> On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, September 26, 2018 at 11:46:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 25 Sep 2018, at 21:20, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 12:01:22 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 25 Sep 2018, at 15:35, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 7:12:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 24 Sep 2018, at 07:28, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 10:55:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> Mind is what a brain does >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >And walking and running is what the legs do. >>>>>>>> There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except >>>>>>>> for some pair of legs to be doing it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) >>>>>>>> to do it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt >>>>>>> that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain >>>>>>> or some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical >>>>>>> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than >>>>>>> Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or >>>>>>> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a >>>>>>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your >>>>>>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a >>>>>>> mistake in my argument, without using your ontological commitment >>>>>>> (which would beg the question). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Up to now, you have failed to that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument >>>>>>> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning >>>>>>> based purely on numbers, combinators, etc.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> <https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> via https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 >>>>>>> <https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and >>>>>>> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness, but a >>>>>>> materialism (one greater than physicalism) that is based on >>>>>>> experientiality (qualitative states and language) in addition to >>>>>>> informationality, may be.” >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which >>>>>> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. >>>>>> Many believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they >>>>>> are logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to >>>>>> arithmetic “seen from inside”. >>>>>> >>>>>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through >>>>>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically >>>>>> predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort >>>>>> of knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical >>>>>> appearance from that theory of consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ >>>>>> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 >>>>>> <https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714> ] to >>>>>> summarize in my own words the Goff view. >>>>>> >>>>>> I elaborate further in my previous post here on Realistic >>>>>> Computationalism: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> By Pure Computationalism [ >>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems >>>>>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems> ] I >>>>>> mean that everything >>>>> >>>>> Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> can be seen as computation with quantitative information (numbers, >>>>>> basically) alone. >>>>>> >>>>>> Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with >>>>>> (pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness >>>>>> (Goff, Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation. >>>>>> >>>>>> But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> At this stage materialism and physicalism can be identified, and we can >>>>> add nuances later. >>>>> >>>>> But with computationalism, neither materialism (even weak, the belief in >>>>> some matter not reducible to something else) nor physicalism are >>>>> consistent with Mechanism. A short argument can be find here: >>>>> >>>>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th >>>>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, >>>>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004. >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >>>>> >>>>> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html> >>>>> (sane04) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> More details are given here: >>>>> >>>>> Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. >>>>> Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 >>>>> >>>>> Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in >>>>> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> As far as I can tell from the summaries: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S007961071300028X >>>>> <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S007961071300028X> >>>>> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0079610715000887 >>>>> <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0079610715000887> >>>>> >>>>> Realistic Computationalism (RealComp) is still greater than Pure >>>>> Computationalism (PureComp, or just Comp, which includes all in the above >>>>> two references) >>>>> >>>>> and it is basically Philip Goff's view: >>>>> >>>>> PureComp emulates how things behave, but not how they are in themselves. >>>> >>>> Good. In arithmetic computable entails arithmetic, but most attribute of >>>> the computable thing are not computable, that is why the machine will be >>>> identify with her beliefs, and this makes each machine very different, >>>> that is how consciousness differentiate in arithmetic to begin with. