> On 30 Oct 2018, at 10:30, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 3:44:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 29 Oct 2018, at 12:04, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 5:05:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 28 Oct 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical >>>>> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before >>>>> humans, although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out >>>>> of time and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or >>>>> yesterday. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in >>>>> the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a >>>>> language that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”. >>>> >>>> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as >>>> true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars. >>>> >>>> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical >>>> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, >>>> which just means false (assuming Mechanism). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material >>>>> reality …. >>>> >>>> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any >>>> language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical >>>> reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to >>>> see this. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> (sort of like, In the beginning was The Word …) >>>> >>>> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism. >>>> >>>> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or >>>> physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that >>>> those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for >>>> centuries. >>>> >>>> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was >>>> contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps >>>> some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I >>>> doubt this too. >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ >>>>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/> ], written >>>>> by Mark Balaguer [ http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer >>>>> <http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer> ]. >>>> >>>> >>>> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime >>>> that there is a moon. >>>> >>>> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory >>>> in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. >>>> >>>> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an >>>> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of >>>> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short. >>>> >>>> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are >>>> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary >>>> test, done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. >>>> The multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum >>>> mechanics, is a normal happening in arithmetic. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in >>>> mathematics at some level of language: >>>> >>>> Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the >>>> question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth >>>> value, Rutgers, March 2013 >>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/ >>>> >>>> <http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/> >>>> >>>> As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as >>>> "reduction to physics: >>>> >>>> Against Fundamentalism.(2018) >>>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/ >>>> <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/> >>>> >>>> non-reductive materialism is in opposition to physicalism: >>>> >>>> "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which the >>>> objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they are >>>> genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at some >>>> other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. >>>> Non-reductive materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking >>>> the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the >>>> existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the >>>> terms canonically used for the basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor >>>> influentially argues this view, according to which empirical laws and >>>> explanations in "special sciences" like psychology or geology are >>>> invisible from the perspective of basic physics. A lot of vigorous >>>> literature has grown up around the relation between these views." >>>> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism >>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism> >>>> >>>> Materialism and physicalism are not the same thing. >>> >>> Indeed. Note that I use “materialism” in a weaker sense than usual. By >>> materialism, I mean the belief in primary matter. Then, depending on how >>> people define “primary matter”, this can be related with physicalisme. >>> Physicalism is the doctrine that all science are reducible in principle to >>> physics. >>> >>> All this is not so important, as Digital Mechanism makes even very weak >>> form of materialism and physicalism dubious. Mechanism leads to a reductive >>> ontology (what exists is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), …), but prevent any >>> effective reductionism of the phenomenologies. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Codicalism (all matter has codicality) is a variant of hylomorphism. There >>> is just matter, not a "pre" or "prime" or "primal" matter. >>> >>> https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism >>> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism> >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism> >>> >>> http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.2.Kinds.Matter.in.Aristotle.pdf >>> >>> <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.2.Kinds.Matter.in.Aristotle.pdf> >>> >>> >>> The objection i raise to a purely information (numbers) processing reality: >>> One can get all possible physics (or any science) theories out of it, and >>> all modal agent (self-references, beliefs, intentions) languages, but the >>> theories and languages are not the things. >> >> >> I agree with this. With mechanism, reality, whatever it is, is not pure >> information processing. Note that elementary arithmetic is already quite >> above what is accessible by information processing, and the phenomenological >> physical reality inherit that non computable aspect. >> On the century matter and physics emerges from one unique sum on all >> computations. It has to be the same physics for all machine. Physics becomes >> theory and machine independent. >> >> >> >> >>> One needs experience processing. Matter is the only candidate to substrate >>> both information and experience processing. >> >> Experience processing is explained by the relation between information >> processing and truth, which is above all form of information processing. >> >> Matter? I don’t know what it is, unless you mean what we observe, but up to >> know, machines observe the same matter, in a reality which dos not assume >> its primitive, ontological existence. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> By "information processing" I include all possible arithmetical and >> hyperarithmetical [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperarithmetical_theory >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperarithmetical_theory> ] (what other >> arithmetic is there beyond all that?) processing. > > That is way above Mechanism. I can understand the need if you want some > primitive matter to exist, but that will not be enough, I think. > > > What arithmetical processing is there beyond even hyperarithmetical > processing?
Hyperhyperarithmetical “processing”, or the full analytical hierarchy. Once you include the “gods” in the ontology, you get a lot of things ... > But in any case, arithmetical + hyperarithmetical processing does not cover > implementation of phenomenal experience (i.e. consciousness). For that, a > material substate is needed. How could matter helps. The (usual) mind-body problem is due to the commitment ontology in matter, I would say. Yet, you are right, in some reading of what you say, as the universal machine (the sigma_1 complete set) knows already that they have a soul, and that such a soul is not a machine, nor *anything* third person describable, or even first-person-plural describable. The machine already knows that their third person describable body is a tool. Unlike Searle, they don’t say “I am a brain”, they say “I have a brain”. You are coherent with the first half of my work, which shows that we cannot have Matter and Mechanism together, but the second part of my work can be annoying for your thesis, as I extract a bit of physics from arithmetic in the way imposed by Mechanism, and it leads to a non boolean quantum physics, making observation confirming more Mechanism than Weak Materialism (the hypothesis of “ontological”, “primitively existing” matter). Bruno > > > > > > > > >> >> But experience (consciousness) is outside all of that (Galen Strawson). > > That is true with mechanism too. The internal phenomenologies in arithmetic > are even above the “whole of mathematics” in case this can make sense. > > Bruno > > > > Mechanism is a form of processing that cannot be defined by > arithmetical+hyperarithmetical processing? > > > (By arithmetical processing I just mean Turing-machine processing of course. > Hyperarithmetical processing is being able to perform - if needed! - > infinitely iterated Turing jumps <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_jump>.) > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
