> On 10 Oct 2018, at 03:16, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Tue, Oct 9, 2018 at 7:54 PM Pierz <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >I refuse to accept that "axiom", and I also do not feel compelled to embrace > >solipsism. > > You are able to function is the world so you must have some method of > deciding when something is conscious and when it is not, if its not > intelligent behavior what is it? > > > I think it is entirely possible - and indeed sensible - to believe that > > some entities that behave "intelligently", like the chess app on my iPhone, > > are insentient. > > I don't know what the quotation marks in the above means but if something > acts intelligently then it is sensible to say it has some degree of > sentience. > > > Whereas some entities that behave unintelligently (like Donald Trump > > (sorry, I really shouldn't)) are sentient. > > I admit it's a imperfect tool but it's all we've got and all we'll ever have > so we just have to make good with what we have. A failure to act > intelligently does not necessarily mean its non-sentient, perhaps both a rock > and Donald Trump are really brilliant but are just pretending to be stupid. > If so then both are conscious and both are very good actors. > > > The absence of an objective test for third-party sentience does not force > > one into solipsism. It may point to 1) a problem with your ontology (qualia > > aren't "real") > > That means nothing. I detect qualia from direct experience and that outranks > everything, it even outranks the scientific method; so if qualia isn't real > then nothing is real which would be equivalent to everything being real which > is equivalent to "real" having no meaning because meaning needs contrast. > > > or 2) a deficient state of knowledge wth respect to the (pre) conditions of > > consciousness. > > I don't know what that means either. > > > Seeing as you have no theory of consciousness at all, > > Yes I do. My theory is that consciousness is the way data feels when it is > being processed and that is a brute fact, meaning it terminates a chain of > "why is that?" questions.
How data process can detect a difference between a physical process and a digital process emulating the physical process at the relevant substitution level? Invoking an ontological commitment is indeed a way to stop a chain of question. God, or Matter made it. Nice. Bruno > > > statements like "you have no alternative but to..." don't have much force. > > There are plenty of alternatives, > > Name one! I ask once more, in you everyday life when you're not being > philosophical you must have some method of determining when something is > conscious, if its not intelligent behavior what on earth is it? > > > a refusal to engage it as a problem, in spite of the increasingly > > widespread acceptance among scientists that it is a real problem, and > > possibly the biggest problem of all in our current state of knowledge > > I think intelligence implies consciousness but consciousness does not > necessarily imply intelligence, so the problem I want answered is abut how > intelligence works not consciousness. > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
