> On 21 Oct 2018, at 13:55, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 3:04:35 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 21 Oct 2018, at 06:47, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 5:55:46 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 10/20/2018 3:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem >>>> >>> unaware that we can doubt Aristotle theology. >>>> >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing. Your "Aristotle >>>> >> theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled >>>> >> "primary matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you >>>> >> believe in primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” >>>> > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that >>>> > “matter” is “primary matter”. >>>> >>>> No, they are not. It's simply irrelevant to them. They seek theories >>>> to explain phenomena. They don't start by assuming some metaphysics. >>>> They only care that the theory works. That's why it has been physicists >>>> like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work >>>> at all. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? >>>> >>>> The 3 mentioned above talked (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the >>>> time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, >>>> they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes >>>> about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics. >>> >>> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is "primary", >>> that there can be nothing more fundamental? No, he doesn't. He knows that >>> QM >>> and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that >>> explains both of them. Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"? >>> No. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386 >>> <https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386> >>> >>> Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll >>> >>> "Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … about >>> the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)" >>> re: Realism about the Wave Function >>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/ >>> <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/> >>> >>>> >>>> Every language has a metaphysics. >>>> >>>> - pt >>>> >>> >>> "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have >>> programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it >>> cannot propose a language for us to speak." >>> -- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language >>> [pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf >>> <http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf> >> >> >> Every language has an ontology, i.e. things it talks about. But that >> doesn't mean that it assumes those things are primary. Bruno wants to >> criticize physicists for assuming there's something he calls "primitive >> matter". But this is just his straw man. In fact physicists almost >> uniformly assume that the stuff in their theories has some deeper >> explanation and is NOT primary. There's a difference between saying a >> metaphysics assumes things and saying that it assumes things which are >> "primary". >> >> Brent >> >> >> >> My point is that all physicists assume a metaphysics whenever they >> articulate or adopt a theory, because all theory is expressed in a language. > > I am not sure of that. They do it like we all do it implicitly in our > everyday life, but I have no find a paper in physics, which use any > metaphysical hypothesis. It is only the materialist philosopher who does > that. Now, some physicists do make a bit of metaphysics after pension, or as > amateur, but then they are no more doing physics. They do > philosophy/metaphysics/theology. > > > > > Every physics paper (e.g. looking ones on arXiv) assume some metaphysics.
I doubt this. I agree most physicists might use one implicitly, but it does not appear as being used, except for the mind-brain identity thesis which is indeed used constantly, but in that case it is always Aristotle notion of primary physical object. This we use even when we do a cup of coffee. > There is the English (the natural language) in the paper, but there is the > mathematical language present there too (technically today written in > LaTeX:Mathematics [ https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/LaTeX/Mathematics ]). > Applying Rorty ("contingency of language") and Derrida ("metaphysics of > presence") reveals the (hidden) metaphysics in the combined > (natural+mathematical) languages. OK. > > It is generally not considered applying Rorty and or Derrida to mathematical > language, but mathematics is a language* too, like English. (or programming > languages for that matter). Mathematics is no more a language that physics. They use a mathematical language, but the mathematical language is independent of the choice of a theory (written in that mathematical language). We should always keep in mind the distinction between - a mathematical language (usually defined by some grammar which determine the well formed formula) - a mathematical theory. (A precise choice of some formula) - a model of that mathematical theory (a structure satisfying the axioms of a theory, with truth preserving inference rule). - a relation judged plausible between a model of a mathematical theory and a portion or an aspect of some “reality". Exemple: take arithmetic: - the mathematical language is given by -> f, E, A, “(“, “)”, x, y, z … (logical symbols) with “s”, “0”, “+”, “*” (arithmetical symbols) + the usual formation rule (if X and Y are formula, then X -> Y is a formula, etc.) - an arithmetical theory: here the one by Robinson, with only 7 axioms (chosen formula). 1) 0 ≠ s(x) 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y) 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 4) x+0 = x 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y) 6) x*0=0 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x + the inference rule of modus ponens - a model is given by any structure verifying (satisfying) the axioms and truth preserving rule. The standard model is the set N together with the usual addition and multiplication (but there are many models, not all isomorphic to the standard model). Bruno > > * technically, family of languages > > > > > > > > >> >> As for "primary matter" (in particular, the "primary" part) this is all I >> know about what that means: >> >> https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism >> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism> >> >> Hylomorphism, (from Greek hylē, “matter”; morphē, “form”), in philosophy, >> metaphysical view according to which every natural body consists of two >> intrinsic principles, one potential, namely, primary matter, and one actual, >> namely, substantial form. >> >> Matter and form, however, are not bodies or physical entities that can exist >> or act independently: they exist and act only within and by the composite. >> Thus, they can be known only indirectly, by intellectual analysis, as the >> metaphysical principles of bodies. >> >> >> What I call codicalism is basically a version of hylomorphism, except my >> "form" is "language", and there is no potential/actual distinction. > > I can be OK with this. We are ourself words in the biochemical language, > locally. But eventually we are the meaning of those words, and that meaning > is independent of the language. Locally and terrestrially, those words have > their importance of course. With mechanism, words like “body” “code”, > “numbers”, “finite 3p things” etc. are all kind of synonymous. > > Bruno > > > > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
