> On 9 Oct 2018, at 16:09, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> On 8 Oct 2018, at 19:16, John Clark <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> On Mon, Oct 8, 2018 at 10:57 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> > What is a language for conscious agents (experiential modalities)? >> >> Intelligent behavior. >> >> > How do you compile them? >> >> There are 2 ways this can be done: >> 1) With a wet Turing Machine (aka a brain made of matter) >> 2) With a dry Turing Machine (aka a computer made of matter) >> >> Both methods work fine. > > That is fine FAPP.
Meaning: it is not fine when doing metaphysics with the scientific attitude. Especially there, we do not do any ontological commitment. You forget the fact that the physical reality is not the only thing capable of emulating Turing machine, the elementary arithmetical reality, in fact all models of Robinson Arithmetic, emulates all Turing machine. > > But you can invoke “matter” I meant, of course, you cannot invoke “matter” … (sorry). > if you want associate consciousness to that intelligent behaviour, because > the consciousness itself will have to associate itself with the infinitely > many computations, and matter has to be recovered from that (or you give a > special, non Turing emulable, role to that “intelligent behaviour”). And just that makes the naturalist/mechanist dichotomy testable empirically, and QM (without collapse) confirms much more mechanism than (weak) materialism or physicalism. > > Bruno > > Bruno > >> >> John K Clark >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
