On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 11:20:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 28 Sep 2018, at 13:02, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 3:07:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 27 Sep 2018, at 21:41, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, September 27, 2018 at 7:44:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability >>> theory and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject of >>> programming language theory (*PLT*). >>> >>> Any entry point is OK. >>> >>> https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory >>> >>> >>> Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go >>> back into mathematica logic. >>> >>> >>> >>> No problem with this. I guess you appreciate topos theory and >>> intutionistic logic, but as I said to Bruce, machine’s theology, even >>> without oracle (but even more with oracle) is necessarily non constructive. >>> I am aware that some people, like the French logicians Jean-Yves Girard, >>> or Jean-Louis Krivine tried to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to >>> classical logic. If they succeed, PLT might have application in theology, >>> but a lot of works would have to be done before. >>> >>> If you follow the combinators thread, at some point I might talk about >>> typed combinators and constructive logics, but mainly to point out how much >>> non constructive theoretical computer needs to be. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >> The debate of arithmetical realism (arithmeticalism) vs. material realism >> (materialism) is a continuation of the older immaterialism vs. materialism >> type debates: It will just evolve. >> >> For materialists, arithmetic is genre of fiction - a useful one. Why does >> math describe what matter does? *Because matter has a programmatic >> nature*. >> >> >> And a non programmatic aspect to, at least phenomenologically, like the >> quantum indeterminacy confirmed. It has to ben due to the fact that a >> universal machine is emulate by infinities of programs in arithmetic. >> >> >> >> >> But matter includes both informationality and experientiality, >> >> >> Why? Primary matter is the devoid of structure, if not it is hardly >> conceivable as being primary. >> >> >> >> >> the latter seemingly missing from arithmetic. >> >> >> Not at all. Arithmetic contains all possible self-reflecting machines >> (and other entities) which all have the same fundamental theology, which >> contains a theory of soul, knowledge and consciousness. The only problem is >> that such a theory does not allowed magical identity link between a mind >> and a piece of matter. A piece of matter is a view from inside arithmetic >> on infinitely many computations. That is already deducible from the first >> seven steps of the argument presented in the SANE papers. >> >> >> >> >> >> From "The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics" there could be an >> approach for how experientiality could come from arithmetic. >> >> >> Yes indeed. >> >> >> >> >> It could be interesting for PLT research (where modal logics are also >> used). >> >> >> >> That is the crux of the matter. Before I though that the ontology could >> be any extension of arithmetic. Since then I know that we cannot ad an >> infinity axiom, like set theory, still less use the whole of Mathematics, >> like Tegmark did at the beginning (but he has corrected this since, but is >> stilll missing the FPI and the whole theology of numbers). What is nice for >> philosophers, is that Mechanism pick up precise modal logics imposed to >> incompleteness. That is nice, because there are *many* modal logics (and >> weak logics) possible/ Mechanism, simply thanks to computer science, put a >> lot of structure in the internal view of arithmetic possible for universal >> machine, including the separation of what is shamble (quanta) and what is >> not sharable (qualia). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > > > On the programmatic nature of the quantum substrate, if one allows for *real > randomness and retrodependency* > > > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/03/16/mirror-mirror/ > > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/25/retrosignaling-in-the-quantum-substrate/ > > then quantum programming is just another programming. > > (It is a strange superstition that physicists have to be allergic to > randomness and retrodependency.) > > > But programs live in the material world in the following sense: *A > simulation is not a synthesis.* > > > ? > > Programs, Turing machine, combinators, have been discovered purely > mathematically, and shown to exist already in all models of any theory of > arithmetic, or in any model of any Turing complete theory. > > (I use “model” in the logician sense, it means mainly an interpretation of > a theory). > > Bruno > >
My claim: Synthetic biology changes the definition of "program". > > If I have a synbio (synthetic biology) program for a life form that could > attack a disease, if it is just transformed into a simulation that runs in > a MacBook, it me does no good. But it could via a biocompiler/assembler be > transformed to an object that "runs" inside me. > > > > - pt > > - > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
