. The H-guy know that after pushing the button, he will get coffee (P(drinking-coffee) = 1) in one and only one city (P(seeing one city from its first person view) = 1. > It's your "experiment" and its all over now so you tell me, what one and only > one city turned out to be correct? > > > That is why we say that a prediction is correct when it is verified by all > > copies, > > The prediction can never be correct, Good. I guess you mean a definite prediction. The “W v M” prediction is 100% correct, but both prediction “W” and “M” are incorrect indeed. > and doing the "experiment" and then just looking won't help figure out what > the correct answer turned out to be because you have no idea what the > question was or what you're trying to predict. False. > And I don't even understand why you're so obsessed with prediction when that > has nothing to do with our sense of self, we get that by looking into the > past and a good thing too because nobody can look into the future. This you will probably need step 4, 5, … to grasp. > > > like the prediction “I will see one city”. > > And you have no idea who Mr. I is either, not if there are Mr. I duplicating > machines. > > >>I have agreed that if survival today means being able to remember being the > >>Helsinki Man yesterday and somebody remembers today then the Helsinki Man > >>has survived today. And obviously if that's what the word means and if we > >>have Helsinki Man duplicating machines then the Helsinki Man will have more > >>than one path into the future. > > >Yes, and the question is what the probability of such path. > > Obviously there is a 100% chance the Helsinki Man will see both cities, a 0% > chance the Moscow Man will see Washington and a 0% chance the Washington Man > will see Moscow. And there is nothing else to predict. When you say that the H-man will see both cities, do you mean that he will see both cities at once. In that case he could write W & M in the diary in Helsinki. But let us listen to the copies: The W-guy says, “no I was wrong I see only once city” The M-guy says “no I was wrong I see only once city”. > > >>Do you agree there is a first person experience of the Helsinki Man being > >>in Moscow and (not or, AND) a first person experience of the Helsinki man > >>being in Washington? > > >Yes, that is what I have called the 3-1 view, > > And I just call that the Helsinki Man, the 3-1 crap adds nothing. Of course if you don’t grasp the difference between 3p and 1p, I can do nothing for you. > > >but the question is on the very 1-view themselves. > > Which one of the two "1-views themselves" do you want to know about? If you > say "both" you can't still demand one and only one answer unless logic means > nothing to you. Don't you think the fact that you can't answer the question > even AFTER the “experiment" Both can. The point is that they give different and of course incompatible answer. But that is normal, by Mechanism and the duplication. > is over is a pretty good indication that it's not a experiment at all and the > question makes no sense? > > >the question is about what to expect in Helsinki, given that we know that > >there will be two futures, but only one from all first person experiences > >accessible from Helsinki. > > If the question was not gibberish you could forget about theories and > philosophy and metaphysics and simply perform the experiment and tell me the > one and only one city name that turned out to be correct, but you can't do > that. The conclusion is obvious. You eliminate the first person experience. You are simply denying the experience of the copies. Suddenly they have become zombie. That corroborate the idea that you have expressed when saying that he H-guy is dead, but then that contradict computationalisme. You keep asking me a 3p answer, when the question is about the expected 1p experience. Bruno > > >>Forget prediction and forget theories too, this can be solved empirically. > >>You've already completed the thing that you claim is a experiment so you > >>tell me what the correct answer turned out to be! Was it Washington or > >>Moscow? > > >It was Washington for he Helsinki guy reconstitute in Washington, and he > >admit he could not have predict this in Helsinki. The same for the Moscow > >guy. > > Well maybe that's true, maybe the Helsinki man was unable to predict that, > but then the Helsinki man is a idiot. I am not a idiot so I could have > predicted it. Not that prediction has anything to do with the sense of self. > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
