> On 28 Sep 2018, at 13:02, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 3:07:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 27 Sep 2018, at 21:41, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, September 27, 2018 at 7:44:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability >>> theory and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject of >>> programming language theory (PLT). >>> >>> Any entry point is OK. >>> >>> https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books >>> <https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books> >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory> >>> >>> >>> Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go back >>> into mathematica logic. >> >> >> No problem with this. I guess you appreciate topos theory and intutionistic >> logic, but as I said to Bruce, machine’s theology, even without oracle (but >> even more with oracle) is necessarily non constructive. >> I am aware that some people, like the French logicians Jean-Yves Girard, or >> Jean-Louis Krivine tried to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to classical >> logic. If they succeed, PLT might have application in theology, but a lot of >> works would have to be done before. >> >> If you follow the combinators thread, at some point I might talk about typed >> combinators and constructive logics, but mainly to point out how much non >> constructive theoretical computer needs to be. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> The debate of arithmetical realism (arithmeticalism) vs. material realism >> (materialism) is a continuation of the older immaterialism vs. materialism >> type debates: It will just evolve. >> >> For materialists, arithmetic is genre of fiction - a useful one. Why does >> math describe what matter does? Because matter has a programmatic nature. > > And a non programmatic aspect to, at least phenomenologically, like the > quantum indeterminacy confirmed. It has to ben due to the fact that a > universal machine is emulate by infinities of programs in arithmetic. > > > > >> But matter includes both informationality and experientiality, > > Why? Primary matter is the devoid of structure, if not it is hardly > conceivable as being primary. > > > > >> the latter seemingly missing from arithmetic. > > Not at all. Arithmetic contains all possible self-reflecting machines (and > other entities) which all have the same fundamental theology, which contains > a theory of soul, knowledge and consciousness. The only problem is that such > a theory does not allowed magical identity link between a mind and a piece of > matter. A piece of matter is a view from inside arithmetic on infinitely many > computations. That is already deducible from the first seven steps of the > argument presented in the SANE papers. > > > > >> >> From "The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics" there could be an >> approach for how experientiality could come from arithmetic. > > Yes indeed. > > > > >> It could be interesting for PLT research (where modal logics are also used). > > > That is the crux of the matter. Before I though that the ontology could be > any extension of arithmetic. Since then I know that we cannot ad an infinity > axiom, like set theory, still less use the whole of Mathematics, like Tegmark > did at the beginning (but he has corrected this since, but is stilll missing > the FPI and the whole theology of numbers). What is nice for philosophers, is > that Mechanism pick up precise modal logics imposed to incompleteness. That > is nice, because there are *many* modal logics (and weak logics) possible/ > Mechanism, simply thanks to computer science, put a lot of structure in the > internal view of arithmetic possible for universal machine, including the > separation of what is shamble (quanta) and what is not sharable (qualia). > > Bruno > > > > > > > On the programmatic nature of the quantum substrate, if one allows for real > randomness and retrodependency > > > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/03/16/mirror-mirror/ > > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/25/retrosignaling-in-the-quantum-substrate/ > > then quantum programming is just another programming. > > (It is a strange superstition that physicists have to be allergic to > randomness and retrodependency.) > > > But programs live in the material world in the following sense: A simulation > is not a synthesis.
? Programs, Turing machine, combinators, have been discovered purely mathematically, and shown to exist already in all models of any theory of arithmetic, or in any model of any Turing complete theory. (I use “model” in the logician sense, it means mainly an interpretation of a theory). Bruno > > If I have a synbio (synthetic biology) program for a life form that could > attack a disease, if it is just transformed into a simulation that runs in a > MacBook, it me does no good. But it could via a biocompiler/assembler be > transformed to an object that "runs" inside me. > > > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