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> In your Progress in Biophysics & Molecular Biology papers (which I'd like >>>> to see), >>> >>> Just ask. I will send you some papers I have published there. >>> >>> >>> >>>> it would be interesting to see how this relates to reflection (the subject >>>> beginning with Brian Cantwell Smith's fundamental thesis) in programming >>>> language theory. (This is the study of code that is "self-aware", can >>>> reason about and modify itself, etc.) >>> >>> Are you talking about FOL and its lisp-like tower?. That is an interesting >>> (albeit a bit naive metaphysically) approach. If you like Smith, you should >>> like the general (and much older) theory, which is actually the theory of >>> any universal machine when studying itself. But Smith belongs to the >>> mechanist family, no doubt. >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> In the case of consciousness, if it is something beyond pure informational >>>> processing - which a lot of physicists think physics just is (Tegmark, >>>> Carroll, ...) - it could be that chemistry and/or biology is not reducible >>>> to physics = not reducible to pure informational processing. >>>> >>>> This is called nonreductive materialism. >>> >>> You might read the sane paper (already available on my URL, see above). >>> Mechanism protects the machine from (basically) all reductionism, >>> including the 19th century conception of machine and numbers, and it shows >>> rather directly that (reductive and non reductive) materialism are both >>> inconsistent with mechanism. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> If you have PDFs of >>> >>> >>> Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. >>> Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 >>> >>> Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in >>> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. >>> >>> I will read those [ email: cloudversed at gmail dot com ]. >> >> >> Done. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> I have read >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >>> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html> >>> >>> Two points: >>> >>> 1. Nonreductive materialism holds that physicalism is false. >>> see, for example, https://people.umass.edu/lrb/files/bak06agaM.pdf >>> <https://people.umass.edu/lrb/files/bak06agaM.pdf> >> >> Indeed. But Comùputationalism, aka Digital Mechanism, makes all form of >> metaphysical materialism either inconsistent or spurious (like involving >> involving epicycles or worst “invisible horses”, violating Occam in a some >> strong sense). >> >> >> >>> >>> (Physicalism came from the idea that everything can be reduced to physics, >>> which turns out to be models of purely quantitative information. See >>> Tegmark's Mathematical Universe.) >> >> That can be a subject of discussion later. Tegmark’s form of mathematicalism >> is still physicalism, although not materialism. But he has progressed toward >> computationalism, certainly. >> >> >>> >>> 2. A computation (what I call real computation) that incorporates >>> experiential states (e-states) in addition to informational states >>> (i-states) would be be different from any i-state-only computation >> >> Very good! That is recovered in the discourse of the machine which >> introspect itself (in the the Gödel-Kleene mathematical precise). To confuse >> a i-state-only and a e-state, is akin to a confusion between first person >> and third person, or a confusion between []p and []p & p. That is also part >> of the debate between in between the neoplatonist theologians. A good book >> illustrating this “Ancient Epistemology,” by Gerson (an expert on Plotinus). >> You might study my PDF on how I “translate” Plotinus in Arithmetic through >> the nuance brought by incompleteness on “provability”. Incompleteness makes >> it from the machine perspective into believability, and by disguishing truth >> and provability, it gives sense to the standard theory of knowledge of >> Theaetetus, and it enforces different logics and mathematics for >> believability, knowability, observability, sensibility. Incompleteness also >> divides those logics into a machine justifiable (and representational part) >> and a non justifiable part (still representational) added with non >> representational, non represensatble part. >> >> The observable is the invariant in the ‘bettable', on all (halting) >> computation (multiplied somehow by the non halting one), that is, with [] >> for Gödel’s beweisbar arithmetical modality (the “Löbian Machine”), what you >> can “meta-represent” through []p & <>t, and []p & <>t & p. I can motivate >> for those definition both through through experience, and by using the >> standard definition of the neoplatonist philosopher/théologian. >> >> >> >> >> >>> (that means any Turing or hyper-Turing or reflective-Turing machine, or >>> anything made of just "numbers”). >> >> Maybe you could define what you mean by hyper-Turing machine. I have heard >> different definitions. >> >> Nor am I sure what you mean by made of just numbers. What I assume is that >> there is a level of description of my “physical body” such that I would >> survive if my “physical body” is emulated at that level, and this relatively >> to the normal physical continuations. >> >> Many people miss that universal machine (sigma_1 complete theories are such) >> are confronted to the non computable, and the first person indeterminacy >> entails that below our substitution level, we are emulated by infinitely >> many universal number/machine. >> >> >> >> >>> The latter may emulate consciousness, but will not *be* conscious. >> >> Equivalently the consciousness weigh will be of measure null, may be, or you >> introduce weird zombies. >> >> Or you talk about the oracle, the gods are not conscious, I can make some >> sense of this, but I would judge all possible notion of oracle. The usual >> sigma_1 machine cannot distinguish an oracle with a machine more complex >> than itself. Yet by reasoning we can understand that the sigma_1 machine are >> confronted with some oracle, and “time” is a sort of halting oracle (yet not >> self-halting oracle) in the limit. >> >> People must be careful that the digital surgeon provides them with an >> authentic Turing machine, or combinator, or any universal number, and not >> with an hyper-Turing machine. >> >> >> >>> >>> (Whether a conscious brain can be be manufactured with totally different >>> elements depends on the e-states different matter can have.) >> >> >> I prefer to not assume matter. My point is that IF we can survive a digital >> brain transplant at some level, then physics is reduced to a statistics on >> first person experience on a universal dovetailing (aka the set of all true >> sigma_1 sentence structured by some modalities of self-reference. >> >> The beauty here is that G* shows that all modalities are confronted to the >> same (sigma_1) truth, but the machine cannot not structured in a non >> equivalent way (yet related). >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> We can only make things out of matter, and we can only make new matter with >>> the matter we have. >> >> >> I guess you have to say no to the digitalis surgeon. All what I say is IF >> Digital Mechanism is correct, then physics has to be extracted from the >> modalities of self-reference, and so we can test it. Up to now, the Matter >> modalities do obey quantum logics, and the hope is that they are enough >> “hilbertian” to have an equivalent of (arithmetic termed) Gleason theorem. >> >> Matter exists phenomenologically with Mechanism, but what exist >> ontologically is any term of any Turing complete theory, or Turing universal >> machine. >> >> It looks we might work in very different theory. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Thanks! >> >> By hyper-Turing I just mean computing related to doing hyperarithmetic (with >> Turing jumps, etc.) >> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperarithmetical_theory >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperarithmetical_theory> ]. > > > OK. Nice precision. Yes arithmetic is full of Gods (non Turing emulable > things, person persons). I would invoke them at the least resort, and most > still obeys to the same theology, that they are Löbian, and obeys to G and > G*, leading to similar physics than us, but at different level. That was seen > by Solovay already in his 1976 paper. Boolos explains some of them in his > 1993 book. > > >> >> I think a difference between universal computationalism (or pure >> computationalism) and real computationalism (the "real" word I take from >> Galen Strawson) is my real computationalism is something of a more practical >> (or pragmatist, or even engineering) perspective than a purely theoretical >> perspective: > > OK. My interest is pragmatical too, but probably more after death than > before, somehow. It is pragmatical too in the sense that learning to the > machine’s already existing, despite it still require studying mathematical > logic, provide a sort of etalon theology helming to compare the human > theology, especially that there is a theological trap, leading for example to > irrationalism in the field like when separated from science. > > My intellectual interest is in the mind-body problem, and who am I, what can > be expected, etc. > > I am humble enough to know that we cannot know the truth “for sure”, but with > mechanism, we get a pretty good collection of mathematical tools to put some > light (and see that things are more complicated than expected). > > > > >> >> PTLOS(π,λ,τ,ο,Σ) = program, language, >> transformer(compiler/assembler), object, substrate >> >> >> [ draft at >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ> >> to be updated soon ] > > OK. > > Bruno > > > > > > I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability theory > and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject of > programming language theory (PLT). > > Any entry point is OK. > > https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory > > > Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go back > into mathematica logic.
No problem with this. I guess you appreciate topos theory and intutionistic logic, but as I said to Bruce, machine’s theology, even without oracle (but even more with oracle) is necessarily non constructive. I am aware that some people, like the French logicians Jean-Yves Girard, or Jean-Louis Krivine tried to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to classical logic. If they succeed, PLT might have application in theology, but a lot of works would have to be done before. If you follow the combinators thread, at some point I might talk about typed combinators and constructive logics, but mainly to point out how much non constructive theoretical computer needs to be. Bruno > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
