> On 10 Oct 2018, at 03:16, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Oct 9, 2018 at 7:54 PM Pierz <pier...@gmail.com > <mailto:pier...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > >I refuse to accept that "axiom", and I also do not feel compelled to embrace > >solipsism. > > You are able to function is the world so you must have some method of > deciding when something is conscious and when it is not, if its not > intelligent behavior what is it? > > > I think it is entirely possible - and indeed sensible - to believe that > > some entities that behave "intelligently", like the chess app on my iPhone, > > are insentient. > > I don't know what the quotation marks in the above means but if something > acts intelligently then it is sensible to say it has some degree of > sentience. > > > Whereas some entities that behave unintelligently (like Donald Trump > > (sorry, I really shouldn't)) are sentient. > > I admit it's a imperfect tool but it's all we've got and all we'll ever have > so we just have to make good with what we have. A failure to act > intelligently does not necessarily mean its non-sentient, perhaps both a rock > and Donald Trump are really brilliant but are just pretending to be stupid. > If so then both are conscious and both are very good actors. > > > The absence of an objective test for third-party sentience does not force > > one into solipsism. It may point to 1) a problem with your ontology (qualia > > aren't "real") > > That means nothing. I detect qualia from direct experience and that outranks > everything, it even outranks the scientific method; so if qualia isn't real > then nothing is real which would be equivalent to everything being real which > is equivalent to "real" having no meaning because meaning needs contrast. > > > or 2) a deficient state of knowledge wth respect to the (pre) conditions of > > consciousness. > > I don't know what that means either. > > > Seeing as you have no theory of consciousness at all, > > Yes I do. My theory is that consciousness is the way data feels when it is > being processed and that is a brute fact, meaning it terminates a chain of > "why is that?" questions.
How data process can detect a difference between a physical process and a digital process emulating the physical process at the relevant substitution level? Invoking an ontological commitment is indeed a way to stop a chain of question. God, or Matter made it. Nice. Bruno > > > statements like "you have no alternative but to..." don't have much force. > > There are plenty of alternatives, > > Name one! I ask once more, in you everyday life when you're not being > philosophical you must have some method of determining when something is > conscious, if its not intelligent behavior what on earth is it? > > > a refusal to engage it as a problem, in spite of the increasingly > > widespread acceptance among scientists that it is a real problem, and > > possibly the biggest problem of all in our current state of knowledge > > I think intelligence implies consciousness but consciousness does not > necessarily imply intelligence, so the problem I want answered is abut how > intelligence works not consciousness. > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
